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Summary  
The aim of this research is to show the effects of financial liberalisation on emerging market 
economies, how these economies removed restrictions on financial institutions so that they can 
be globally integrated, and to show the flow of international finance in and out of a country. This 
research also illustrates how the financial system in these economies moved from being 
government-led to being market-led. The main finding of this research is that many countries 
failed to reap the benefits of liberalisation because of weaknesses in the regulatory structure, 
undercapitalised banks, volatile markets and contagion effects. The research concludes that the 
long-term gains of liberalisation certainly supersede short-term instability of liberalisation. Thus, 
for financial liberalisation to have predominantly positive effects, attention should be drawn to 
the importance of a more prudent regulatory and supervisory environment. Furthermore, 
financial liberalisation must be accompanied by a sound institutional infrastructure, proper 
conduct of monetary and fiscal policies, a reduction in corruption, and an increase in 
transparency. In addition, liberalisation should be a gradual process whereby the right measures 
are taken in the right sequence. 
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Overview  
 
The term ‘financial liberalisation’ is defined by various economists in different ways, yet they all 
arrive at the same meaning. For example, Patnaik (2011:1) states that  
 
financial liberalisation is used to cover a whole set of measures, such as the autonomy of the 
Central Bank from the government; the complete freedom of finance to move into and out of the 
economy, which implies the full convertibility of the currency; the abandonment of all “priority 
sector” lending targets; an end to government-imposed differential interest rate schemes; a freeing 
of interest rates; the complete freedom of banks to pursue profits unhindered by government 
directives; the removal of restrictions on the ownership of banks, which means de-nationalisation 
and full freedom for foreign ownership.  
 
While Baswir (2007:1) defines financial liberalisation as “an integrated part of overall economic 
liberalisation. Specifically, the objective of financial liberalisation is to promote the role of the 
market and to minimize the role of the state in determining who gets and gives credit and at 
what price”. Similarly, Baden (1996:2) advocates that “financial liberalisation means the removal 
of government ceilings on interest rates and of other controls on financial intermediaries. It is 
concerned with macroeconomic aggregates (interest rates, savings and investment) and 
conditions in formal financial markets”.  
 
Based on the above definitions, in the context of this thesis, financial liberalisation can be 
defined as the removal of various constraints in the financial sector such as the withdrawal of 
interest rate restrictions and deregulation of banks, combined with better monetary policy 
frameworks, to enhance development and growth in the financial sector. Financial liberalisation 
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brings both costs and benefits to emerging market economies. The potential benefits could be 
better mobilisation of savings, both local and foreign; higher economic growth; reduced poverty; 
and enhanced stability. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) concur that liberalisation enhances 
growth in an economy by allowing domestic and international firms to access their financial 
markets, and by improving the efficiency and corporate governance in domestic financial 
systems. However, the potential cost must be considered too. Following liberalisation, many 
developing countries found that their financial markets had become more unstable, and their 
financial institutions more fragile because of unfamiliar practices, excessive risk-taking and 
weaknesses in the regulatory structure.  
 
 The aim of this research is to show the effects of financial liberalisation on emerging market 
economies, how these economies removed restrictions on financial institutions so that they can 
be globally integrated, and to show the flow of international finance in and out of a country. This 
research also illustrates how the financial system in these economies moved from being 
government-led to being market-led. By ‘government-led’ is meant the extensive regulation, 
legislation and intervention by government on the domestic financial sector, for example, by 
restricting the allocation of credit through controls on prices and imposing several constraints on 
cross-country capital movements. A ‘market-led’ financial system is when agents of the markets 
(such as borrowers, investors and financial institutions) are seen as a driving force of the 
markets. The current research interprets data relating to the positive and adverse effects of 
financial liberalisation in emerging markets, with information being sourced from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Bank for International Settlements (BIS), South 
African Reserve Bank (SARB) and academic articles. Particular attention is paid to specific 
countries and banks where the positive or negative spin-offs of financial liberalisation were most 
pronounced. 
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 The main finding of this research is that liberalisation brings benefits to countries but in order to 
reap these benefits, countries must implement proper regulatory framework and legal 
structures. For financial liberalisation to have predominantly positive effects, it must be 
accompanied by a sound institutional infrastructure; the proper conduct of monetary and fiscal 
policies; a reduction in corruption; an increase in transparency; and vigilant prudential 
supervision. In addition, liberalisation should be a gradual process whereby the right measures 
are taken in the right sequence.  
 
 Chapter 1 reviews the need for regulation by central banks in order to counteract market failures 
and the common types of regulation that are at stake, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
these types of regulation. Furthermore, it explains the history of financial regulation before 
liberalisation. Chapter 1 also explains how developed economies were deregulated, touching on 
the forces that led to the move towards liberalisation.  
 
 In Chapter 2 the general characteristics of developing economies, and the rationale for 
liberalisation and the way in which it was typically implemented by these economies are 
discussed. The financial crises that ensued during the 1990s are described and the underlying 
reasons for the crises are analysed.  
 
 Chapter 3 is a review of the lessons learnt, and an analysis of the interrelationship between the 
conduct of policy and financial liberalisation. Attention is drawn to the importance of a more 
prudent regulatory and supervisory environment to prevent bank failures and systemic risks. In 
addition, international best practices and the manner in which they regulate market behaviour 
are explained. 
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 Chapter 4 concentrates on South Africa and contains a historical overview of its economic 
instability, explaining the impact of sanctions on the domestic economic environment. 
Furthermore, South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy, and its experience during the 
first ten years of liberalisation and thereafter is explained. The chapter sets out how South Africa 
modified its domestic financial sector by restructuring its policies in a sequential manner during 
liberalisation in order to maintain a stable economic and financial sector. 
 
 Finally, Chapter 5 presents the findings of the research and provides recommendations for an 
economy before it decides to liberalise and also makes suggestions for further research. 
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Chapter 1 
Financial regulation and financial liberalisation 
 
1.1 Why do banks and financial markets need to be regulated? 
 
The general consensus (BCBS (2010a); Aizenman (2009); Hoban (2010)) is that neither too 
much regulation nor too little is good for an economy. This is evidenced by a variety of financial 
crises and periods of instability that have occurred during the past decade or two. The 
uniqueness of banks lies in the financial services that they provide, their deposit-taking 
capabilities, and their ability to create deposit money in the process of making credit available to 
individuals and institutions. However, in answer to the question as to why regulation is needed, 
the conventional response is usually linked to bank instability. For example, regulation maintains 
public confidence and decreases the risk of a run on banks; it prevents banks from taking the 
type of risks that can cause economic instability. Since banks and financial markets have 
become more complex in their services, the need for regulation has become more important.  
 
Furthermore, because the central bank oversees the deposit insurance activities that protect 
depositors (some countries, such as South Africa, do not have deposit insurance), it creates a 
moral hazard on the banking side where banks pay too little attention to the risks they take. In 
addition, the central bank is a lender of last resort but it would generally accommodate banks, 
first, by utilising various facilities and instruments before lender-of-last resort facilities would be 
offered. It accommodates the regular cash needs of solvent banks and provides lender-of-last-
resort facilities to illiquid but solvent banks, or to insolvent banks that are “too big to fail” (in 
some cases banks that are “too big to fail” are allowed to fail if it would not pose a systemic risk 
to the financial system). Banks have to be regulated so that they do not take advantage of this 
facility by recklessly lending or borrowing, and thus exposing themselves and the economy to 
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risks. The payment system that central banks provide is a system that settles all payments 
made through banks. If a bank fails to meet its payment obligations, this can have a ripple effect 
throughout, and threaten the financial system (i.e., settlement risk). Therefore, the need for 
regulation is essential: it is necessary to counteract market failures to ensure stability and order 
in the financial markets. 
 
1.1.1 The role of the central bank, and ways in which it regulates banks and financial 
markets 
 
It is generally accepted that the main aim of a central bank’s policy interventions is to provide 
“stability in the purchasing power of the currency of the country, as well as in the workings of the 
financial system including the payments system” (White, 2009:4); to act as a lender of last 
resort; and to set the interest rate on cash reserves as a way of influencing the level of spending 
and, ultimately, of prices. No central bank can distance itself from the functioning of the financial 
markets if it is to execute its monetary policies in a satisfactory manner. Its first responsibility is 
to foster and maintain monetary stability (i.e., price stability) and financial system stability, which 
can be defined as the absence of systemic risks (i.e., a risk that affects an entire financial 
market or system, and not just specific participants (Investorwords (1999a)) in the financial 
system that can contribute to market failure. 
 
Bernanke (2011:12) states that “the objective of monetary policy should remain focused on 
macroeconomic objectives, while more-targeted micro-prudential and macro-prudential tools 
should be used to address developing risks to financial stability, such as excessive credit 
growth”. By contrast, Svensson (2011) maintains that the objective of monetary policy and that 
of financial stability are distinct. He explains that “monetary policy, in the form of flexible inflation 
targeting, has the objective of stabilising both inflation around the inflation target and resource 
utilisation around a sustainable level, while financial stability has the objective of maintaining 
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and promoting financial stability . . . through supervision, regulation and financial stability reports 
that may provide early warnings of stability threats”. However, he continues to explain that these 
policies need to work in harmony with one another as monetary policy affects the real economy 
and financial stability policy affects the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. Kamin et al. 
(1998:8) state that the “objective of monetary policy is to achieve sustainable economic growth 
with a reasonable level of internal and external stability”. Monetary policy enhances price 
stability by ensuring that markets are functioning in an efficient manner. Thus price stability, in 
turn, contributes to financial stability by anchoring inflation expectations, thus limiting 
uncertainties in the market arising from inflation. Tools that central banks use to conduct 
monetary policy include the following: 
 
• The accommodation rate: This is the official interest rate determined by the central 
bank. In South Africa the accommodation rate is called the ‘repurchase (repo) rate’. 
The official interest rate usually has an impact on economic activity and inflation 
through several means, which are known as the ‘transmission mechanism’ of monetary 
policy. Once the official interest rate is changed, banks react by also changing their 
prime lending rates. The change in the banks’ prime lending rate affects households, 
assets and shares, among other things. All these changes in the market will affect 
aggregate demand in the economy as spending patterns of consumers and firms may 
either increase or decrease. For example, if interest rates increase, then aggregate 
demand will decrease. Furthermore, the exchange rate may change in reaction to the 
new level of interest rates set by the central bank. The level of imports and exports will 
also be affected due to the changes in the exchange rate. Finally, the impact on 
aggregate demand may also affect gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation since 
too much demand can be inflationary.  
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 Cash reserve requirements and open-market operations are subservient to the aim of 
influencing the interest rate level through the accommodation rate. 
 
• Cash reserve requirement: This is where banks are obligated to hold cash reserves 
with the central bank. These reserves can be used if there is a change in domestic 
liquidity, for example, in the event of a financial crisis, or if a troubled bank is in need of 
funds. However, in a classical cash reserve system this tool is there to create a money-
market deficit. It is seldom used as an “operational tool” to influence the size of the 
money-market deficit, because that will imply changing the percentage regularly.  
 
• Open-market operation: This is another tool used by a central bank to influence the 
liquidity in the market by buying or selling securities. For example, if the central bank 
sells treasury bills or government bonds, business buys the paper “causing money 
market liquidity to tighten and money supply to decline” (Mboweni, 2002). 
 
Another function of a central bank (although not in all countries) is to act as a supervisor to 
banks. Since banks have the potential to generate instability, the central bank as bank 
supervisor ensures that they are adequately capitalised so that they are more solvent; it also 
ensures that banks comply with risk management procedures to determine and manage various 
risks. The methods of supervision that are used include off-site and on-site supervision. The off-
site approach is characterised by a set of statutory returns that a bank submits to the 
supervisor. This data is analysed by the supervisor who then provides the individual banks with 
feedback based on the data. The on-site supervisory approach is based on visits to the banks. 
A discussion with the bank’s service management is held, and an examination of the bank is 
completed and an opinion is formed based on the information gathered. The main reason for 
bank supervision lies in the various risks that banks take and the consequences for the whole 
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economy should things go wrong as a result. Therefore, supervision is aimed at enhancing 
proper risk management for credit risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, price risk and currency 
risk. 
 
The central bank may also conduct exchange rate policy which is “the policy of government 
towards the level of the exchange rate of its currency” (Farlex, 2008). There are different types 
of exchange rate regimes that can be adopted such as a fixed exchange rate and a floating 
exchange rate.  
 
A fixed exchange rate or pegged rate is a rate set by the central bank and maintained as the 
official exchange rate against a major world currency, while a floating exchange rate is 
determined by the private market through supply and demand. A floating rate is often termed 
“self-correcting”, as any differences in supply and demand will automatically be corrected in the 
market assuming the relevant price elasticities are sufficient (Investopedia, 2007). 
 
The reason why central banks adopt these exchange rate policies is that the exchange rate can 
have a profound impact on economic performance.  
 
The central bank is also a custodian of gold and foreign-exchange reserves, and manages them 
by maintaining foreign currency liquidity, assisting government with regard to external debt 
obligations and providing confidence to the markets in times of crisis when borrowing is limited.  
 
Along with ensuring stability in the economy, in some countries (e.g., South Africa) the central 
bank may also act as a banker, agent and adviser to the government. The central bank has the 
obligation to issue treasury securities on behalf of government, hold government’s deposit 
10 
 
accounts, which are used for receiving funds and making payments by government 
departments, and settling foreign currency transactions, among other things.1 
 
The central bank also plays a key role in adopting the macroprudential and micro-prudential 
policies. Macroprudential policy is concerned with the stability of the financial system and 
mitigating risks to the financial system, while a micro-prudential policy is aimed at the responses 
of an individual bank to exogenous risks and the prevention of failure of individual financial 
institutions. The central banks role is therefore to communicate information about financial 
stability and to provide information, analysis and recommendations about systemic risks.  
 
Another function of the central bank is that it is responsible for the safety and efficiency of the 
payment and settlement systems. Through this system the central bank ensures that there is 
reliable transfer of funds between participants in the financial system. Furthermore, the central 
bank is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the payment and settlement system, 
and monitors the operations of the payment and settlements system. 
 
All central banks collect and interpret economic data pertaining to various sectors of the 
economy. This function is important for monetary policy decisions, monitoring of exchange 
rates, economic analysis or outlook and the promotion of financial stability. Recently, central 
banks have begun using surveys as a method of collecting data to get more timely statistics.  
 
Other important functions of a central bank may include the issuing of banknotes and coin, 
research, and acting as the custodian of the cash reserves of commercial banks. Most of the 
functions and duties of the central bank are met through the regulation and supervision of the 
                                                 
1 This is, however, not applicable to all central banks, for example, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) has 
deregulated its financial system and is independent of government but acts in consultation with it. 
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financial markets and banks, to ensure a more sound and efficient economic environment. 
These functions follow from the central bank as 
(i) provider of cash reserves; and 
(ii) supervisor and regulator of the banking system (prudential supervision). 
 
1.2 Types of central bank regulation, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
these regulatory stances 
 
The most common types of regulation include the direct and indirect method, prudential 
supervision, and so-called twin peak regulation. The direct method of regulation (which has 
been used mostly in the past) is composed of a mixture of “monitoring individual transactions, 
setting minimum capital requirements [still used today] and imposing entry restrictions” 
(Hellmann et al., 2000:147). Das (2004:52) emphasises that these policies include “controls 
over interest rates on both deposits and loans, as well as over exchange rates, capital markets 
and capital flows”.  
 
Some of the advantages (for authorities and central banks) of this direct method of regulation in 
a pre-liberalised banking financial sector are that they maintain only a small number of domestic 
banks for easier control and prohibit foreign banks from entering the domestic financial system. 
Interest rate ceilings imposed by government ensure that bank competition is very limited, that 
excessive risk-taking is minimised, that banks operate as oligopolies and that government owns 
all or many of the banks. The disadvantage of this method can be expressed by inefficient 
financial markets, low economic growth rates and high inflation. 
 
The indirect method of regulation is based on safeguarding depositors, monitoring and 
managing banks’ risks, and ensuring that banks have sufficient capital in relation to the risks to 
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which they are exposed. Hellmann et al. (2000:148) explain this change in three steps. First, 
emphasis is placed on monitoring a bank’s risk management system, rather than individual 
transactions. Second, with the removal of a ceiling on deposit rates, banks have a wider choice 
of assets and, third, more emphasis is placed on capital requirements. The disadvantage of this 
indirect method of regulation or deregulation is that bank managers are faced with unfamiliar 
practices and modes of regulation, which results in increased risk-taking. 
 
Prudential supervision is related to systematic risk and is concerned with preventing a problem 
in one institution from spreading to another. Polizatto (1990:1) maintains that “prudential 
regulation is designed to remove or lessen the threat of systemic instability”. Its primary 
objective is broadly to promote the stability of financial institutions and/or the financial system. It 
therefore focuses on institutions with a view to protecting their solvency. The aim of prudential 
regulation is to protect the banking system from crises. The direct way of regulation is not an 
alternative to prudential supervision. This is because prudential supervision encourages an 
open-market system and competition, whereas direct regulation does not. In addition, prudential 
supervision ensures proper disclosure and transparency of banking activity. 
 
Twin peak regulation is when prudential regulation and market conduct regulation are 
separated, with the central bank responsible for prudential and systemic risk regulation, and 
operates alongside a conduct of business regulator. In other words, the central bank is 
responsible for potentially systemic institutions, and oversight of the payment and settlement 
systems, while the business regulator is responsible for the conduct of business across the 
financial system such as banks, insurance and securities services. Twin peak regulation is 
common in Australia, the Netherlands and Canada. The advantages of twin peak regulation are 
that it strengthens the operational independence, integrity and accountability of all regulators; 
clarifies roles and responsibilities; increases the scope of regulation and improves enforcement 
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capacity (National Treasury, 2011:27–36). The disadvantage is that in this type of regulation 
there could be duplication of work and jurisdictional overlap if roles and responsibilities are not 
clearly defined; and conflict can exist between the two regulators (National Treasury, 2011:29).  
 
1.3 A broad outline of the history of financial regulation before liberalisation 
in developed economies  
 
According to Ribakova (2005:03), “prior to liberalisation there was little need for prudential 
supervision because of government control, limited competition, and small banks”, which 
escalated into financial repression. Denizer et al. (1998:3) define ‘financial repression’ as “a set 
of policies, laws, formal regulations and informal controls, imposed by governments on the 
financial sector that distorts financial prices, interest rates and foreign-exchange rates, and 
inhibits financial intermediaries from performing at their full potential.” Since the early 1970s, 
financial repression has usually been associated with less-developed countries, but before the 
1970s, economists in developed economies also favoured financially repressive policies. It is 
generally argued that the main reasons for the implementation of the repressive policies were 
for government officials to control fiscal resources and to extract rent from the banking system. 
Financial repression also took the form of restrictions on the in- and outflow of capital. 
 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) identified financial repression as regulatory restrictions on 
competition in the financial sector and government interventions. They were among the first to 
point out concerns regarding financial repression. They argued that an economy that was 
constrained in this way discouraged savings and investment because of lower rates of return 
compared to a competitive market; in other words, institutions are unable to direct most savings 
into investment effectively, which affects the growth of the economy. In addition, Rouibini and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992; 1995) also argue that financial repression has negative repercussions for 
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economic growth when (i) the output of investment is negatively affected; (ii) the general level of 
investment and savings has declined in the economy; and (iii) intermediation costs increase.  
 
The impact of financial repression is that it induces great economic distortions. It leads to bank 
insolvencies, high and persistent inflation, and an underdeveloped financial system. Financial 
repression is said to hamper economic growth. Excessive regulation and financial repression 
result in large-scale rigidities in the financial system. This is evidenced by the 
 
direct controls used in many [Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development] OECD 
countries during the 1960s and 1970s to allocate finance to preferred industries during the post-
war reconstruction period; restrictions on market access were partly motivated by a concern for 
financial stability; and controls on banks and financial institutions were frequently used as 
instruments of macroeconomic management. (Edey and Hviding, 1995:8.) 
 
Historically, financial repression resulted in heightened economic costs, corruption and 
inefficiencies. The desire for more financial resources, pressure from international trade, and 
demand for better finances led to the relaxation of controls on the financial sector and a shift 
towards liberalisation.  
   
1.4 A brief history of deregulation and liberalisation in developed economies 
 
Edey and Hviding (1995:8) assert that the shift towards liberalisation was due to “interrelated 
factors which made direct controls increasingly ineffective in achieving their intended purposes”. 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) postulated that financial repression was not the answer to 
economic growth. They argued that an increase in interest rates to market-related levels would 
lead to savings which, in turn, would spur economic growth. They convinced regulators and 
authorities that that strategy would improve investments and growth. Developed economies 
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then started implementing this macroeconomic policy by lifting the restrictions on interest rates 
and implementing more positive interest rates. 
 
Eventually, the direct methods of regulating were relaxed because they were hampering 
institutions from adapting to changes in the financial market environment. For example, during 
the 1980s the United States’ (US), Australia’s and the United Kingdom’s (UK) efforts to remove 
direct interest rate controls were eventually accomplished. Thus, for many banking regulators, 
the change from direct to indirect regulation of banks was seen as an effort to liberalise. 
Furthermore, deregulation and financial liberalisation were important components in shaping the 
financial system and in making it more effective. 
 
Another force that also led to the move towards liberalisation was globalisation: central banks 
were attempting to adjust their policies to comply with international standards. Some economists 
began considering that an independent central bank would ensure a more favourable monetary 
policy. In addition, the introduction of new technology in the areas of information and 
communication, financial innovation and in improved risk management systems encouraged a 
faster shift towards liberalisation. 
 
A further factor that pushed these economies towards liberalisation was the need for a more 
efficient financial system, which was better equipped to achieve growth and development. 
Therefore, further reform policies were implemented in the 1990s. These policies included a 
change in bank supervision from a micro-level, for example, monitoring banks’ individual 
transactions, to a broader macro-level, for example, banks’ compliance with corporate 
governance, international best practices, more risk-based supervision, transparency in 
disclosure and an appropriate legal infrastructure. Thus regulations that were retained include 
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prudential regulation at a macro-level, which has evolved over time to ensure stability within the 
economy and to reduce the effect of shocks. 
 
1.5 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, banks have to be regulated because of the threat financial instability poses to the 
economy. History proves a need for regulation. However, the manner in which it is conducted 
will determine the state of how the financial system is run. For example, if the policies that are 
implemented by government are repressive, then the outcome will produce inefficient markets; 
increased economic costs and hampered economic growth. If the policies implemented by 
government are more market-friendly, then this will result in greater competition and more 
efficient markets. However, the change from repressive to more open liberal markets is not an 
easy one, as will be discussed in Chapter 2. The impact of liberalisation on economic growth, 
stability and crisis prevention should be considered.  
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Chapter 2 
Developing economies, financial liberalisation 
and the crises of the 1990s  
2.1 Characteristics of a developing economy before liberalisation 
 
A developing economy is generally characterised by medium economic growth rates, generally 
low export capability and poor infrastructure. In some developing economies the banking 
system generally has poor liquidity, is subject to reserve requirements (all though all countries 
have reserve requirements) and provides an inefficient payment system. While not completely 
unindustrialised, a developing country has relatively low levels of industrialisation compared to 
more developed countries. It does, however, have a higher standard of living compared to some 
less-developed peers. Before liberalisation, developing countries were inundated with financial 
repressive policies. As mentioned earlier, financial repression was said to hamper economic 
growth and bring about large-scale rigidities in the financial system. Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 
(1995:276) mention that in a pre-liberalised financial system, a typical developing country had 
the following characteristics: 
 
• Anti-usury laws were needed for social reasons 
• Tight control and regulation of the banking system were considered necessary to 
ensure banking soundness and a properly functioning monetary policy transmission 
mechanism 
•  Financial resources were allocated to certain sectors or projects deemed “strategic” by 
government. 
•  Interest rates were kept below market rates in order to reduce the cost of servicing 
government debts. 
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2.2 The rationale for liberalisation in developing countries during the 1990s 
 
In response to the adverse effects of financial restrictions, many countries became engaged in 
liberalisation strategies. The aim of liberalisation was to ensure the free flow of international 
finance in and out of a country, to remove restrictions on financial institutions in order for 
countries to become participants in world financial markets, and to provide for central bank 
independence from government (Patnaik, 1999:1). The idea was to make the domestic financial 
sector part of the international sector, with the intention of it operating according to market 
forces and thus more effectively.  
 
Different strategies were followed in the process of liberalisation, among which were the 
Washington Consensus, intervention in the banking sector and actions taken in capital 
accounts. 
 
2.2.1 The Washington Consensus 
 
The history of financial liberalisation in developing countries became more pronounced with the 
Washington Consensus, a reform policy developed by Williamson in 1989. The aim of this policy 
was to restructure developing countries in Latin America after the macroeconomic crisis they 
had experienced during the 1980s when economic growth was slow and foreign credit could not 
be accessed. The Washington Consensus was one of the first reform programmes and 
proposed ten broad economic policies as recommendations to bring stability within an economy. 
According to Williamson (2004:3), the recommendations were as follows:  
 
i. Exercising fiscal discipline 
ii. Reordering public expenditure priorities, such as switching expenditure in a pro-growth 
and pro-poor way, from matters such as non-merit subsidies to basic health and 
education and infrastructure 
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iii. Reforming the tax system: A tax system that would combine a broad tax base with 
moderate marginal tax rates 
iv. Liberalising interest rates 
v. Introducing competitive exchange rates 
vi. Establishing international trade liberalisation: This entailed the liberalisation of imports 
vii. Liberalising inward foreign direct investments (FDIs): This did not include 
comprehensive capital account liberalisation 
viii. Privatising state enterprises 
ix. Deregularising, that is, easing barriers to entry and exit 
x. Extending property rights to a broader base, in order to provide the informal sector with 
these rights.  
 
This reform package served as a benchmark and was promoted by the IMF, the World Bank 
and the US Federal Treasury Department. The policy emphasised freeing up the private sector 
by removing government controls, opening up local markets to international competition and 
maintaining macroeconomic discipline. Developing countries increasingly modelled their policies 
on the Washington Consensus which, broadly speaking, created a paradigm shift away from a 
government-led financial system towards a market-orientated system. 
 
Gore (2000:791–94) describes this paradigm shift as consisting of two main elements. The first 
refers to the partial globalisation of development policy analysis, which means a shift from a 
national to a more global frame of reference. He adds that, before the Washington Consensus, 
development processes were typically explained in terms of local factors and development 
policies were geared towards local objectives. The second element refers to a shift away from 
historical towards non-historical performance assessment. He regards “development as a 
societal and economy-wide transition from a traditional, rural, agricultural society to a modern, 
20 
 
urban, advanced society” (p. 794). Furthermore, he notes that “this process was expected to 
consist of a sequence of growth stages through which all countries had to go. The shift to a non-
historical performance assessment focused mainly on a country’s economic performance, 
among others, ‘performance’ being the key term to evaluating the success of a policy 
measure” (p. 794). 
 
The Washington Consensus was implemented on a one-size-fits-all basis, as a stepping stone 
for other countries to follow. It was seen as an ideal reformation policy to ensure high economic 
growth. It was thus quickly regarded as a model for the wider developing world. Countries that 
participated in implementing it, other than the Latin Americans, included India, Indonesia, South 
Korea, Thailand, Zambia and Russia. The degree and timing of the implementation varied in 
different countries, for example, African countries implemented it during the 1990s, while East 
Asian countries did so in the 1980s and South Asian countries in the 1970s. However, the 
Washington Consensus proved fatal to some countries, as will be seen later in this chapter. 
 
2.2.2 The banking sector 
Further reasons for the liberalisation of developing economies included the belief that financial 
liberalisation would positively affect the banking sector. Liberalisation was said to bring about 
foreign currency deposits in the financial system of countries, which would positively influence 
the foreign deposit-to-GDP ratio. Government authorities, together with institutional supervisors, 
believed that an increase in this ratio would have positive effects on economic growth in that it 
would help finance large fiscal and current-account deficits, and also have a spillover effect on 
productivity, investment and savings. For example, in 1992 in South Africa prior to liberalisation 
(which will be discussed in Chapter 4), banks’ foreign currency deposits were in the vicinity of 
R6,8 million. After liberalisation, foreign currency deposits grew to R1,2 billion in 1994. Ten 
years after liberalisation, foreign currency deposits increased to R27,7 billion in 2004 and in 
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2008 it stood at R78,2 billion. As a result, the foreign deposit-to-GDP ratio increased from 
1,85 per cent in 2004 to 4,31 per cent in 2008. The increase in deposits had a positive effect on 
the country’s growth, which is evidenced by the increase in GDP. In 1994 to 2004 GDP 
increased gradually from 3,2 to 4,6 per cent. In 2007 GDP increased further to 5,5 per cent. 
However, in 2008 GDP declined to 3,7 per cent due to the global financial downturn.  
 
Furthermore, liberalisation was said to contribute to an increase in general bank deposits. This 
is evidenced by the IMF study on the progress of Asia, Latin America and Africa in bank 
deposits. Figure 2.1 reveals that the growth of bank deposits as a share of GDP increased in 
the 1990s compared to the 1980s. In India, East Asia and some Latin American countries non-
bank deposits from, for example, non-bank financial intermediaries, pension funds, credit 
unions, stokvels2 and so forth, also supplemented the growth of bank deposits. Other factors 
that contributed to the growth in deposits were the slowdown of inflation in the 1990s, new 
deposit instruments and positive real deposit rates.  
 
  
                                                 
2 A group of people who contribute a certain amount of money every month, and each person has the opportunity to 
use the total amount on a rotational basis. 
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Figure 2.1:  Increase in average deposits-to-GDP ratio in major countries by 
region 1960s–1990s (Difference between three-year average of 
bank deposits-to-GDP ratio at the end of each decade) 
 
Source: IMF (2007:208) 
Note: Countries and regions covered:  
East Asia:  Indonesia; Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand 
Latin America:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, República 
Bolivariana de Venezuela 
Africa: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal 
South Asia: Bangladesh, India, Pakistan 
 
Moreover, there was the belief that the presence of foreign banks in developing countries would 
increase the capacity of local banking sectors to lend and support development, and introduce 
international best practices and know-how to domestic banks, and so to increase their 
efficiency. Financial liberalisation was said to enhance foreign competition in the domestic 
markets, thereby decreasing the cost of doing business. Foreign presence was believed to allow 
financial institutions to implement the latest financial knowledge and technologies. As a result, 
financial liberalisation would stimulate institutional reform. 
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These beliefs and expectations were, to some extent, realised as shown in a study by Laeven 
(2000), who analysed 20-year data of emerging market economies, and concluded that the 
liberalisation did ease financial restrictions that domestic institutions faced, such as high interest 
rates, credit ceilings and excessive regulation. The integration with international firms also 
accelerated transformation and contributed towards the achievement of a more robust financial 
system, that is, a financial system that was sounder, and more efficient and effective. Thus, 
emerging market economies did, to some extent, benefit from financial liberalisation by being 
able to tap into global capital, which contributed towards increasing the degree of investment 
and output, and improved the efficiency of capital allocation.  
 
2.2.3 Capital account liberalisation 
 
The capital accounts of developing economies were also liberalised, which was said to benefit 
these economies. Kose and Prasad (2004:50) define ‘capital account liberalisation’ in broad 
terms, as “the easing of restrictions on capital flows across a country’s borders, which 
presumably results in a higher degree of financial integration with the global economy through 
higher volumes of capital inflows and outflows”. Since the capital account covers a variety of 
financial inflows, such as portfolio flows, FDI and bank borrowing, controls on these accounts 
can be restricted for the purpose of a country shielding itself from danger related to volatility in 
international capital flows. As a result, capital inflows that are of short duration can be 
suspended when a country experiences macroeconomic shocks, thereby magnifying their 
macroeconomic effect. However, Kose and Prasad (2004:50) advocate that “in some 
developing countries capital controls are also used to manoeuvre the composition of inflows 
towards more stable forms such as FDI and that countries favour FDIs because the benefits of 
the flows are usually long term and not subject to rapid reversals associated with changes in 
investor sentiment”.  
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Generally, the benefits of capital account liberalisation include a higher return on savings for 
people in developed countries, and improvement in economic growth and strengthening of 
employment opportunities in developing countries. This is because, according to Kose and 
Prasad (2004:50), “capital account liberalisation allows for a more efficient global allocation of 
capital from industrial to developing economies. Capital account liberalisation may also be 
interpreted as signalling (to First World investors – mostly pension funds and other investment 
companies) a country’s commitment to good economic policies.”  
 
There are, however, also dangers associated with capital account liberalisation. The argument 
in favour of capital account liberalisation assumes that investments in financial markets (mainly 
the stock exchange) amount to real investments in capital stock, which is clearly not the case. 
Moreover, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002:27) assert that “capital account liberalisation will not 
induce a significant catch-up in the development of less developed economies if its only effect is 
to reallocate capital internationally, since the international allocation of capital is not the main 
factor behind the inequality across nations.” Furthermore, “a country’s policy environment could 
be ruined by domestic and foreign investors, who could suddenly pocket capital out of the 
country if that country has an open capital account” (Kose and Prasad, 2004:50). Despite these 
dangers, Gourinchas and Jeanne (2002:27) advocate that “capital account liberalisation could, 
in combination with other policies, play a significant role in the economic take-off of less 
developed countries, and to the extent that it does, it would have large benefits”. 
 
Theory suggests that under certain assumptions the benefits of capital account liberalisation for 
developing countries include globalisation of finance, which could result in a higher economic 
growth rate and lower macroeconomic volatility. Globalisation of finance promotes potential for 
growth in developing countries and reallocation of capital around the world, in that capital 
movement without barriers should move from capital-rich places to capital-poor places. 
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According to Licchetta (2006:5), this is because “the return on new investment is higher where 
capital is limited. As a result, the amount of saving and the level of physical capital in poor 
countries can be positively influenced. This, in turn, can help the recipient economy to raise its 
rate of growth and improve its living standards.” Thus the lack of investment in less-developed 
countries is not mainly due to the lack of savings.  
 
Fischer (1998), Stulz (1999), Rodrik (1998) and Stiglitz et al. (2000a, b) have a similar view of 
the effects of capital account liberalisation on the financial sector. The allocative efficiency view 
shows that when restrictions on the capital account are eliminated, then capital movement 
across borders commences. Hence, capital from rich economies moves to poorer economies, 
where the marginal rate of return is higher. 
 
In addition, with the many risks that liberalisation creates, the globalisation of finance can 
reduce both production and consumption volatility in developing countries as more capital flows 
to these countries. Accordingly, production volatility will reduce which, in turn, will result in 
production growth being diversified. Henry and Sasson (2008:2) argue that “when liberalisation 
occurs the cost of capital reduces, which stimulates firms to increase their rate of investment”. 
They explain that 
 
for a given growth rate of the labour force and total factor productivity, a higher rate of 
investment increases the ratio of capital per effective worker, driving up the marginal product of 
labour, and in turn, the market-clearing wage. Thus, the growth rate of labour productivity rises 
sharply in the aftermath of liberalisation. (P. 2.) 
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Furthermore, borrowing abroad during periods of recession and lending during periods of 
expansion sometimes allow developing countries to smooth their consumption over time and 
increase their domestic welfare (Licchetta, 2006).  
 
2.3 General characteristics of an efficient financial system 
 
Before getting to the core of the financial crises that ensued in the 1990s, it is important first to 
capture the essence of an efficient financial system. This can be identified by the stability of that 
system. Financial stability requires the financial system, which comprises financial 
intermediaries, markets and market infrastructures, to be able to tolerate shocks for the 
foreseeable future. This is important for all economies, especially those experiencing financial 
turmoil. A financial system or economy that is resilient to shocks can be identified by its well-
operating institutional framework. Institutions that contribute to (or damage, as the case may be) 
the financial system operating well include banks, insurers, securities exchange, central banks 
and national regulators. These institutions conduct economic transactions and promote 
investments. Therefore, it is crucial that the financial system is sound since it plays a role in the 
country’s economic growth.  
 
In contrast, financial instability frequently leads to a financial crisis. A financial crisis generally 
occurs when creditors, especially when they are banks, are unable to fulfil their obligations. 
Usually, a fragile financial system will lead to instability in an economy. This is evident from a 
weak banking system, insufficient liquidity buffers, low-quality capital, uneven supervision, lack 
of effective regulation, fiscal imbalances and macroeconomic vulnerabilities. The SARB 
(2004a:25) states that “financial instability can be triggered by a whole range of developments 
such as inherent weaknesses in the fabric of the financial system itself”, for instance, 
• inadequate banking laws and supervision;  
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• quality of the financial system infrastructure, such as lack of transparency and 
inadequate payment system; and  
• the probability of a shock.  
 
A crisis may have a ripple effect. In this case it is usually known as ‘contagion’, where a crisis 
spreads from one sector to another or from one country to another. Some of the reasons why a 
particular sector or country is vulnerable to contagion are generally as follows: 
 
i. It has exposure to other sectors or countries (usually through liberalisation): An 
example of this can be observed in the relationship between an insurance company 
and a bank, where failure of an insurance company can disrupt the banking system 
because of the exposure the bank has to risks. If the risks are not mitigated, it could 
lead to financial system instability. 
ii. So-called amplifiers that cause a small crisis to turn into a big one: An example of this 
can be seen in a fragile financial market where a small shock in the financial market 
can promote large changes in asset prices. Hence, this volatility can cause a crisis and 
if contagion occurs, then amplification is possible. Thus, the ripple effect of the crisis 
can have a much larger effect compared to the original. 
 
2.3.1 Description of financial crises during the 1990s  
 
Typical crises that ensued during the 1990s were observed in many countries such as Mexico, 
Russia, East Asia and Brazil. These crises were all preceded by liberalisation of the financial 
sector and capital accounts characterised by a reduction of reserve requirements, removal of 
credit allocation, entry deregulation and relaxation of interest rates. Furthermore, in response to 
domestic pressures and pressure originating from international financial institutions, some of 
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these countries had opened up their financial systems before reforming their existing policies. 
Following liberalisation, many developing countries found themselves involved in a condition of 
high instability and increasing fragility of their financial systems. This was because of 
weaknesses in the regulatory structure and excessive risk-taking. As a result, financial 
liberalisation led to a difficult transition in order to achieve an efficient financial system. It 
“coincided with heightened financial instability, culminating in dramatic financial crises” 
(Kirkpatrick, 2002:2). According to Walter (2002:1), this was because “weak prudential 
regulation and institutions created substantial vulnerabilities in the financial systems of various 
developing countries”. In addition, “the increase in moral hazard problems eroded bank 
profitability” (p. 1). This was because previously government had protected banks’ profits by 
restricting banking competition, but after liberalisation competition increased and banks did not 
have that privilege of government protection. This resulted in greater risks being taken by these 
banks to maintain the previous levels of profitability which, in some cases, led to an erosion of 
profitability.  
 
2.3.1.1  Crises arising from the Washington Consensus fallout 
 
Jomo (2005:12) states that the Washington Consensus failed to deliver on its promise of high 
economic growth. According to him, countries that resisted the consensus experienced much 
higher growth compared to those that had implemented it.  
 
The Washington Consensus was an important reason for the crises in many countries, because 
it focused less on sustainable development and more on increasing GDP. This was problematic 
because observing GDP alone was not a sufficient tool to measure the contribution of economic 
developments to improving or growing an economy. Implementation of the Washington 
Consensus in Russia led to a financial crisis that was “rooted in the fiscal imbalances and the 
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structural weaknesses in its enterprise and banking sectors” (IMF 1999a:31). Owing to the 
pressure to deregulate, little gains from FDI were brought into the economy as a result of the 
volatility of international markets. Russia experienced increased imports in spite of GDP 
declines affecting the country’s trade balance, which caused it to be negative. In addition, fiscal 
imbalances resulted from excessive government expenditure commitments and a swell in debt- 
servicing costs. Furthermore, the Russian central bank fell short in adequately monitoring risk 
management procedures at banks, which led to a reduction in the aggregate capital in the 
banking sector, and tax revenues fell, which could not cover domestic expenditure. These 
weaknesses drove Russia to high inflation rates in 1998, depreciation of the exchange rate and 
a fall in GDP, which led to a strong control of money supply. Instead of averting a crisis, the 
Washington stabilisation programme exacerbated the Russian crisis. According to the IMF 
(1999a:28–31), Brazil was also affected by the contagion from the Russian crisis due to the 
credit risk shock. Although Brazil’s financial crisis originated in the collapse of the exchange rate 
peg, which ultimately put Brazil under the watchful eye of investors, when Russia announced a 
devaluation of the rouble and a moratorium on foreign debt payment, Brazil’s stock and bond 
market fell on fears of default. This eventually resulted in restrictions on the outflow of capital.  
 
Argentina, in turn, experienced numerous occurrences of recessions, hyperinflation and debt 
default. In an attempt to create a sound economic background that would contribute to 
economic growth and development, Argentina implemented the Washington Consensus which 
required liberalising its markets. However, the implementation of the consensus was negatively 
received as Argentina experienced a flight of capital, its currency depreciated and its financial 
markets collapsed. This crisis had occurred because of the exorbitant debt incurred by 
government, following reduced tax revenues, which led to an increase in interest rates. 
Moreover, a wave of privatisation, which previously contributed to FDI, eventually withered and 
the peso-to-dollar exchange rate was devalued.  
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The Mexican crisis of 1994–5, was evidenced by an overvalued exchange rate and a current-
account deficit. At the core of the country’s macroeconomic instability was its growing current-
account deficit financed by short-term capital. In accordance with the consensus, Mexico also 
deregulated its financial sector where lending and borrowing rates were allowed to float and 
extensive privatisation of banks was carried out. However, with the new adjustments to the 
banking sector, the supervision of banks was poor. As a result, the combination of limited 
capitalisation of banks, excessive lending and non-performing loans were some of the factors 
that contributed to the crisis.  
 
In implementing the consensus, other countries such as Poland and Bolivia liberalised their 
economy with a “big bang” approach, that is, a wholesale immediate change. The aim of this 
approach was to do away with the country’s budget deficit, get rid of its inflation, close its trade 
deficit, privatise its state-held companies and improve its fiscal policies. However, these 
countries did not take into consideration the legal or institutional framework or the state of their 
financial markets before liberalising. This resulted in a rise in unemployment and a loss of 
income because of the shock and rapid change to the economy.  
 
Many critics, such as Quiggin (2005), Stiglitz (1998) and Arestis (2004), argued that the 
Washington Consensus proved inadequate and was a failure, even though it brought about 
lower inflation, economic growth and lower debt ratios to some countries. They argued that the 
side-effect of the consensus increased poverty and unemployment, and that it gave business 
from developed economies opportunities to take business advantage of poor economies. This is 
evidenced by the consensus prescription of trade barrier reduction and free movement of goods 
across borders. In this case companies from developed economies use cheap labour from less-
developed countries to manufacture their goods and sell them at a high price, while the wage 
earned by labourers in less-developed countries remained the same and was offset by high 
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inflation. Quiggin (2005) argues that “the Washington Consensus was weak in its approach to 
financial stabilization”. Furthermore, he argues that during the crisis of the 1990s “financial 
markets appeared to have contributed to the crisis, first by financing unsound investments and 
then by facilitating capital flight when the crises began”. He argued that “the Washington 
consensus discouraged the use of capital controls as a way of managing debt problems, and 
encouraged countries to deregulate their financial systems”.  
 
2.3.1.2 Crises arising from East Asia 
 
During the 1990s, East Asian countries experienced considerable economic growth, 
accompanied by favourable fiscal conditions and large investments. This favourable condition 
was due to the countries’ financial liberalisation which obviously attracted foreign investors. The 
substantial inflows of foreign capital led to an increase in credit in these countries, resulting in a 
rise in bank credit being extended to the private sector. Foreign investors (mostly foreign banks) 
gave short-term loans, in dollar terms, to local banks rather than through local financial markets; 
these foreign loans were attractive to local banks, because they carried relatively low interest. 
Local banks, in turn, lent the money on a long-term basis to locals at much higher interest rates, 
which was obviously very profitable for these banks. Consequently, local bank borrowers used 
the money to finance projects of questionable quality and those that carried little promise of 
earning additional foreign currency. As a result, the factor that triggered the eventual crisis was 
the strengthening of the dollar. This caused an overvaluation of the local currency as it was 
pegged to the dollar and worsened the trade account. Country risk increased, which eventually 
led to uncertainty and insecurity on the part of foreign banks. This caused them to stop rolling 
over loans, thereby precipitating a general disinvestment from local markets. A massive dollar 
shortage in the local markets ensued, followed by a huge fall in the value of the local currency. 
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At that time, local banks could not obtain dollars and failed, which caused the local economic 
crisis. 
 
The Asian crises, as explained by Stevens (2007:3), were due to 
 
underdeveloped capital markets, where capital inflow tended to be intermediated through the 
banking sector. Exchange rates were heavily managed and the counterparts of the inflow were 
a large build-up in money and credit in the domestic financial sector . . . Neither borrowers nor 
bankers were managing their risks due to weak risk management capacities and ineffective 
supervision. 
 
Miller and Luangaram (1998:3) describe the East Asian crises as “a creditor panic, which was in 
large part due to economic excesses in the domestic private sector and inadequate regulatory 
responses by the government, particularly in respect of banking” and note that “the main 
features of the Asian crises were inefficient and inadequate regulation and (implicit or explicit) 
government guarantees” (p. 3). Other critics (Guitian (1998); Radelet and Sachs (1998)) 
generally agree that the East Asian crisis was caused by large-scale movement of funds out of 
domestic financial markets, beginning in Thailand and quickly spreading to neighbouring 
countries, as investor sentiment deteriorated. Table 2.1 shows the banking crises in the Asian 
economies and their liberalisation dates.  
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Table 2.1: Banking crises and liberalisation dates in East Asia 
Banking crisis Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Thailand 
Year 1997−2002 1997−2002 1997−2001 1998 1997−2002 
Decontrol of interest rates 1983 1991 1991 1983 1992 
Abolition of direct credit 1983 1981 1985 1993 1992 
Allowance of capital flows * 1996 * 1995 1992 
Privatisation 1996 1983 * 1995 1993 
Deregulation 1992 1988 1989 * 1993 
Source: Noy (2005:6)  
* Blank space denotes sector liberalised either before 1980 or not yet liberalised. 
 
Table 2.2: Exposure of individual international banks to the four most-affected countries 
(1997–8) 
Country Bank 
 
South Korea 
 
 
Indonesia 
 
Malaysia 
 
Thailand 
 
Total 
End 
1997 
End 
1998 
% 
Change 
End 
1997 
End 
1998 
% 
Change 
End 
1997 
End 
1998 
% 
Change 
End 
1997 
End 
1998 
% 
Change 
End 
1997 
End 
1998 
% 
Change 
                 
France 
BNP 1,7 1,6 -0,06 1,0 0,8 -0,20 0,6 0,5 -0,17 1,0 0,7 -0,30 4,3 3,6 -0,16 
Credit 
Agricole 1,9 1,0 -0,47 0,7 0,5 -0,29 0,2 0,1 -0,50 1,1 0,6 -0,45 3,9 2,2 -0,44 
Credit 
Lyonnais 3,7 2,4 -0,35 1,3 1,0 -0,23 0,3 0,2 -0,33 0,6 0,5 -0,17 5,9 4,1 -0,31 
Paribas 1,5 1,0 -0,33 0,4 0,4 0,00 0,3 0,3 0,00 0,4 0,3 -0,25 2,6 2,0 -0,23 
Société 
Générale 4,5 2,7 -0,40 0,8 0,6 -0,25 0,9 0,6 -0,33 2,4 1,8 -0,25 8,6 5,7 -0,34 
 Total 13,3 8,7 -0,35 4,2 3,3 -0,21 2,3 1,7 -0,26 5,5 3,9 -0,29 25,3 17,6 -0,30 
UK 
                
Barclays 1,0 0,8 -0,20 0,5 0,2 -0,60 n/a  n/a   0,5 0,2 -0,60 2,0 1,2 -0,40 
Natwest 1,8 1,3 -0,28 0,4 0,3 -0,25 n/a  n/a   0,4 0,2 -0,50 2,6 1,8 -0,31 
HSBC 4,1 3,6 -0,12 1,8 1,4 -0,22 n/a  n/a   2,8 2,3 -0,18 8,7 7,3 -0,16 
Llyods TSB 0,5            0,8  
Abbey National            0,8   
Total 6,9 6,2 -0,10 2,7 1,9 -0,30    3,7 2,7 -0,27 14,1 11,1 -0,21 
                 
Japan 
Bank of 
Tokyo 3,4 2,7 -0,21 2,6 1,2 -0,54 1,3 1,1 -0,15 4,5 2,7 -0,40 11,8 7,7 -0,35 
Mitsubishi                
Dai Ichi 
Kangyo 1,6 1,7 0,06 1,4 1,0 -0,29 0,4 0,4 0,00 1,8 1,6 -0,11 5,2 4,7 -0,10 
Sanwa 0,9 2,0 1,22 2,3 0,9 -0,61 0,8 0,7 -0,13 2,2 1,7 -0,23 6,2 5,3 -0,15 
Fuji 0,9 1,2 0,33 1,4 0,8 -0,43 0,6 0,5 -0,17 1,8 1,1 -0,39 4,7 3,6 -0,23 
Sumitomo 1,6 1,2 -0,25 1,2 0,9 -0,25 0,6 0,6 0,00 2,0 1,4 -0,30 5,4 4,1 -0,24 
Tokai 0,4 0,3 -0,25 0,6 0,5 -0,17 0,6 0,5 -0,17 1,4 0,8 -0,43 3,0 2,1 -0,30 
Sakura 0,7 1,0 -0,43 1,4 1,4 0,00 0,3 0,3 0,00 2,4 1,5 -0,38 4,8 4,2 -0,13 
Total 9,5 10,1 0,06 10,9 6,7 -0,39 4,6 4,1 -0,11 16,1 10,8 -0,33 41,1 31,7 -0,23 
                 
US¹ 
Chase 
Manhattan 5,3 2,4 -0,55 2,2 1,2 -0,45 0,9 0,6 -0,33 1,4 0,9 -0,36 9,8 5,1 -0,48 
Citicorp 2,6 <0,8 n/a  0,6 n/a  n/a  0,7 n/a  n/a  0,3 n/a  n/a  3,5 n/a  n/a  
JP Morgan 3,4 1,7 -0,50 0,8 0,2 -0,75 0,4 n/a  n/a  1,2 0,2 -0,83 5,8 2,1 -0,64 
Total (1) 11,3 4,1 -0,64 3,6 1,4 -0,61 2,0 0,6 -0,70 2,9 1,1 -0,62 19,1 7,2 -0,62 
 Grand 
total 41,0 29,1 -0,29 21,4 13,3 -0,38 8,9 6,4 -0,28 28,2 18,5 -0,34 99,6 67,6 -0,32 
Source: Cailloux and Griffith-Jones (2000:21) 
Notes: Some banks include their on- and off-balance sheet exposure, while others do not. Data exclude for most banks 
sovereign risks, trade credit risk and export credit agency guarantees 
1 The total for the US needs to be interpreted with care due to lack of data 
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In analysing total exposure by country it can be seen that the outflow from the four Asian 
countries totalled US$32 billion in 1998. In 1997, at country level, France’s exposure was 
US$25,3 billion, that of the UK US$14,1 billion, Japan’s total exposure was US$41 billion and 
US exposure amounted to US$19,1 billion. In 1998 international banks’ exposure to the Asian 
economies totalled US$67,6 billion.  
 
All in all, the institutional factors that increased the crisis-proneness of these countries include 
their liberalised markets, weak supervision and risk management, and their exchange rate 
pegged to the dollar. The factors that set the scene for the crisis were attributed to foreign 
investors and local banks. The crisis-prone countries ended up having weaker banking systems, 
reduced credit availability and slower, or even negative, economic growth. 
 
2.3.1.3 Exchange rate volatility 
 
The East Asian crisis drew attention to the importance of a sustainable exchange rate regime. 
This is because during the Asian liberalisation process, authorities used a blend of fixed 
exchange rate policies with open capital account policies, even though the markets and 
regulatory institutions were weak, and this also contributed to the drastic financial crisis.  
 
Most of the Asian economies had their exchange rate pegged against the US dollar to ensure 
price stability, and to make foreign capital obtainable at a reduced rate for business ventures by 
means of bank finance and FDIs. Pegging against the dollar encouraged domestic companies in 
general to take loans from foreign banks, while foreign banks lent recklessly in US dollars on a 
short-term basis. However, when the dollar appreciated against other major currencies, this 
resulted in competitive losses for the East Asian economies as their currencies became 
overvalued and made exports less competitive. Since the Asian economies were export-driven, 
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overvaluation of the currency aggravated the current-account balances when export growth fell. 
Chow et al. (2007:3) advocate that “unless domestic financial sectors are sufficiently developed 
and an exchange rate sufficiently flexible, capital account liberalisation is premature and 
effectively neutralises the stability benefits of fixed exchange rates”.  
 
Since fixed exchange rate strategies increased systemic risks during the Asian crisis, some 
countries abandoned the fixed exchange rate and switched to a floating regime (although the 
float is seldom completely free due to central bank intervention, to some extent, in foreign-
exchange markets), and others tried to eradicate the excessive capital movements while still 
remaining pegged to the US dollar. However, abandoning the fixed exchange rate led to the 
Asian currencies depreciating substantially and governments were unable to protect the Asian 
currencies due to their small foreign reserves. This consequently left businesses with enormous 
foreign debts that had to be paid with more local currency. Banks refused to extent further 
credit, which brought about many corporate bankruptcies.  
 
2.4 Underlying reasons for the crises 
 
According to Bird and Rajan (2001:889), “banking crises seem to be more likely following 
financial liberalisation with sharp increases in domestic lending”. Some of the underlying 
reasons for the crises are identified as (i) banking mismanagement and weak supervisory 
capacity; (ii) weak credit review and speculative activities by banks; (iii) lack of regulatory 
measures in the financial system; and (iv) a fixed exchange rate regime, all of which are 
described below. 
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2.4.1 Banking mismanagement and weak supervisory capacity  
 
In the Asian crisis bank managers borrowed short term and lent long term, and their risk 
management stance was not strengthened, nor was it reviewed. In addition, Asian banks did not 
hold sufficient capital to buffer the risks that they took, as the extra capital could have acted as a 
safeguard or cushion for unforeseen circumstances. Instruments of prudential control were 
eliminated and bank managers’ regulatory oversight was weakened. In addition, the shift in 
financial market sentiment exposed structural weaknesses in these economies. Developing 
economies had not taken into account the efficient running of their economy and the importance 
of the stability of the financial system. Therefore, these economies were unable to withstand the 
shocks that they experienced.  
 
2.4.2 Weak credit review and speculative activities by banks 
 
Information asymmetry can be regarded as one of the reasons for weak credit review on the 
part of supervisors. In the case of the Mexican and Asian crises, banks’ ability to exercise credit 
judgement was impaired. Overexposure to credit and speculative activities contributed to the 
crises. Ribakova (2005:3) states that “when liberalisation occurs, bank competition increases, 
risky investments increase and bank managers often lack the experience in traditional banking, 
thus supervisors need to enhance supervision by concentrating on a more risk-based method”. 
 
2.4.3 Lack of regulatory measures in the financial system 
 
In some countries weaknesses in the regulatory structure had led to a financial crisis, which the 
government was unable to control. This happened for the obvious reasons that macroeconomic 
policies and market discipline were not reviewed to cater for the deregulation. However, Noy 
(2004:1) argues that “liberalisation can lead to financial instability either because of insufficient 
regulation of the financial sector or because of erosions of previously granted monopolies of 
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existing banks”. His theory on lax supervision and the monopoly power hypothesis “explains the 
relationship between financial liberalisation and banking crises in developing countries” (Noy 
2005:3). In the lax supervision hypothesis, a fully liberalised domestic financial banking sector 
has no government restrictions, which leads to bank managers being unfamiliar with the new 
challenges or risks facing them and which results in their taking more risks. Noy (2004:3) 
asserts that “financial liberalisation will enable undue risk taking behaviour and a consequent 
crisis, if this behaviour is accompanied by inefficient supervision”. The monopoly power 
hypothesis, in turn, can be viewed as pre-liberalised banks having monopoly power to their 
advantage, because government has protected these banks from competition. However, during 
liberalisation, domestic bank profit margins are decreased because of an increase in deposit 
rates and a decrease in lending rates. In addition, the entry of foreign banks increases 
competition and those banks that are inefficient will go bankrupt. Noy (2004:4) adds that “under 
this scenario systemic problems in the banking sector are an almost inevitable result of financial 
liberalisation”. However, inefficient banks going out of business is not a negative development in 
itself. It may also create space for efficient, more prudent banks to thrive – as long as no 
contagion occurs. As mentioned, bank failures can generate financial instability due to weak 
banking systems and when risks are mismanaged. Walter (2002:2) asserts that “greater 
competition may lead banks to take greater risks to sustain levels of profitability previously 
ensured by government restrictions on competition in the banking sector.” Stiglitz et al. 
(2000a:2) similarly mention that  
 
liberalisation causes an increase in competition, which in turn, reduces franchise value (i.e. the 
capitalised value of expected future profits) and if franchise value falls, then incentives for good 
loans also fall. This is as a result of competition eroding profits. Thus, increased competition 
tends to promote gambling in the banking sector.  
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2.4.4 Fixed exchange rate regime 
 
The collapse of the exchange rate in countries such as Argentina and Asia was due to the 
exchange rate peg. These countries pegged their currencies in order to maintain the stability of 
the currency and hence decrease inflation. As a result of market volatility in Argentina, the 
Brazilian real depreciated in terms of the dollar and in Asia the dollar appreciated against the 
yen, which contributed to the crises in those areas. According to Mishkin (1998:23), “an 
exchange rate peg is a very dangerous strategy for controlling inflation in emerging market 
countries as it increases financial fragility and makes the potential for financial crises more 
likely. Instead central bank independence and the adoption of inflation targeting is a better 
strategy to controlling inflation.” 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Financial liberalisation was implemented so that the negative effects of the financial restrictions 
were eliminated and the domestic financial sector operated more effectively as part of the 
international sector. The Washington Consensus, which was the father of liberalisation, 
emphasised that a country should open its markets to the world, as a result, moving from a 
government-led to a market-orientated financial system. Liberalisation of the financial sector 
was said to bring foreign currency deposits into the country’s financial system and increase 
financial efficiency. Furthermore, liberalising a country’s capital account and fixing the exchange 
rate was said to improve economic growth through globalisation of finance, lower 
macroeconomic volatility and also to ensure price stability. However, in response to 
deregulation, many countries were shattered by a crisis. The underlying reasons for these crises 
were undercapitalised banks, contagion effects, volatile markets and weaknesses in the 
regulatory structure. 
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Chapter 3 
Lessons learnt: Measures to ensure effective 
financial liberalisation in developing economies 
 
3.1 Practical experience of improvements during the 1990s and 2000s 
  
Financial liberalisation intensified the fragile state in some developing countries, thus exposing 
these countries to recurring financial and currency crises. As explained in Chapter 2, the impact 
of financial liberalisation was more negative than theory postulated, as it led to many crises due 
to the lack of regulation and policy implementation in some emerging market economies. The 
sudden liberalisation of capital accounts, domestic banks, exchange rates and so forth brought 
about huge financial instability, and was mostly responsible for the negative impact of financial 
liberalisation.  
 
However, in recent years and after many financial crises, other countries started liberalising 
their economies through a more gradual process so that they could better adjust to the changes. 
Consequently, if any irregularities in the financial system were detected, they could be rectified 
and a crisis diverted. As a result, developing countries started adopting a slower and more 
cautious move into liberalisation, which served their future stability better. This gradual process, 
known as ‘sequencing’, is defined by Nsouli et al. (2002:4) as “the order in which either 
macroeconomic policy actions or specific reforms are introduced. It involves the order in which 
reforms are undertaken across sectors and the order in which reforms are undertaken within 
sectors.” In this light, liberalisation needs to be sequenced carefully so that economic stability 
and fiscal sustainability are secured.  
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The advantage of sequencing is that it enhances the outcome of macroeconomic policies, 
stimulates the development of markets and strengthens the structure of the markets. In addition, 
in the event of a policy readjustment, sequencing can allow for a flexible portion of the 
readjustment process, thus reducing the chances of a crisis. Nsouli et al. (2005:759) outline four 
key factors as guidelines for policymakers when sequencing:  
 
i Preparatory time is important, since implementing different reforms can vary; 
Ii Prerequisites are necessary, for example, financial stabilisation may be a prerequisite 
for another reform; 
Iii Complementarities are seen as vital in shaping sequencing, for example, fiscal policy, 
trade liberalisation and public enterprise reforms can complement one another; and 
iv Conflict between different policy instruments should be considered, for example, trade 
liberalisation and a depreciation of the exchange rate versus capital account 
liberalisation and an appreciation of the exchange rate.  
 
The issue of sequencing shows that if reform policies are implemented in a structured fashion, 
then liberalisation is less crisis-prone, less complicated and better accepted. Mishkin (2006:28) 
also agrees that “to avoid financial instability, policymakers need to put in place elements of a 
proper institutional structure before liberalising their financial systems”. A good example of this 
is the case of Bulgaria, which experienced deep economic and financial crises during 1996. 
However, after reforming its policies, such as adopting a disciplined fiscal stance and 
implementing it in a more structured fashion, it has managed to continue on a path of economic 
growth. 
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Likewise the Washington Consensus, exchange rate regime, capital account liberalisation and 
monetary policy have either been reformed or been done away with to ensure more effective 
financial liberalisation.  
 
3.1.1 Washington Consensus follow-up 
 
Following the crisis that resulted from the Washington Consensus, Joseph Stiglitz (1998) 
developed a Post-Washington Consensus in an attempt to improve liberalisation strategies. The 
difference between the Post-Washington Consensus and the Washington Consensus is that 
while the Washington Consensus focused on trade liberalisation, macroeconomic stability and 
stable prices, the Post-Washington Consensus concentrated on making the market economy 
more effective and efficient by including in its policy, financial reform that was transparent, 
contained a strong legal framework and readily available information; and by enhancing the 
government’s role in the private sector and the market as a whole. The Post-Washington 
Consensus places emphasis on sustainable, equitable and democratic development. Stiglitz 
(1998) points out that the aim of this consensus is to address market imperfections, and to 
ensure limited regulation, better living standards and sustainable development. 
 
However, according to Onis and Senses (2003:20, 26), the Post-Washington Consensus 
displayed certain limitations. First, it was seen as extremely narrow and weak, because it failed 
to take into account skewed income distribution, extreme poverty and lack of self-sustained 
growth in many developing economies. Second, it focused on the transparency and 
accountability of domestic institutions, yet ignored the lack of such accountability and 
transparency in the international sphere. Third, it displayed a  
 
technocratic approach towards state-market interactions at local and global levels as existing 
power structure are seen as predetermined. As a result, failure to address fundamental power 
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relations and asymmetries of power that exist between classes at the level of the nation state 
and powerful versus less powerful states in the global economy. (P. 28.) 
 
For this reason, some economists say that the power relations should not be taken as an 
analytical starting point. Arestis (2004:251) argues that 
 
both the Washington Consensus and the Post-Washington Consensus have proved to be a 
disaster for developing countries, because prerequisites were not mentioned when 
implementing the consensus. These include sequencing in financial liberalisation policies, 
where capital flows should follow the establishment of liberalised and robust domestic financial 
systems; and institutional preconditions, where sound financial institutions should be in place 
before financial liberalisation is introduced. 
 
As a result, economists started questioning the pace and sequencing of deregulation and 
liberalisation. However, Nsouli et al. (2005) propose that because each country is unique in its 
own way, the sequencing of reforms and the pace at which a country wants to make 
adjustments should be country-specific. 
 
3.1.2 Shifts away from capital account liberalisation 
 
The risks and economic fluctuations that resulted from the sudden liberalisation of the capital 
account brought little benefits to the previously crisis-prone economies. Nowadays, economists 
(e.g., Das (2004); Stiglitz et al. (2000a)) believe that capital account liberalisation does not 
distribute financial resources effectively because the difference between global capital 
movements and real economic activities are not related. The reason for this is that such capital 
tends to be invested in second-hand financial assets, which do not induce more real investment. 
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Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) also support the shift away from capital account liberalisation. 
In their study they argue that different economies (e.g., a savings-constrained economy or an 
investment-constrained economy) will respond differently from capital account liberalisation. 
They found that in an investment-constrained economy investments are unaffected by 
liberalisation because they are determined by forward-looking returns. In this case the effect of 
liberalisation simply enhances consumption. In a savings-constrained economy the rise in the 
availability of finance through capital account liberalisation encourages domestic investment by 
firms, and consumers who experience a change in prices tend to engage in more spending and 
less savings. Rodrik and Subramanian (p. 2–14) further argue that financial globalisation has 
not contributed to higher growth in emerging markets. This is because some emerging 
economies may have insufficient access to finance, while others are limited by too-little 
investment demand as a result of low social returns or too low private appropriability. Countries 
that rely less on capital inflows have grown rapidly, with the result that “financial globalisation 
has not led to better smoothing of consumption or reduced volatility” (p. 18). Examples of 
countries that rely less on capital inflows and yet have grown rapidly include Singapore, Korea, 
China and Indonesia. 
 
Another important argument against capital account liberalisation is that it tends to overvalue 
the exchange rate, which damages developing countries’ chances to be competitive in export 
markets. Moreover, it adds to exchange rate volatility when short-term capital is withdrawn from 
a country, often for unsystematic reasons. 
 
Wyplosz (2001:14) also asserts that capital account liberalisation opens the doors to potential 
risk-taking. He adds that “in the absence of adequate supervision and regulation, risk-taking 
may easily become excessive” (p. 14). In his analysis of the effects of liberalisation on 
developing and developed countries, using a sample of 27 countries, he finds that financial 
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liberalisation is more destabilising in developing countries than in developed ones. This is 
because when developing countries liberalise their capital accounts, they experience an 
immediate boom followed by a sudden decline. He explains that the sudden large inflow of 
capital causes vulnerability in the developing countries, as a considerable “inflow of capital 
tends to be followed by sudden outflows, which impact on the exchange rate” (p. 4). For 
example, in 1980 the net private capital flows in Asian crisis countries before liberalisation was 
US$7,52 billion. After liberalisation, net private capital flows increased to US$62,52 billion in 
1995. However, net private capital flows fell considerably in 1997 to -US$17,73 billion due to the 
Asian crisis (IMF, 1999b). Further data on emerging and developing market economies as a 
whole show that there have been sudden declines in net private capital flows (Figure 3.1). As 
evidenced by the IMF (2011c), in 2003 these flows had peaked by 208 per cent year on year to 
US$167 billion from US$54 billion in 2002, but fell at a continuous rate between 2004 and 2006. 
The small volumes of net private capital flows was due to the financial market volatility 
experienced in developed economies, which led to interest rates increasing, hence impacting 
developing economies asset prices where investors had taken large exposures that had 
appreciated. Again, in 2007 net private capital flows peaked by 136 per cent year on year to 
US$715 billion from US$302 billion in 2006. However, owing to the financial crisis, in 2008 net 
private capital flows fell by 65,6 per cent year on year. Recovery was evident in 2009 where net 
private capital flows increased 8,6 per cent year on year. In 2010 and 2011 net private capital 
flows totalled US$482 billion (2009: US$ 267 billion) and US$574 billion respectively. 
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Figure 3.1: Net private capital flows: Emerging and developing market economies 
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According to the Institute of International Finance (IIF) (2009; 2011; 2012), the private capital 
flow to emerging market economies for 2007 was US$928,6 billion; in 2008 it was US$622 
billion and in 2009 it was US$602 billion due to the slowdown of global economic growth. 
Capital flows for 2010 was at US$1 040 billion but in 2011 capital flows was down to US$910 
billion. The IIF also forecasts net private capital flows for 2012 to be US$746 billion and for 2013 
to be US$893 billion due to the financial turbulence in the Euro area.  
 
The shifts away from capital account liberalisation in emerging markets are due to higher growth 
rates and lower macroeconomic volatility failing to materialise sufficiently. Licchetta (2006:5,21) 
suggests that “it is only for the special case of FDI . . . that an open capital account leads to 
higher growth rates . . . and that . . . financial integration is not a necessary condition for 
achieving high growth rate”. This can be seen in Table 3.1, which lists the fastest-growing 
46 
 
developing economies and the slowest-growing economies during 1980–2000 with their status 
of financial openness. 
 
Table 3.1:  Fastest- and slowest-growing economies during 1980–2000 and their status 
 of financial openness 
Fastest-
growing 
economies 
1980-2011
Total % 
change in 
per capita 
GDP*
More financially 
integrated
Slowest-
growing 
economies 
1980-2011
Total % 
change in 
per capita 
GDP*
More financially 
integrated
China 278.24 Yes/No** Haiti -43.3 No
Korea 182.26 Yes Niger -27.34 No
Singapore 135.01 Yes Nicaragua 9.73 No
Thailand 138.49 Yes Togo -48.21 No
Mauritius 123.3 No Cote d' Ivcoire -51.21 No
Botswana 138.64 No Burundi -8.2 No
Hong Kong SAR 118.14 Yes Venezuela 0.21 Yes/No**
Malaysia 107.43 Yes South Africa 16.56 Yes
India 134.06 Yes/No** Jordan 30.39 Yes
Chile 93.54 Yes Paraguay 20.61 No
Indonesia 104.38 Yes Ecuador 33.13 No
Sri Lanka 117.91 No Peru 41.6 Yes  
Source: Prasad et al. (2003), IMF (2011d) 
* Note: Growth rate of real GDP per capita is expressed in current constant local currency units. 
** Yes/No means limited capital account liberalisation 
 
China and India have limited capital account liberalisation, yet have achieved very high growth 
rates. In addition, Botswana and Mauritius also have a high growth rate, even though they are 
not financially integrated into the world financial system. In contrast, Jordan’s and Peru’s growth 
rates in per capita GDP show that financial integration with the world is not a panacea for 
growth. From the table it can be seen that there is some positive correlation between growth in 
GDP and financial integrated economies, but capital account liberalisation alone is not an 
adequate requirement for fast economic growth. This is because economic growth is a function 
of more than one factor.  
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However, capital account liberalisation does bring about indirect benefits to an economy in the 
sense that domestic financial markets get better developed in the long run, there are 
improvements to local institutions and there is an inflow of knowledgeable foreign investors, 
which increases competition and stimulates efficiency among local investors (CGFS, 2009). 
Indeed, the implicit argument of those who favour capital account liberalisation is that 
insufficient capital is the main bottleneck in investment and growth which, for most developing 
countries it is not, Rodrik and Subramanian (2008) also tend to agree with this argument. 
Moreover, money inflows tend to be invested in secondary assets in financial markets. There 
are therefore no contributions to the real capital stock of a country at all because real production 
capacity remains the same; only share values increase. 
 
In the case of Brazil, the leap to capital account liberalisation brought about some rewards. 
Previously, the country adopted a system according to which capital flows were taxed. 
According to Brazils FDI and loans regulation in the 1960s (Laws 4,131 [9.3.62] and 4,390 
[8.29.64] and decree 55,762 [2.17.65]), foreign capital inflows had to be registered and income 
tax paid in order to obtain permission for associated outflows such as profits, interests, royalties, 
and repatriation. Cardoso and Goldfajn (1997:16) explain that “proceeds of foreign borrowing 
were subject to a financial transaction tax with rates that range from 5 percent for loans with 
maturities under 3 years to zero percent for loans with maturities over 6 year . . . Purchasers of 
foreign exchange for some current invisibles were subject to financial transaction tax of 
25 percent”. With regulations like these in place, Brazil’s macroeconomic performance was 
volatile.  
 
In their study, Goldfajn and Minella (2007) found that during the pre-liberalised period from 1970 
to 1982 the majority of Brazil’s capital inflows were composed of loans (74,3%) while portfolio 
investments were small (5,4%). Gross external debt as a percentage of GDP was 31,5 per cent 
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in 1982 and peaked at 53,8 per cent in 1984. Brazil also experienced a shortage of capital flows 
(in 1983–1991) during the external debt crisis, which resulted in the loan flow balance being 
negative.  
However, after Brazil had liberalised its capital account in the early 1990s, Goldfajn and Minella 
(2007:351) maintain that the liberalisation process had the following benefits in the country:  
 
1. The debt accumulation pattern changed substantially after the liberalization of the capital 
account and, especially, after the floating of the currency. The private sector decreased 
significantly its issuance of external debt.  
2. The profile of external financing has also changed since liberalization and the floating 
regime. After a period based on portfolio investment, FDI replaced it as the main financing 
source. Since 1998, net direct investment has comprised more than 100 percent of net 
private capital flows. 
3. Net financial flows have, in general, financed current account deficits. Some differences 
emerge over time. Net financial flows financed 
(a) a strong accumulation of international reserves between 1992 and 1996;  
(b) a large expansion of the current account deficit from 1995 to 1997, representing a 
growth of both investment and consumption; and  
(c) an increase in the current account deficit from 1998 to 2001, resulting from a higher 
deficit in net income from abroad. 
4. Following capital account liberalization, consumption—its growth rate and share in GDP—
has been more stable than in the 1980s. In comparison to the 1990s growth episodes, 
economic growth in 2000–2001 took place in a different context. First, net capital flows have 
been of a lower magnitude and have been dominated by FDI. There has been no significant 
surge of short-term flows or portfolio investment. Second, the expansions have been 
accompanied by a more favourable situation in the trade balance.  
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Goldfajn and Minella (2007) support the fact that capital account liberalisation has led to a more 
resilient economy, even though the country made a transition when it experienced 
macroeconomic volatility. 
 
Griffith-Jones (2003:1) asserts that for capital account liberalisation to be gainful to developing 
countries, three prerequisites should apply. First, there should be adequate private capital flows 
feeding into developing countries. She asserts that this condition was met during the 1990s. 
However, the situation had changed drastically in the wake of the Asian crisis with capital flows 
to emerging markets reducing. This was due to “structural changes where domestic banks have 
crossed the border and will replace domestic lending with foreign lending as there are not many 
‘sufficiently large’ companies left for equity investors to buy in developing countries” (p. 2).  
 
Second, capital flows should be long term and not too relaxed where they can easily be 
switched so as to avoid a costly crisis. In her research, Griffith-Jones emphasises that FDI is the 
key supply of net capital flows, which is more long term and less easily reversible. However, 
non-FDI capital flows to emerging markets (e.g., debt and portfolio equity) seem to have 
become increasingly volatile due to the increased use of derivatives and other institutional 
factors. 
 
Third, there should be global assistance in both crisis prevention and better crisis management 
in order to make crises shorter and less costly, for example, the IMF lending to Brazil in mid-
2002 contributed to a more stable market sentiment.  
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3.1.3 A more sustainable exchange rate regime 
 
Since the Asian crisis, many countries have attempted to overhaul their exchange rate regime to 
make it more sustainable in order to optimise growth. Chow et al. (2007:2) advocate that “when 
we combine a fixed exchange rate and premature opening of the capital account with a weakly 
structured domestic financial sector, currency crises quickly turn into financial crises and 
perhaps to full-blown economic and political crises”. Capital account liberalisation should thus 
not be isolated. In fact, it should be sequenced with appropriate macroeconomic reforms and 
exchange rate policies. In addition, the exchange rate regime must also be consistent with other 
policies to achieve macroeconomic stability so that large volatility in, and disruptions to, the 
economy are prevented. 
 
In choosing an exchange rate regime, the execution of policies is significant for a country’s 
economic and financial stability. The advantage of having a floating exchange rate is that it is 
better able to absorb shocks. Experience has proven that economies are more robust and 
resilient with flexible exchange rates. This can be seen in the case of Brazil in 2002, when the 
markets put substantial downward pressure on the real before the presidential elections. 
Although the Brazilian real had depreciated against the US dollar for a little while, it gained 
momentum and later appreciated. “The floating Brazilian real averaged US$2,34 against the 
USD, within a range of US$1,32 on the outset to US$3,96 on 22 October 2002” (Campos 
Meirelles, 2009:1). Another example can be seen in the effects of the 2007 global economic 
crisis (explained later in the chapter). According to Kaltenbrunner and Painceira (2009:1)  
 
late in 2008, Brazil experienced one of the largest exchange-rate depreciations in the world as 
short-term speculative capital flooded out of the economy. However it had little to do with Brazil’s 
‘economic fundamentals’, such as its current-account balance, its fiscal balance or its public-sector 
debt. Instead, it was linked directly to deteriorating conditions in international financial markets.  
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However, sizeable short-term capital inflows are causing the exchange-rate to appreciate again. 
The downside to flexible exchange rates is that of greater volatility with important destabilising 
effects on the inflation rate. It is worth noting that economies that are robust and resilient to 
shocks with strong domestic and well-functioning markets can generally tolerate this volatility.  
 
Dodge (2005) explains that a flexible exchange rate alone is insufficient. He maintains that a 
combination of a flexible exchange rate with a domestic anchor, such as inflation targeting and 
sound fiscal policy, can work more effectively and provide a more complete monetary policy 
framework. He adds that a floating exchange rate, together with anchors, helps the economy to 
adjust to transforming environments and that changes in the exchange rate are seen as a 
warning signal by businesses, thus helping the economy adjust to changing circumstances. 
 
To avoid irregular capital flows and unstable exchange rates, a gradual approach to 
liberalisation should be followed. Nsouli et al. (2005) agree with McKinnon (1973) and suggest 
that countries should follow a gradual approach to liberalisation and liberalise their domestic 
financial sector first, followed by the exchange rate and then the capital account. Chow et al. 
(2007:5), in contrast, propose the cascading of financial liberalisation where all aspects of a 
liberalisation programme are executed concurrently. They advocate that 
 
under optimal cascading, selected lifting of capital controls and a limited degree of exchange 
rate flexibility can take place while the domestic financial sector is developing. As the domestic 
financial sector deepens, increased exchange rate flexibility and an increasing liberalised capital 
account will not only be possible, but optimal. (P. 5). 
  
Nowadays, exchange rate and external financial strategies are established concurrently to 
maximise potential growth and development while reducing risks. It is important for central 
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banks to settle on exchange rate policies in conjunction with financial account liberalisation. In 
addition, an appropriate exchange rate regime should reflect the individual properties and 
characteristics of an economy.  
 
3.1.4 Better monetary policy in general 
 
The process of liberalisation has impacted on the conduct of monetary policy in a significant 
manner. Some of the key issues that emanated from financial liberalisation include the role of 
monetary policy authorities and their co-operation in avoiding future crisis, the risks of contagion 
and threats it poses to macroeconomic and financial stability, and increased competition and 
globalisation.  
 
Ferguson (2002:2) explains that “in preventing financial instability, central banks should foster a 
macroeconomic environment of low and stable inflation and sustainable economic growth”. 
However, Crockett (2001:4) argues that “the combination of a liberalised financial system and a 
fiat standard with monetary rules defined exclusively in terms of inflation is not a sufficient 
condition for financial stability”. 
 
These developments have led to the refinement of the objectives and strategies of monetary 
policy in that central banks are concentrating on financial stability in formulating their monetary 
policy. Svensson (2011) defines ‘financial stability’ as  
 
a situation in which the financial system can fulfill its main functions of submitting payments, 
transforming saving into financing and providing risk management with sufficient resilience to 
disruptions that threaten these functions . . . Financial-stability policy directly affects spreads, 
lending and other aspects of financial conditions as well as the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy. 
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The objective of central banks globally is generally to maintain monetary and financial stability. 
While monetary stability relates to price stability, financial stability can be seen as the smooth 
functioning of the financial system. The smooth functioning of financial institutions and markets 
can be identified by the absence of disruptions, such as crisis or volatility, to the various sectors. 
“The transmission of monetary policy to the real economy depends crucially on the smooth 
functioning of key financial institutions and markets” (Ferguson, 2002:3), because monetary 
policy affects the overall liquidity conditions of these institutions; in other words, if monetary 
policy is loose or tight, the balance sheet of financial institutions is affected but not necessarily 
the balance-sheet totals. The institutions either expand their balance sheet via collateralised 
loans or contract their balance sheet by reducing stock of repos (i.e., by selling repos) in 
exchange for more cash. This effect ensures that the supply of liquidity either increases or 
decreases in these institutions but leaves the balance-sheet totals unaffected (but recently 
balance sheet adjustment has become more complex after the introduction of quantitative 
easing which is explained in section 3.2.3.3 Lender of last resort). Accordingly, consumption 
expenditure and investments also increase or decrease, which eventually affects output. This 
influences the effectiveness of the transmission mechanism.  
 
Monetary stability and financial stability are intertwined in that price stability encourages positive 
investment and longstanding growth which, in turn, is favourable to financial stability. Borio 
(2011:12) is in agreement and asserts that central banks cannot abandon financial stability and 
therefore its “operational autonomy in pursuing price stability should be safeguarded”. ‘Price 
stability’ can be defined as “a state in which the general price level is literally stable or the 
inflation rate is sufficiently low and stable” (Papademos, 2006).  
 
In promoting financial stability, Mishkin (2006:2) says that “financial deepening must be 
promoted . . . by developing an institutional infrastructure that enables the financial system to 
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allocate capital efficiently”; for example, the reform in Thailand was gradual, which allowed 
institutions to adjust. This reform included strengthening the monitoring and examination of the 
financial system; developing the payment system, and the countries’ debt market and 
instruments; and allowing foreign firms to access the domestic financial market.  
 
Opening up the financial system to global institutions enhances competition and allows for 
better practices, which should strengthen the functioning of financial markets. Mishkin (2006:17) 
asserts that  
 
because many emerging market and transition economies are more volatile than industrialised 
countries, having a large foreign component to the banking sector is especially valuable 
because it can help insulate the banking system from domestic shock. Encouraging entry of 
foreign banks is thus likely to lead to a banking and financial system that is substantially less 
fragile and far less prone to crisis 
 
since better competition, governance and more efficient and knowledgeable market participants 
will help sustain a competent financial system. 
 
In the new environment of globalisation and financial integration up to the beginning of 2007 the 
monetary policy stances of central banks (e.g., South Africa and Brazil) have proven adequate 
in influencing and safeguarding financial stability in the domestic sector. Threats to the financial 
system (e.g., excessive competition, overcrowding in the banking sector, misguided regulation, 
and currency and banking crises) cannot be completely discarded. However, a well-regulated 
financial system can limit these threats.  
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The liberalisation process has brought about many changes in the economic and financial 
environment in many developing countries. The central banks of most developing countries 
have implemented various monetary policy strategies and best practices after liberalisation with 
a better regulatory framework (which will be discussed later in this chapter), in order to ensure a 
less-volatile and more stable economic environment. It is evident that monetary policy is an 
important function in limiting the effect of future possible crises. 
 
Monetary policy should be adopted in such a way that it should try to prevent a volatile market 
and high rates of inflation by all means. This is because volatile inflation rates can affect 
consumers as well as firms, for example, high inflation may cause central banks to increase 
interest rates. Banks react by also increasing their lending rates, which can trigger bankruptcy, 
thus affecting the performance of bank loans due to the risk that some borrowers cannot repay 
their loan in time. However, if inflation is low in a loose monetary policy stance, then investment 
and consumer spending increase, which contributes to an increase in growth and can again 
accelerate inflation. However, too-low or negative inflation can be risky, because borrowers will 
prefer holding cash rather than bank deposits as the interest on the bank deposit may be non-
existent or insignificant. As a result, this can affect the bank’s profits. Sinclair (2000:388) states 
that “monetary policy should therefore aim at stabilising inflation with positive and stable short-
run nominal interest rates, as quick temporary changes in short nominal rates may add to 
uncertainties in financial markets”. 
 
3.2 Various best practice standards  
 
In response to the Asian financial crisis, attention was drawn to the importance of a more 
prudent regulatory and supervisory environment to prevent bank failures and systemic risks. 
International financial institutions, such as the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
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(BCBS), the OECD, the Financial Stability Forum (FSF),3 the IMF and the World Bank, have 
created a number of international standards to control market behaviour. These standards, now 
known as ‘best practices’, are being assessed through various methods (which are explained 
later in this chapter). Some of the changes that these standards have brought about include 
supervisors focusing on better risk management practices, and government strengthening 
regulation and prudential supervision of financial institutions. Furthermore, these best practices, 
which are benchmarks for countries to follow, now include a reform of the International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel I) (followed by the 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised 
Framework (Basel II) which will be explained in the next section and the subsequent Basel III), 
safety net practices and the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Stevens (2007:10) 
asserts that “these and other efforts represent an attempt to use what was learnt from the Asian 
and other crises to reduce susceptibility, or at least to get an early warning of regional level 
problems in the future.” 
 
3.2.1 Raised capital requirements 
 
3.2.1.1 Basel I  
 
In Noys’s (2004:343) description of the lax supervision hypothesis (also explained in section 
2.4.3) he says that “if an efficient supervisory structure is in place, excessive risk-taking will not 
occur, and financial liberalisation is unlikely to have an adverse effect on the stability of the 
banking system”. If the same line of thought is followed, it is evident that one of the ways to 
maintain stability in the banking sector is for banks to have an adequate amount of capital in 
order to do business, as a bank’s net worth (i.e., value of assets minus the value of debts) can 
                                                 
3 In April 1999 the FSF was summoned, at the initiative of the Group of Seven (G-7) Finance Ministers and Central 
Bank Governors, in order to promote financial stability globally and improve the manner in which financial markets 
operated by co-ordinating the efforts of various authorities responsible for financial stability. 
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become negative, if asset values depreciate at a fast pace. Thus, this can result in the bank 
experiencing technical bankruptcy. Therefore, in international banking there needs to be a set 
standard across the globe of maintaining capital to mitigate risks and to ensure that financial 
systems are more robust. 
  
The BCBS therefore developed a framework to set standards for maintaining capital levels for 
international banks so that systemic stability could be maintained. This framework was the first 
Accord, known as Basel I, which was released in 1988. “The framework was mainly directed 
towards assessing capital in relation to credit risk” (BCBS, 1998:2). As a result, a risk-weighted 
ratio method was used to classify banks’ assets into various risk categories, five risk categories 
to be precise (see Table 3.2). Banks were required to retain at least 8 per cent capital of their 
risk-weighted assets, especially if their businesses were based abroad. Table 3.2 shows the 
banks risk categories and weights under Basel I. 
 
Table 3.2: Banks’ risk categories and weights under Basel I 
Risk weights 
(%) Risk asset category 
0 Cash, central bank and government debt and any OECD government debt 
0, 10, 20 or 50 Public sector debt 
20 Development bank debt, OECD bank debt, OECD securities firm debt, non-OECD bank 
debt (under one-year maturity) and non-OECD public sector debt, cash in collection 
50 Residential mortgages 
100 Private sector debt, non-OECD bank debt (maturity over a year), real estate, plant and 
equipment, capital instruments issued at other banks 
Source: BCBS (July 1988) 
 
The main weakness of Basel I was confirmed in the few credit risk categories and the vague 
weightings of some loans for capital-adequacy purposes. First, critics such as Griffith-Jones and 
Spratt (2001) argue that the distinction between OECD countries and non-OECD countries in 
risk weights is biased, as developing countries will long to become a member of the OECD. 
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Second, the 20 per cent risk weight to non-OECD countries for short-term loans seemed more 
profitable for creditor banks. Furthermore, Table 3.2 shows that loans to non-OECD countries 
with maturity over a year required a 100 per cent risk weighting. The reason for this was that 
non-OECD countries were regarded as being risky countries in terms of debt repayment. 
International banks were therefore discouraged from lending long-term loans. While the risk 
weight of loans with a maturity of under one year made to non-OECD members was 20 per 
cent, whether it was for long- or short-term loans, this rule pushed international banks to lend 
excessively in the short term to developing countries, which was obviously cheaper considering 
the risk weight capital. Some developing countries used their short-term loans to fund long-term 
projects, which eventually became problematic due to the instability in the financial system. 
 
3.2.1.2 Basel II  
 
Basel II is a revised framework of the 1988 Capital Accord, which did not take into account the 
advances in risk management practices, technology and financial markets. Basel I encouraged 
banks to boost their capital positions and reduce competitive inequalities by adopting a standard 
approach to internationally active banks. Whereas Basel II focuses on the improvement of 
safety and soundness in the financial system, an increase in competitive equality and a more 
comprehensive approach to addressing risks, the goal of Basel II is to ensure a sound financial 
market and to enhance financial stability by making sure certain banks have sufficient capital to 
guard against the risks that they face. Previously, under Basel I, banks were required to 
maintain 8 per cent of their capital requirements to counter risks, but Basel II states that banks 
would have to calculate how much of their capital to reserve for each risk area.  
 
The reason why banks are subject to capital requirements is because capital acts as a cushion 
against banks’ unexpected loss and a foundation for a bank’s future growth. If capital levels are 
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in short supply, then banks may be vulnerable to huge losses, thus this may increase the risk of 
a bank failure or technical bankruptcy. However, if capital levels are excessively high, then 
banks may limit the use of their resources which, in turn, may hamper the available credit that 
they offer to the public.  
 
So, as part of strengthening the financial environment, capital reserves are viewed as an 
appropriate instrument to mitigate risks to which a bank may be exposed. This will lead to bank 
managers enhancing their risk management and prudential supervision. However, with the 
recent global economic crises (which will be touched on later in this chapter) it is debatable 
whether increased capital acts as a cushion against unexpected losses as it did little to prevent 
or ameliorate the recent subprime problems. What it does, is ensure that more of the risk is 
carried by shareholders instead of deposit holders and other lenders to banks, without reducing 
the overall risk very much. 
 
The goal of Basel II is to be accomplished by three pillars. According to the BCBS (2003), they 
are as follows: 
 
i Pillar 1: Minimum capital requirements 
 
These requirements are more risk-sensitive and closely aligned to the bank’s actual risk of 
economic loss. The primary risk categories include credit risk, market risk and operational risk.  
 
Credit risk is defined as the risk of a counterparty (borrower) failing to perform according to 
contractual agreements. As a result, Basel II allows for the measurement of this risk in three 
different ways, namely (i) the standardised approach, for less complex forms of lending; (ii) 
foundation internal ratings-based (IRB) approach, where banks can determine the probability of 
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default by using their own risk model; and (iii) advanced internal ratings-based (AIRB) approach, 
where institutions will be allowed to use their own internal measures of credit risk as primary 
input to capital calculation.  
 
Market risk is defined as the risk that the market price of an asset changing, may lead to a loss. 
Market risk is measured using the value-at-risk (VaR) method.  
 
Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss caused by staff, failures in systems, processes and 
so forth. This risk is measured in three ways, namely (i) the basic indicator approach; (ii) the 
standardised approach, which is used for minimum operational risk exposure, and (iii) the 
advanced measurement approach (AMA), which is more risk-sensitive, and caters for 
internationally active banks and banks that are largely exposed to operational risks. 
 
ii Pillar 2: Supervisory review 
 
This pillar is a review of the banks’ overall risks to ensure that management has set aside 
adequate capital for all the business risks beyond minimum requirements. 
 
iii Pillar 3: Market discipline 
 
This pillar complements Pillars 1 and 2, and encourages cautious management by improving 
the transparency and disclosure in the bank’s public reporting. Market discipline is enhanced 
through policies such as corporate governance, accounting policies and auditing policies, thus 
increasing information about the banks and companies.  
 
Internationally active banks implemented Basel II in January 2008, while other emerging 
countries are making an effort to work towards Basel II at their own pace. Basel II is expected to 
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bring many advantages, such as improved risk management systems to address the complexity 
and innovation in the markets; enhance firms’ and financial systems’ resilience in the changing 
financial landscape; and a more flexible framework to accommodate risk strategies. However, 
there has been a general dispute because it is believed that Basel II has a negative 
consequence for developing countries as it affects the cost of capital and thus can limit the 
developing countries’ access to external financing. In addition, because emerging market 
economies’ financial institutions are not properly structured, problems with implementation will 
exist. Furthermore, a high proportion of information asymmetry exists in these economies, 
making credit risk difficult. Accordingly, Powell (2004:2) asserts that “Basel II was not written 
with developing countries in mind, but that does not necessarily mean that there is nothing in it 
for developing countries or that it can be ignored”.  
 
Recently, there has been a call for further improvements in Basel II by the Group of Seven (G-7) 
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FSF, 2008:1) due to the global financial crisis in 
2007, which was caused by the US subprime mortgage crisis (see section 3.2.3.1 Financial 
regulation). The FSF was tasked by the G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors to 
“set out recommendations for increasing the resilience of markets and institutions going 
forward” (FSF, 2008:1). According to the FSF (2008:3), these recommendations include the 
following: 
 
• Strengthening prudential oversight of capital, liquidity and risk management: Raising 
capital requirements for certain structured credit products such as collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs). 
•  Changes in the role and uses of credit ratings: [credit rating agencies] CRAs have 
undertaken a series of actions to improve their rating process, such as utilising 
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differentiated ratings, and expanded information on structured products and CRA 
assessment of underlying data quality. 
•  Strengthening the authorities’ responsiveness to risks: Other risk management and 
supervisory initiatives, where the BCBS has worked with the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and the International Accounting and Auditors Standards Board 
(IAASB) to ensure that fair-value estimates in financial statements were reliable, relevant 
and auditable. 
•  Enhancing transparency and valuation: Better valuation and disclosure practices relating 
to structured products and off-balance-sheet exposures. 
•  Robust arrangements for dealing with stress in the financial system: Central bank 
operational frameworks should be sufficiently flexible in terms of potential frequency and 
maturity of operations, available instruments, and the range of counterparties and 
collateral to deal with extraordinary situations. 
 
3.2.1.3 Basel III 
 
In December 2010 the BCBS released new regulations for capital and liquidity, known as 
Basel III (which was endorsed by the Group of Twenty (G-20) Summit in Seoul in September 
2010) due to the weaknesses in the banking sector which was an accessory to the global 
financial crisis in 2007. Basel III is not a substitute for Basel I and Basel II but is seen as a 
supplement to the previous frameworks. The intention of Basel III is to ensure that banks are 
faced with higher capital requirements, especially the bigger banks due to their systemic 
influence on the economy in cases of bank failures. In this case the aim of Basel III is to ensure 
that the banking system is appropriately armoured to handle extreme financial and economic 
volatility. The reform has a micro- and a new macroprudential approach to it. In the micro-
prudential approach, the importance of a clearer definition of capital is stressed where good-
quality capital now means “more loss-absorbing capacity”, while more emphasis is placed on 
common equity.  
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The micro-prudential approach further elaborates on  
i. bank liquidity risk profiles where global minimum liquidity standards will “make banks 
more resilient to potential short-term disruptions in access to funding and to address 
long-term structural liquidity mismatches in their balance sheets” (BCBS, 2010b:6); 
ii. a stronger Pillar 2 guidance which enhances risk management and supervision; and  
iii. a revised Pillar 3 requirement for better disclosure of risk exposure and the regulatory 
capital base. 
 
In the macroprudential approach, ways to reduce procyclicality are also addressed through a 
capital conservation buffer and a countercyclical buffer. The reason for this is to protect the 
banking sector and absorb losses during periods of volatility and excess credit growth. Further 
to the macroprudential approach is the issue of systemic risk of banks and how they are 
connected to other banks on a global basis. The BCBS (2010b:10) is looking at “measures to 
mitigate the risk or externalities associated with systemic banks, including liquidity surcharges, 
tighter large exposure restrictions, and enhanced supervision”. Basel III will be gradually 
implemented over from the period 2011 to 2019 (Table 3.6). 
 
3.2.2 Financial Sector Assessment Program  
 
The FSAP was jointly introduced by the World Bank and the IMF in 1999 after various financial 
crises. Its objective is to increase the soundness of financial systems in member countries. The 
aims of the FSAP include determining risk management, and identifying the strengths and 
weaknesses of a country’s financial system. The key component of the FSAP lies in its 
observance of various standards and codes, which gives rise to the Report of Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC). The ROSC reviews countries’ compliance with internationally 
recognised standards and codes. These standards and codes are set by established 
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international bodies for a sound financial system. The standards and codes are composed of 
12 globally accepted key standards ranging from core principles for financial supervision to 
market infrastructure issues, such as corporate governance, which are promoted by the FSF. 
According to the FSF (2000) the key standards help to  
 
• strengthen domestic financial systems by encouraging sound regulation and supervision, 
greater transparency, and more efficient and robust institutions, markets, and 
infrastructure; and  
• promote international financial stability by facilitating better-informed lending and 
investment decisions, improving market integrity, and reducing the risks of financial 
distress and contagion.  
 
Table 3.3: Twelve key standards for sound financial systems 
Area Standard Issuing body Date 
Macroeconomic policy and data transparency 
1. Monetary and financial 
policy transparency 
Code of Good Practices on Transparency in 
Monetary and Financial Policies IMF July 1999 
2. Fiscal policy 
transparency Code of Good Practices on Fiscal transparency IMF Aril 1998 
3. Data dissemination Special or General Data Dissemination Standard IMF March 1996 
Institutional and market infrastructure 
4. Crisis resolution and 
deposit insurance 
Core Principles for Effective Deposit Insurance 
Systems BCBS/IADI December 2010 
5. Insolvency Insolvency and Creditor Rights World Bank April 2000 
6. Corporate governance Principles of Corporate Governance OECD May 1999 
7. Accounting and International Financial Reporting Standards IASB Various 
 Auditing International Standards on Auditing IAASB Various 
8. Payment, clearing and 
settlement 
Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment 
Systems  
Recommendations for Securities Settlement 
Systems  
Recommendations for Central Counterparties 
CPSS/IOSCO 
January 2001 
 
November 2001 
 
November 2004 
9. Market integrity The Forty Recommendations and Nine Special recommendations Against Terrorist Financing  FATF 1990 
Financial regulation and supervision 
10. Banking supervision Core Principles for Banking Supervision BCBS September 1997 
11. Securities regulation Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation IOSCO September 1998 
12. Insurance supervision Insurance Core Principles IAIS October 2000 
Source: FSF (2000) 
BCBS: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision CPSS: Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems 
FATF: Financial Action Task Force IAIS: International Association of Insurance Supervisors. 
IASB: International Accounting Standards Board IFAC: International Federation of Accountants 
IMF: International Monetary Fund IOSCO: International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
IADI: International Association of Deposit Insurance 
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3.2.3 A financial safety net for banks 
 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2003:10) define a ‘financial safety net’ for banks as “the whole of 
financial regulations and institutions that seek to prevent or limit depositor losses in case of an 
(impending) bank failure”. Such a safety net plays an important role in helping to preserve 
financial stability and would be implemented because of the unique contribution that banks 
make towards the financial system such as contributing to economic growth. The safety net also 
improves information asymmetry. Disruptions to banking activities can have negative 
externalities that can extend into other sectors of the economy. Most countries have decided to 
establish a safety net for banks because it can assist in preventing a crisis, especially if the 
banking system is weak or it can help government deal efficiently with a crisis. The most 
common components of a safety net include financial regulation, deposit insurance and a lender 
of last resort. These components will be discussed in more detail in sections 3.2.3.1, 3.2.3.2, 
and 3.2.3.3. 
 
3.2.3.1 Financial regulation 
 
Financial regulation is a form of regulation or supervision that is managed by government or 
non-governmental organisations and that ensures that financial institutions adhere to certain 
conditions or guidelines, with the aim of maintaining systemic stability and consumer protection. 
Bamber et al. (2001:11) assert that the rationale for regulation is identified by the following: 
 
• Potential systemic problems associated with externalities. 
• The correction of market imperfections and failures. 
• The need for monitoring of financial firms and the economies of scale.  
• The need for consumer confidence and consumer demand for regulation. 
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Although the regulators’ main concern deals with liquidity, solvency and riskiness of institutions, 
other important concerns include the protection of consumers from potential exploitation and 
protection of the systemic stability of the economy against crisis. Mishkin (2006:7) asserts that 
“since financial institutions like banks are at the core of what can go wrong and trigger financial 
instability, promoting financial stability to prevent financial crises must start with governments 
providing effective prudential supervision and regulation of the financial system”. Ensuring a 
safe and sound institutional environment is one of the key objectives of regulation. Therefore, 
regulators need to ensure that their regulatory stance does not create barriers to, for example, 
the entry or exit of institutions, or unwarranted costs on the economy and consumers. Instead, 
regulation should impose restrictions on institutions in such a way that it does not cause a moral 
hazard problem and ensure a system of direction or conduct is provided. According to the SARB 
(2004a:25), “too much regulation can give rise to inefficiencies; inconsistencies; overlaps; 
duplication; and higher administrative costs, which can be as damaging as financial instability”.  
 
New developments, technology and structural changes make it possible for countries to 
harmonise their financial regulations. Therefore, it is important for regulatory policies to be 
flexible so that innovation is not stifled and competition is promoted. Likewise, Thompson 
(1996:34) asserts that changes in the financial system, such as increased competition, require 
adaptation in supervision and regulation. His concern is that the securitisation4 of mortgages 
(which is a fairly new development in the market) by non-bank originators should be regulated 
and subjected to prudential capital requirements similar to those for a bank. In addition, the 
creditworthiness of borrowers should be observed by the mortgage originators. According to 
Thompson (1996:34), “these new channels of finance draw attention to the competitive impact 
                                                 
4 Securitisation is the bundling of loans into packages financed by the sale of marketable securities; an example is 
housing loans. 
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of prudential requirements”. The SARB (2004a:25) cautions that “regulation can never provide 
absolute assurance that financial failures will not occur”, but providing sound regulation and 
supervision, and increasing the level of institutional transparency are preventative measures 
against a crisis occurring. According to Bamber et al. (2001:86), proper regulation could have 
prevented financial crises when, among other factors, 
 
(i) there are increasing bank liabilities with large maturity and currency mismatches. In this 
case, an unhedged debtor position in foreign exchange not only makes banks and their 
customers more vulnerable, but also makes it harder to deal with a banking crisis once it 
occurs; and  
(ii) there are weaknesses in the accounting, disclosure and legal framework where there are 
banks that make bad loans look good by lending more money to troubled borrowers (in 
other words, lending to borrowers who are in default so that they appear not to be in 
default). In this case, borrowers are over indebted; as a result, banks are faced with the 
problem of excessive risk exposure.  
 
A recent example of regulation failing to prevent a crisis was that of the US subprime mortgage 
crisis5 where subprime borrowers6 defaulted on their loans, which caused a ripple effect of the 
crisis to other sectors. The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (2009a) explains that a 
lack of effective regulation was key to the crisis. The committee explains that the US economy 
                                                 
5 During the past years (i.e., between 2002 and 2007), the borrowing and lending rates in the US were extremely low, 
which increased the demand for houses. Home loans were offered to borrowers with inferior credit histories thus 
creating “subprime mortgages”. These subprime mortgages were packaged and securitised. Securities backed by the 
packaged mortgages, combined with credit default swaps to decrease the risk, received high ratings from rating 
agencies and were then sold at attractive rates. This attracted investment banks and hedge fund owners to bet big on 
this emerging aspect of the US economy. However, when the United States Federal Reserve System (US Fed) 
began a cycle of interest rate hikes, the cost of borrowing became expensive, which led to several subprime 
mortgage holders defaulting on their loans. In addition, “teaser rates” (which are lower interest rates offered to the 
borrower initially with higher market-related interest rates kicking in later, usually after a number of years) also lapsed 
at the same time. 
6 A ‘subprime borrower’ is defined as one who cannot qualify for prime financing terms but can qualify for subprime 
financing terms. Most subprime borrowers are declined by traditional lenders because of the huge risks of them 
defaulting on their debt payments.  
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failed to protect investors and support market discipline because of the lack of transparency; 
regulation was not consistent across products and services; supervision was uneven; and global 
rules lacked co-ordination. The impact of the subprime mortgage crisis has seen record levels of 
loan defaults and home repossessions.  
 
In addition, the securitisation of the mortgages resulted in contagion affecting major global 
investment banks such as Bear Stearns, which came under strain in May 2008 because of its 
dealings with the US subprime market; General Electric, which decided to sell its WMC 
Mortgage subprime lending business; and Lehmann Brothers, which eventually went bankrupt. 
The securitisation of mortgages created a contagion effect, because it was crammed with 
subprime loans and then sold in the global market at attractive rates. Furthermore, the subprime 
mortgage crisis has affected credit in the economy in that consumers are not willing to buy 
homes for fear of losing value in their purchase and investors are no longer willing to take the 
risk of purchasing securities that are exposed to mortgages. 
 
NematNejad (2007) explains that “subprime loans7 are generally considered risky for both the 
borrower and the lender. It is risky for the lender because borrowers usually have lower incomes 
and a poor record for paying debt, which increases their default probability. It is also risky for 
borrowers” in terms of loss such as foreclosure on homes when the interest rate increases.  
 
However, similar to Noys’s (2004) theory of lax supervision (as explained in Chapter 2, section 
2.4.3), in this case subprime borrowers (and not bank managers) lack the knowledge of the 
types of loans or the contracts they sign. This places borrowers in a situation where they are 
unable to assess their mortgage risks, thus enabling undue risk-taking behaviour, which results 
                                                 
7 Subprime loans tend to have a higher interest rate compared to the prime rate offered on traditional loans. 
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in a crisis. Furthermore, a lack of supervision on the part of the lenders and a lack of 
government regulation also contributed to the crisis, thus fulfilling Noys’s theory. Schafer 
(2007:1) asserts that  
 
a prudential checking and assessment of creditworthiness and credit standing, as well as 
appropriate real-estate valuation, should be an essential pre-requisite for granting a loan. If 
these conditions are fulfilled and proper debtor-creditor relationships meet the requirements of 
prudential risk management there is no reason for the objection to the provision of innovative 
housing loans. 
 
Even though the subprime mortgage crisis was essentially a First World economy illness, it had 
serious consequences for emerging market economies too, but not directly. The transmission 
effects of the crisis from the US to Europe to the rest of the world occurred through many 
channels affecting financial systems and economic activities. Although some emerging market 
economies did not engage in certain banking activities (such as credit default swaps or 
collateralised debt obligations), they were still unfortunately hit by the crisis. Some of the ways 
in which the crisis was transferred to these economies were through: 
 
• Withdrawal of funds: During the crisis, business holdings of major financial institution 
located in emerging economies withdrew their funds. This action limited funding to 
emerging economies that relied on foreign currencies such as the dollar or euro.  
• Credit limitations: The international credit markets were constrained, in that international 
banks and the global bond markets were closed to lending facilities which was a 
consequence of a decline of inward flows to the emerging market economies. As a result 
this action caused significant financial stress especially for those countries that operated 
with large current account deficits.  
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• Economic activity: The impact of the crisis on economic activity affected exports in those 
emerging markets that supplied developed economies. Exports contracted rapidly, thus 
this lack of trade also destabilised the domestic economies of emerging market 
countries. 
• Decline in remittances: The transmission effects of the crisis also influenced the flow of 
remittances. Remittances to emerging markets declined and domestic remittances (i.e., 
transfer of money from individuals – who are moving from rural to urban areas usually in 
search of employment – to their families) also declined because of the high 
unemployment rate. 
 
The ripple effect of the subprime mortgage crisis resulted in a global recession and a significant 
fall in the growth rate of the world economy, which affected emerging countries. In Asia, for 
example, export- and manufacturing-orientated countries were negatively affected by the 
recession. Exports in Asia were hard hit by the drastic decline in external demand and in 2008 
manufacturing had recorded huge downfalls of about 25 per cent in industrial production 
compared with levels a year earlier (IMF, 2009:72). Moreover, in emerging European countries 
imports slumped due to the tightening of external financing by developed economies, as 
markets in the developed economies were illiquid. As a result, some of these emerging 
countries were traumatised by severe recession. 
 
In contrast, Latin America’s experience of the first part of the crisis was different. It enjoyed high 
economic growth, which led to an increase in portfolio inflows, strengthening of the currency and 
an accumulation of reserves. This high growth rate was a consequence of the boom in 
commodity prices. However, Latin America was hard hit when the commodity prices began 
falling in mid-2008. Stock markets plunged, currencies depreciated (by 40 per cent in Brazil and 
almost 30 per cent in Chile) and remittance flows contracted significantly (Cox, 2009). 
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Countries in Africa managed to escape the subprime mortgage crisis because of their low levels 
of financial integration. Generally, African banks have not been involved in complicated financial 
products, because their financial markets are still underdeveloped. However, the contagious 
effects of the subprime crises affected some African countries, especially those that are 
dependent on natural resources. As in Latin America, the fall in commodity prices resulted in a 
depreciation in currencies, a decline in foreign-exchange reserves and non-profitability in some 
of the oil-producing countries, for instance, the price of crude oil dropped by 65 per cent, from 
US$125,73 per barrel at the start of the financial crisis to US$43,48 in January 2009 (African 
Development Bank, 2009:1–7). 
 
Despite the contagious effects of the subprime crises, some of the emerging markets managed 
to rebound and stabilise, for example, according to the IMF (2009:72), the rebound in Asia can 
be linked to the following three factors: 
  
(1) Expansionary fiscal and monetary policy.  
(2)  A rebound in financial markets and capital inflows, which eased financing constraints for 
smaller export enterprises and improved consumer and business confidence.  
(3) The growth impulse for industry following large inventory adjustments due to the increase 
in domestic demand which was accompanied by policy adjustments. 
 
Whilst few emerging economies had limited exposure to the subprime market, for example, the 
Czech Republic and Poland showed signs of stabilisation during the crisis due to their strong 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
In containing financial market turbulence, government should strengthen the regulation and 
prudential supervision of financial institutions and implement ample reform efforts, such as 
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better financial and economic policies. Therefore, regulatory authorities should ensure an 
effective and efficient system of regulation, where consumers are protected, institutions are 
sound and the stability within an economy is secured. The SARB (2004a:25) suggests that 
“regulation should permit healthy competition between the regulated institutions as far as 
development of new products, services and competitive strategies are concerned, while 
ensuring that regulatory objectives are met”. South Africa, for example, is in the process of 
improving its financial regulatory system by moving towards a twin peaks approach of the 
regulatory architecture where prudential conduct of regulation and market conduct of regulation 
will each have separate key roles. In addition “South Africa will adopt a system-wide approach 
to financial stability and regulation, bolster the supervision of individual institutions, and ensure 
better coordination and information sharing. The scope of regulation will also be extended to 
cover presently unregulated financial activities that have the potential to create systemic risks to 
financial stability” (National Treasury, 2011:23). The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation 
(2009b:1) states that for an effective regulatory system the following four objectives must be 
achieved:  
 
i. Reduced systemic risk through more sensible and effective regulation; 
ii. Increased disclosure to protect investors and stabilise the market; 
iii. A unified regulatory system where lines of accountability are clear and transparency is 
improved; and 
iv. International regulatory harmonisation and cooperation. 
 
However, with that being said, one would question why Basel II did not prevent the crisis when it 
was designed to reduce systemic risks and places emphasis on disclosure. Blundell-Wignall 
and Atkinson (2008), Petersen et al. (2009) and Alles (2010) argue that Basel II exacerbated the 
financial crisis. They are of the opinion that Basel II prescribes inadequate levels of required 
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capital and that the framework strengthens business cycle fluctuations, resulting in limited bank 
lending during times of recession: for example, minimum capital requirements tend to be pro-
cyclical; in other words, when measured risks are low and the market is expanding, minimum 
capital requirements are low, but when there is a contraction in the market and measured risks 
are high, minimum capital requirements increase. Thus, this amplifies cyclical instability which, 
in turn, raises financial instability. Furthermore, the procyclical behaviour of banks is due to 
weak risk management. Therefore, supervisors with weak risk management will make hasty 
decisions such as cutting lending when there is a slowdown in the market.  
 
Other reasons why economists such as Eichengreen (2008), Kirk (2007) and Alles (2010) 
believe that Basel II exacerbated the financial crisis include the issue of rating agencies 
assessing the creditworthiness of borrowers. These economists question the reliability and 
quality of the rating agencies’ assessment. They are of the opinion that the rating models for 
mortgage-related structured products were inconsistent. This is because the subprime products 
that were previously rated high were suddenly downgraded during the crisis, which was 
unprecedented. This resulted in write-downs by financial institutions and intensified a downward 
trend. Furthermore, the interaction of accounting rules (e.g., fair-value accounting) with the new 
Capital Accord lacked specific guidelines. It is argued that International Accounting Standard 
(IAS) 39 is not in line with banks’ credit risk measurement. This is because fair-value accounting 
is extremely procyclical if liquidity disappears: for example, during the financial crisis, many 
institutions were compelled to liquidate their assets and prices developed by these institutions 
were not met by the requirements for fair-value measurement. Owing to limited guidelines, 
financial institutions had to carry out fair-value measurement on the basis of unreasonable 
market prices. This inflated book losses and intensified the vicious cycle. 
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In contrast, other economists (Caruana and Narain (2008); Cannata and Quagliariello (2009)) 
argue that the crisis occurred while countries were still in the process of implementing Basel II; 
in other words, they were still in the Basel I phase. Griffin (2008) argues that “although Basel I 
provided a regulatory capital incentive, it resulted in reduced incentives for banks to monitor the 
credit quality of the loans that banks pumped into collateralised loan obligations and other 
structured vehicles”. He further states that “Basel I rules failed to highlight contingent credit risk, 
which put strain on banks’ capital once the credit risk from conduits and structured investment 
vehicles (SIVs) started to come back on to bank balance sheets”. Caruana and Narain also 
agree that one of the shortcomings of Basel I is that “it did not capture well the risks associated 
with banks’ securitisation exposures, which have grown significantly since the implementation of 
the accord” (p. 25). In spite of this, they further explain that during the transition phase of Basel 
II risks had to be managed and that advanced approaches had to be factored in over a number 
of years, bearing in mind that Basel I still applied (pp. 25,26). An example of this can be seen in 
Table 3.4 where Japan had implemented the standardised approach in 2007 and the advanced 
approach only in 2008. Hence, many countries did not fully implement the framework in 2007 
when the financial crisis began to unfold due to operational delays and legislative bottlenecks. 
Similarly, Cannata and Quagliariello (2009:14) also agree that Basel II had not played a major 
role in the financial crisis. They argue that the epicentre of the financial crisis was in the US and 
that the US’s implementation of the accord had been deferred to 2010. Moreover, in 2007 in the 
European Union (EU) the use of Basel II was minimal when the crisis erupted because banks 
took advantage of the Capital Requirements Directive which allowed them to defer Basel II to 
2008. As a result, the financial crisis occurred under the Basel I Framework.  
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Table 3.4: Basel II implementation schedules 
Country Credit risk standardised Credit risk advanced 
Australia 1 January 2008 1 January 2008 
Canada 1 November 2007 1 November 2007 
European Union 1 January 2007 1 January 2008 
Hong Kong SAR 1 January 2007 1 January 2007 
Japan  
Korea 
1 March 2007 
1 January 2008 
1 March 2008 
1 January 2008 
Singapore 1 January 2008 1 January 2008 
South Africa 1 January 2008 1 January 2008 
United States Not announced Mid 2009 
 Source: Caruana and Narain (2008) 
 
The BCBS (2010b:1) states that the crises was intensified by weaknesses in the banking sector 
such as “excessive leverage, inadequate and low quality capital, and insufficient liquidity 
buffers”. In order to address these issues, the BCBS introduced a revised set of rules called 
‘Basel III’. As mentioned earlier, the aim of Basel III is to ensure that the banking system is 
appropriately armoured to handle extreme financial and economic volatility. Thus banks are 
currently in the process of implementing Basel III. The implementation process will have some 
effects with regards to capital composition, leverage ratio and liquidity standards. For example: 
 
Capital composition: The importance of a clearer definition of capital is stressed where good-
quality capital now means “more loss-absorbing capacity”, while more emphasis is placed on 
common equity. Because of the emphasis on common equity in future Tiers 1 and 2 capital will 
no longer cater for regulatory capital deduction but common equity will cater for this instead. 
Thus the minimum requirement for common equity will be raised from 2 per cent to 4,5 per cent 
(see Table 3.5). If the capital conservative buffer is taken into account, then the total common 
equity requirement will be 7 per cent. The Tier 1 capital requirement will now increase from 4 
per cent to 6 per cent, while Tier 1 leverage ratio will be 3 per cent during testing of on- and off-
balance-sheet exposures. Furthermore ways to reduce procyclicality is also addressed through 
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a capital conservation buffer of 2,5 per cent and a countercyclical buffer of 0 to 2,5 per cent, 
both composed of common equity. 
 
Leverage ratio: The implementation of the new leverage ratio began in January 2011 which can 
be seen as the initial period of supervisory monitoring. However, from January 2013 to 
January 2017 a parallel-run period will commence to determine if the proposed level of the 
leverage ratio is appropriate for a full credit cycle. From 1 January 2015 banks will be required 
to disclose their leverage ratio.  
 
Liquidity standards: The observation period for the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) began in 
January 2011 and observation for the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) will begin in January 2012 
after which LCR will be introduced in January 2015 and NSFR will move to minimum standard in 
January 2018. 
 
The implementation of Basel III is summarised in Table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.5: Calibration of the capital framework: Capital requirements and buffers (all numbers 
in percentage) 
Capital requirement and buffer 
Common equity 
(after deductions) Tier 1 capital Total capital 
Minimum 4,5 6,0 8,0 
Conservation buffer 2,5   
Minimum plus conservation buffer 7,0 8,5 10,5 
Countercyclical buffer range* 0–2,5   
Source: BCBS (2010 (c)) 
 * Common equity or other fully loss-absorbing capital 
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Table 3.6: Phase-in arrangements (all dates are as of 1 January, in percentage) 
  2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Leverage ratio Supervisory monitoring 
Parallel run 
1 January 2013 – 1 January 2017 
Disclosure starts 1 Jan 2015   
Migration 
to Pillar 1   
Minimum common 
equity capital ratio     3,5 4,0 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 
Capital conservation 
buffer           0,625 1,25 1,875 2,50 
Minimum common 
equity plus capital 
conservation buffer     3,5 4,0 4,5 5,125 5,75 6,375 7,0 
Phasing in of deductions 
from CET1 (including 
amounts exceeding the 
limit for DTAs, MSRs 
and financials)       20 40 60 80 100 100 
Minimum Tier 1 capital     4,5 5,5 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 6,0 
Minimum total capital     8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 
Minimum total capital 
plus conservation buffer     8,0 8,0 8,0 8,625 9,25 9,875 10,5 
Capital instruments that 
no longer qualify as non-
core Tiers 1 or 2 capital     
Phased out over ten-year horizon beginning 2013 
                    
Liquidity coverage ratio 
Observation 
period 
begins 
      
Intro- 
duce 
mini- 
mum 
standard         
Net stable funding ratio 
  
Observation 
period 
begins           
Introduce 
minimum 
standard   
Source: BCBS (2010c) 
 
The implementation of Basel III also creates a unique set of challenges for every organisation. 
Thus there are many complexities to the implementation of Basel III. These include the 
following: 
 
• Design complexity: Banks must now build an integrated view of credit, migration, and 
default risks for the trading book, whereas under Basel II regulatory capital for credit risk 
was addressed only in the banking book. Banks must also develop methodologies for 
calculating stressed VAR, and incremental risk charge, none of which were required 
under Basel II (Harle et al, 2010: 21). 
• Data quality: The challenge for data management in Basel III is more strenuous than 
before since managers must ensure that high-quality data is available for the calculation 
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of enhanced capital, new liquidity ratios and new leverage ratios for regular reporting 
purposes. Furthermore, the banks’ risk and finance teams must have easy access to 
accurate data that reflect various risks the bank may incur such as credit, market, 
operational, liquidity and concentration risks. Complexities arise where organisations 
have fragmented data. 
• Operational complexities: Under Basel II many banks exceeded their budgets which, of 
course, led to significant cost increases. With the implementation of the new Basel III 
there is a possibility that these risks can be even greater. 
 
3.2.3.2 Deposit insurance 
 
Deposit insurance is a guarantee that depositors placing their funds in banks will not suffer a 
loss when the bank goes bankrupt. It has recently become an important player in the financial 
safety net, especially in the aftermath of severe banking crises such as the East Asian crisis and 
the current global economic crisis. Similar to prudential supervision, the aim of deposit 
insurance is to provide stability in the financial economy by preventing runs on banks or bank 
failures, thus deposit insurance provides a sense of security and confidence in the market. 
Mishkin (2006:10) emphasises that “by decreasing the incentive for depositors to withdraw their 
money if the bank gets into trouble, deposit insurance can prevent bank panics because 
depositors will no longer run on banks”. In addition, deposit insurance ensures a stable financial 
system by giving depositors confidence that their insured money will be available to them in the 
event of a bank failure and that there would be no need for a run on banks. Thus, deposit 
insurance reduces the notion of panic from spreading in the financial system.  
 
Conversely, deposit insurance does display some disadvantages in that it creates moral hazard 
problems where banks tend to adopt excessive risk-taking strategies and abuse government 
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protection, and households or businesses have little incentive to monitor banks’ risk-taking; in 
other words, banks will reap the benefits of risky investments while being protected from losses. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) found in their research that moral hazard was 
problematic in liberalised financial systems where huge risk-taking possibilities were at hand. 
They point out that in countries with weaker institutions, moral hazard problems were also 
greater because in these countries it was more difficult to supervise and control risk-taking by 
banks. 
 
Calomiris (1997:19) asserts that  
 
any meaningful reform of deposit insurance must either credibly restrict risk-taking or make the 
cost of protection against losses to bank deposits sensitive to the riskiness of insured deposits. 
Doing either would remove any incentive for banks to increase risk in response to a capital loss, 
since they would receive no subsidy from raising their risk. 
 
However, a deposit insurance system allows government to support the country’s banking 
system against the potential threat of disruptions or bank failures. In Chile banks have time 
deposits: these deposits are deposit insurances that do not have 100 per cent coverage. This 
strategy is to encourage debt holders to monitor banks as they will suffer the consequences. 
Unlike Chile, Argentina’s deposit insurance was abolished in 1992. The banking crises in 
Argentina during 1980, 1985 and 1989 led to the regulation that Argentinean banks now have to 
finance 2 per cent of their total deposits in the form of subordinated debt, which must comply 
with the principles of the private market.  
 
During the 2007 financial crisis, the role of deposit insurance proved to be inadequate as the 
deposit insurance was insufficient to cover bank runs. For example, in the US during the crisis 
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the reserves of the Deposit Insurance Fund were hard hit. The reserves fell to 1,01 per cent of 
insured deposits in June 2008, and decreased by US$15,7 billion (45%) to US$18,9 billion in 
the fourth quarter of 2008, plunging the reserve ratio to 0,4 per cent of insured deposits, its 
lowest level since June 1993 (Acharya et al., 2009:5). The crisis revealed that the major part of 
the deposit insurance was designed for individual bank failure and not for systemic risks. 
Furthermore, the insignificant coverage or partial insurance proved that the deposit insurance 
premiums were insensitive to risk.  
 
Countries affected by the global crisis, such as the US and the UK, have now taken more 
precautionary steps to safeguard their financial markets against future turmoil seeing that a 
weak deposit insurance scheme does little for financial stability. These countries have extended 
deposit insurance coverage to new areas in addition to increasing their level of coverage 
Furthermore, Australia and New Zealand have also initiated guarantees for the first time. 
 
In having a deposit insurance system in place, it is vital to conform to recognised best practices. 
As a result of the current global economic crisis, in 2009 the BCBS and International 
Association of Deposit Insurers (IADI) developed a new set of Core Principles for the Effective 
Deposit Insurance System. These principles were developed so that countries could use them 
as a standard when launching a new deposit insurance system or modifying their deposit 
insurance systems to suit the needs of the country, and to deal more severely with financial 
stress. There are 18 core principles that are divided into 10 groups. According to the BCBS and 
IADI (2009:9–18), they are as follows: 
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i. Setting objectives: Such as public policy objectives and mitigating moral hazard.  
ii. Mandates and powers: Mandates should be formally specified and consistent with the 
public policy objectives whilst the deposit insurer should have the power to fulfil its 
mandate.  
iii. Governance: The deposit insurer should be independent and not influenced by industry or 
politics.  
iv. Relationships with other safety net participants and cross-border issues: A framework 
should be in place for close coordination and information-sharing, which should be 
formalised. Also relevant information should be exchanged between deposit insurers in 
different jurisdictions confidentially. 
v. Membership and coverage: Membership in the deposit insurance system should be 
compulsory for all financial institutions accepting deposits from those deemed most in 
need of protection and policymakers should define clearly in law, what an insurable 
deposit is. 
vi. Funding: A deposit insurance system should have available all funding mechanisms 
necessary to ensure the prompt reimbursement of depositors’ claims. 
vii. Public awareness: The public must be informed on an ongoing basis about the benefits 
and limitations of the deposit insurance system.  
viii. Selected legal issues: The deposit insurer and individuals working for the deposit insurer 
should be protected against lawsuits.  
ix. Failure resolution: There should be a framework that provides for the early detection and 
timely intervention and resolution of troubled banks.  
x. Reimbursing depositors and recoveries: The deposit insurance system should give 
depositors prompt access to their insured funds and the deposit insurer should share in 
the proceeds of recoveries from the estate of the failed bank.  
 
Furthermore, the deposit insurance system must be based on the following preconditions, which 
will have a direct impact on deposit insurance: 
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• An ongoing assessment of the economy and banking system. 
• Sound governance of agencies comprising the financial system safety net. 
• Strong prudential regulation and supervision. 
• A well-developed legal framework and accounting and disclosure regime. (BCBS and 
IADI, 2009:2.) 
 
The new principles stress that an effective safety net system must be in place for deposit 
insurance to be credible. In order for deposit insurance to be effective, safety net authorities 
need to work hand in hand. Mishkin (2006:10) believes that “without adequate prudential 
regulation and supervision to reduce banks’ incentives to take on too much risk, deposit 
insurance can increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood of a banking crisis”. Deposit 
insurance alone cannot increase financial stability: strong capital standards and sound banking 
supervision should also be included in maintaining a sound financial system. 
 
3.2.3.3 Lender of last resort 
 
The lender of last resort is usually a country’s central bank that provides support by offering 
loans to banks that are facing liquidity problems. Mishkin (1996:35) defines the ‘lender of last 
resort’ role as “a role in which the central bank stands ready to lend during a financial crisis”. 
The aim of these official financial operations is to limit the risk of problems in banks spreading to 
other parts of the financial system. Similar to deposit insurance, the lender of last resort serves 
to protect depositors and prevent large panic withdrawals from banks. Goodhart and LLLing 
(2002:293) state that “the lender of last resort has undertaken two roles: crisis lender and crisis 
manager. The crisis lender provides financing to deal with a crisis, while the crisis manager 
takes responsibility for dealing with a crisis or potential crisis, whether or not the institution itself 
lends for that purpose.” 
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It should be noted that banks do not access the lender-of-last-resort facility on a regular basis: 
this only happens during times of financial crisis, for example, Finland experienced a severe 
banking crisis during 1991–4, which was mainly due to bad banking and bad policies. The 
country did not have the specific legal or institutional framework for managing banking crises. 
Therefore, the central bank took the initial lead in crisis management since it had both the legal 
competence and financial resources. The central bank, together with government, took over the 
savings banks, injected capital into the savings banking sector and implemented special crisis 
support to the whole banking sector. Mishkin (1996:36) suggests that “recovery from a financial 
crisis in many developing countries is a much more complicated exercise than it is for 
developed countries . . . and that the lender of last resort role of a central bank must be used far 
more cautiously in a developing country”. This is because most developing countries’ debt is in 
foreign currencies and is of short duration, with the result that inflation in these countries can 
rise further and their domestic currency can depreciate substantially. 
 
Bagehot (1873) suggests that in a crisis the lender of last resort should offer assistance, at a 
penalty rate, on the basis of a guarantee or security that is marketable in a usual business day 
that is free from market panic. Conversely, Freixas (1999:11) argues that “in a liquid market 
Bagehot’s principle would contradict itself, since the private sector would be willing to lend 
against collateral with a lower penalty. Only in an illiquid market, can the lender of last resort 
intervene and only through open market operations”. Fitz-Gibbon and Gizycki (2001:10) add 
that the “provision of last-resort support should be confined to those financial institutions that are 
of systemic importance and that a special case can be mounted for the provision of support to 
banks”. However, those banks that play a crucial role in the economy or that are of systemic 
importance are usually huge. Policymakers therefore regard these banks (mainly the 
commercial banks) as being “too big to fail”; in other words, policymakers ensure that these 
banks are not allowed to fail due to the contagion effect it will have on the rest of the economy. 
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In the recent financial crisis significant banks that had to be bailed out in the US cost the 
treasury billions of dollars: for example, Bank of America, which was severely affected by the 
crisis, received a bailout from government that amounted to US$20 billion in government aid 
and US$118 billion worth of guarantees against bad assets. 
 
Rodrik (1999:20) is of the view that “the costs of domestic regulatory failure should be 
substantially lower when domestic regulation is backed by a central bank that performs a lender 
of last resort function”. The recent general preconditions for a lender of last resort to be 
enforced entails that the troubled banks should have ample room for solvency; that the lender-
of-last-resort assistance should have adequate collateral; that all other existing sources of 
funding have been looked into before seeking lender-of-last-resort support; and that 
shareholders have taken the initiative to provide liquidity as a demonstration of their own 
commitment. In addition, the troubled bank must take appropriate steps to deal with its liquidity 
setbacks. At present, some of the common instruments used by central banks to provide lender-
of-last-resort assistance include the purchase of the institution’s placements with other banks 
that are acceptable to the central bank; repurchase of securities that are in the domestic 
currency, such as exchange fund bills and notes and investment grade securities; and a credit 
facility against the banks’ residential mortgage portfolio. However during the 2007 financial crisis 
central banks also used the quantitative easing facility to expand the supply of money and credit 
into the markets to protect local and small banks (whose main business is lending) from 
bankruptcy. ‘Quantitative easing’ is defined as a composition of open-market operations on 
long-term maturities to lower long-term interest rates, namely an increase in quantities through 
open-market operations after the interest rate has reached the zero bound (Tropeano 2011). 
The US was one of the countries that implemented quantitative easing after a very lax monetary 
policy. When the Fed’s interest rate reached its lower zero limit, the interest rates was not 
effective enough as a monetary policy instrument, thus the implementation of quantitative 
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easing. During the crisis, quantitative easing has allowed for the purchase of various types of 
assets from financial institutions with different maturities and more supply of money and credit 
into the market.  
 
As with deposit insurance, some critics argue that the lender-of-last-resort facility encourages 
banks to acquire more risks since the central bank serves as a backup strategy.  
An example of this function would be the recent crisis that shook the financial markets in the UK 
when the mortgage lender Northern Rock could no longer refinance its maturing obligations. 
The main reason for this was its engagements with reckless borrowing, huge risks and a 
dependence on wholesale markets instead of depositors for its funding. In addition, depositors 
withdrew about £2 billion, exposing the economy to a financial crisis. The Bank of England took 
a stand against bail-outs, because of the message it would send out to other banks on taking 
excessive risk, thus the moral hazard issue. Despite this, it eventually had to offer support in the 
bailing out of Northern Rock at a penalty rate on fears of a threat to the stability of the financial 
system. Goodhart and LLLing (2002:499) explain that a moral hazard problem has “no specific 
solution”. The authors assert that “the lender of last resort should seek to limit moral hazard by 
imposing costs on those who have made mistakes. Lending at a penalty rate is one way to 
impose such costs.” However, Fitz-Gibbon and Gizycki (2001) believe that “while a lender of last 
resort may reduce the frequency of bank runs, it may create an environment where the runs that 
do occur are more severe”. In contrast, Stiglitz (1999:45) suggests that strong supervision is an 
essential part of any system of lender of last resort. 
 
It is clear that financial liberalisation, combined with a lack of financial infrastructure, has 
brought about a more careful consideration of regulation and standards. Financial crises have 
transformed from “country crises” to “systemic crises”, as can be seen from the occurrence of 
the Asian crises and the more recent subprime mortgage crisis. International standards are now 
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regarded as benchmarks that can be used by authorities to identify weaknesses and pinpoint 
areas that require improvements in their financial system; they also ensure a more stable 
international financial system. Interestingly, the new regulatory practices, combined with the 
efforts made to liberalise, have ensured that developed and emerging market economies have 
integrated more closely. However, the question now arises whether these practices will provide 
more protection from crises than in the past? 
 
Furthermore, it has become clear that supervisors and managers should act in a more prudent 
manner in order to prevent problems such as that of the East Asian and the US subprime 
mortgage crisis. As regards the East Asian crisis, liberalisation was one of the factors that 
contributed to the impact and spread of the crisis. In the US subprime mortgage crisis bad 
monitoring, and a lack of risk management and regulation exacerbated the crisis. Had prudential 
supervision been implemented more efficiently and effectively, it would have contributed to 
minimising or preventing both crises. Mishkin (2006:19–24) explains that to make prudential 
supervision work, the following reforms should be considered:  
 
• Implementation of prompt corrective action – which requires supervisors to prevent 
financial instability by intervening early and closing down institutions if they are close to 
insolvency. 
• Adequate resources and statutory authority for prudential regulators/supervisors – without 
sufficient resources and incentives, supervisors will not adequately monitor the activities 
of the banks and their managers. Therefore, it is crucial to provide supervisors with the 
latter to promote a safe and sound financial system that is resistant to financial crisis. 
• Independence of regulatory/supervisory agencies – where agencies are independent 
from the political processes and will not be encouraged to engage in forbearance. 
• Make supervisors accountable – if they engage in regulatory forbearance, they should be 
subject to criminal prosecution, censure and penalties.  
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Countries should not delay upgrading financial prudential supervision, as it can be seen as an 
addition to a sounder macroeconomic environment; in other words, it adds the ability of the 
financial sector to weather a storm. Prudential supervision complements financial liberalisation if 
an adequate risk management system is in place, sufficient disclosure is practised by 
institutions, there is discipline in the regulatory stance and supervisors are able to intervene if a 
problem arises. Prudential supervision can be viewed as a prerequisite for a strong and efficient 
financial system, since it can secure better economic performance and provide the economy 
with resilience in the face of adverse events.  
 
3.2.3.4  Recent developments on the financial safety nets 
In addition to the above standards, after the recent financial crisis more updates to the financial 
safety net were implemented by authorities and the creation of new policies. For example, the 
update on deposit insurance design features now includes higher coverage levels, a better 
payout process, more transparency for depositor awareness and deposit insurers to be involved 
in failure resolution. Other policy measures that are in the process of being fully implemented by 
institutions include policy measures for systemically important financial institutions (SIFI), over-
the-counter (OTC) derivatives market reforms, compensation practices and shadow banking. 
 
a) Systemically important financial institutions  
The FSB recommends that authorities put measures in place for those institutions that have a 
high systemic risk factor, and externalities affecting domestic and global systemically important 
financial institutions. It is recommended that supervisors intensify their supervision of SIFIs and 
improve their supervisory tools and methods. For those systemic institutions that have a global 
link, a higher loss-absorbency capacity is recommended above the minimum levels agreed in 
Basel III as the size, complexity and interconnectedness of these global institutions would cause 
significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity. Thus the FSB further 
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recommends that a recovery and resolution planning be implemented to reduce the impact of 
failure of institutions. 
 
b) Over-the-counter derivatives market reforms 
The FSB recommends that reforms for OTC derivatives should include improved transparency 
and regulatory oversight, and that authorities should aim for international consistency. Thus by 
the end of 2012, “all standardised OTC derivative contracts should be traded on exchanges or 
electronic trading platforms, where appropriate, and cleared through central counterparties; that 
OTC derivative contracts be reported to trade repositories; and that non-centrally cleared 
contracts be subject to higher capital requirements” (FSB, 2010:3). 
 
c) Compensation practices  
In the light of employees being paid large sums of bonuses during short-term profits without 
consideration for long-term risks imposed on companies, when risks became visible during the 
global economic crisis, firms were left with little resources to absorb losses. This also 
contributed to the intensity of the financial crisis. As a result, the FSF introduced the principles 
for sound compensation practices. These principles aim to “ensure effective governance of 
compensation, alignment of compensation with prudent risk taking and effective supervisory 
oversight and stakeholder engagement in compensation” (FSB: 2011a). 
 
d) Shadow banking 
The shadow banking system can broadly be described as “credit intermediation involving 
entities and activities outside the regular banking system” (FSB, 2011b). Shadow banking can 
lead to systemic risks because of its interconnectedness with the normal banking system. In 
addition, this type of banking has the potential to threaten stricter bank regulation through 
arbitrage. Thus the FSB recommends that more effective monitoring should be implemented in 
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these institutions and that authorities should concentrate on those shadow banks that can cause 
systemic risks. In doing so authorities should take into consideration four key risk factors which 
include 
1. maturity; 
2. liquidity transformation; 
3. imperfect credit risk transfer; and 
4. leverage. 
 
3.2.4 Improved measures in central banking  
 
3.2.4.1 Inflation targeting in developing countries 
 
Inflation targeting has become more formal and commonly used by monetary authorities since 
the 1990s. Under an inflation-targeting regime, the central bank sets a target rate of inflation 
and is obligated to meet this target because this is a very transparent method of enforcing 
monetary policy. Masson et al. (1997:7, 8) state that the main prerequisites for an effective 
inflation-targeting framework are (i) the central banks’ scope for conducting independent 
monetary policy and (ii) the undisputed primacy of the inflation objective. Roger and Stone 
(2005:6) explain that “the key elements of the inflation targeting framework are the governance 
structure, the specification of the inflation target, and the arrangements for policy transparency 
and accountability”. They say that “these elements of the framework provide the central bank 
with the authority and incentives to pursue the inflation target”. Since inflation targeting is 
determined by the consumer price index (CPI), the framework on which it is based gives the 
public an opportunity to observe how committed the central bank is to its target.  
 
However, central banks commonly miss their target range. When deviating from the target 
range, they could either be above or below the set range. The reason for this varies from 
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country to country. However, some of the common reasons for missing the inflation target 
include sharp exchange rate depreciation or appreciation, lower- or higher-than-expected food 
prices, an interruption to capital inflows, a fall or rise in fuel prices, geopolitical issues, too-tight 
or too-loose fiscal and monetary policies, and large current-account deficits. 
 
Table 3.7: Inflation target misses and shocks and reason(s) for deviation 
Country Miss Period 
External shocks Domestic shocks 
Capital 
flows 
World 
fuel 
prices 
Other 
external 
Domestic 
food 
supply 
Other 
Domestic 
Fiscal 
policy 
Monetary 
policy 
Brazil 
 
 
 
Czech 
Republic 
 
 
Iceland 
 
 
Israel 
 
 
 
Poland 
 
 
South 
Africa 
 
over 
 
 
 
 
under 
 
 
over 
 
 
under 
under 
over 
 
over 
under 
 
 
over 
2001–3 
 
 
 
 
1998–9 
 
 
2002 
 
 
1998 
2001–2 
2002–3 
 
2000 
2002 
 
 
2002–3 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
x 
x 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Immigration 
 
Intifada 
 
 
 
 
 
Regional 
political risk 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
Controlled 
prices, 
political risk 
 
 
Retail 
competition 
 
Real wages 
 
 
 
Productivity 
 
 
Taxes 
Taxes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
 
x 
 
x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x 
 
x 
 
x 
Source: Roger and Stone (2005:30) 
 
Research shows that emerging market countries are susceptible to large inflation target misses 
because of domestic vulnerabilities. Masson et al. (1997) believe that some developing 
countries with high inflation rates do not meet the requirements (e.g., freedom from commitment 
to nominal anchors such as wages or exchange rates, and an independent monetary policy, i.e., 
freedom from fiscal interventions) for adopting inflation targeting. However, Kasa (2001:4) 
explains that “inflation targeting can work in developing countries but it is not a ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
policy”.  
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Roger and Stone (2005) illustrate through their research the largest inflation target misses 
during the period 1998–2003 (Table 3.7). According to them, it is not an uncommon feature that 
central banks miss their inflation target. The authors established that all of the above countries 
had some common features, namely that the countries were “vulnerable to external shocks; the 
largest deviations of inflation from target occurred during disinflation and misses were triggered 
by a mix of domestic and external shocks” (p. 29). Some of their conclusions are that “in 
countries with stable inflation targets, target ranges are missed about 30 percent of the time, 
while disinflation countries miss their targets nearly 60 percent of the time” (p. 31). 
 
However, in many developing countries, inflation targeting has been fairly new. It is therefore 
important for inflation targeting to be harmonised with financial market reforms, for example, 
sound supervisory practices, the presence of competition in the banking sector and the absence 
of government dominance over this financial activity; economic reforms such as adequate fiscal 
policies and controlled government debt; and institutional reforms, such as proper governance 
and accountability (Roger and Stone 2005). The reason is that financial market reform 
contributes to a more efficient and stable financial system; economic reform ensures sound 
policies; and institutional reform ensures proper disclosure and transparency. All these reforms 
together will make it easier for inflation targeting to be implemented. In 1999 in Chile, for 
example, the country adopted an inflation-targeting regime to strengthen its monetary policy. 
However, before fully implementing inflation targeting, it gradually got rid of its fixed exchange 
rate policy and adopted a floating exchange rate; developed a modelling and forecasting 
strategy; and increased its communication with the public. On the fiscal side, Chile reformed its 
fiscal policy by implementing a structural budget surplus rule, which ensures that there is a 
ceiling on government expenditure of 1 per cent of its GDP. This exercise reduced the 
government’s public debt, and strengthened its credibility and accountability. Furthermore, 
institutional reforms such as the legal framework also ensured transparent reporting of statistics, 
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fiscal accounts and so forth. In 2001 the Central Bank of Chile started to target inflation at a 
range of 2–4 per cent. At present, Chile’s inflation is at 3,40 per cent year on year and GDP is at 
5,80 per cent. 
 
During the 2007 economic crisis, economists such as Marinković and Radojičić (2009) and 
Leijonhufvud (2008) were of the view that inflation targeting did little to stabilise the economy 
and thus failed. However research on the performance of inflation targeting countries during the 
recent global economic crisis showed that inflation targeting countries performed better during 
the global economic crisis compared to non-inflation targeting countries. Research done by 
Roger (2010) reveals that in the period 1991–2000 and 2001–2009 inflation targeting in low-
income and high-income economies experienced considerable declines in inflation volatility 
while non-inflation targeting low-income and high-income economies encountered more volatility 
in inflation. Furthermore, the global economic crisis stimulated a price shock in many economies 
with growth declines and inflation surges. During this period, high-income inflation targeting 
economy’s growth rate fell partially and their increase in inflation was slightly less compared to 
the high income non-inflation targeting economies.  
 
De Carvalho Filho (2010) also conducted research on the performance of inflation-targeting 
countries during the global economic crisis and found that inflation targeting brought about key 
benefits to inflation-targeting countries compared to non-inflation-targeting countries. Her 
research found that inflation-targeting countries were safe from a deflationary stance, and 
avoided the liquidity trap and dangers of zero interest rate zone compared to non-inflation-
targeting countries. Furthermore, since inflation targeting allows for tight monetary policy during 
booms and excess liquidity, when the financial crisis began inflation-targeting countries were in 
a better position to cut interest rates from a higher nominal rate, and thus had more 
opportunities for further rate cuts, compared to non-inflation-targeting countries. During the 
93 
 
crisis, both inflation-targeting and non-inflation-targeting countries experienced an increase in 
unemployment. But later on, inflation-targeting countries unemployment rates stabilised and the 
unemployment rate of non-inflation-targeting countries continued to increase. As regards 
economic growth, de Carvalho Filho’s (2010) finding was similar to that of Roger (2010) where 
high-income inflation-targeting countries’ growth rates were higher than the high-income non-
inflation-targeting countries. Roger (2010:48) confirms that “these results are consistent with the 
notion that inflation expectations are better anchored in countries that adopt inflation targeting”. 
Thus inflation targeting did, to some extent, provide proper tools for dealing with the financial 
crisis. 
 
3.2.4.2 Monetary policy transparency 
 
Monetary policy transparency is also a product of liberalisation. It is a contributing factor to 
changes brought about by liberalisation. It has emanated as an important trait of monetary 
policymaking during the last decade. ‘Transparency’ can be defined as a situation of symmetric 
information. In line with this, the IMF developed a Code of Good Practices on the Transparency 
of Monetary and Financial Policies.8 The IMF argues that this best practice can be more 
successful if monetary authorities’ goals, underlying principles and means of execution are 
communicated to the public in a timely manner. Likewise, Siklos (2000:15) confirms that the 
“benefits of openness, transparency, and accountability increase the awareness of financial 
markets and the public about the aims and limitations of monetary policy. As a result, one would 
expect these developments to increase the credibility of central bank actions”. Geraats 
(2005:112) stipulates that “a reduction in information asymmetries between monetary 
policymakers and the private sector improves the transparency of monetary policy”. 
 
                                                 
8 The code was developed to strengthen the international monetary and financial system with a view to increasing 
transparency. The code contains a list of broad principles that central banks and financial agencies should seek to 
achieve. 
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The IMF (2011a:1–2) code has as its aim to improve the transparency of monetary policy, and 
in view of this it rests on the following four broad principles: 
 
i Clarity of roles, responsibilities, and objectives: Where central bank goals should be 
communicated to the public in a clear manner and written into law. 
ii Open process for formulating and reporting policy decisions: Central banks should 
explain to the public how they are going to achieve their objectives by using framework 
and instruments. 
iii Public availability of information on policies: The central bank should ensure that its 
monetary policy is in line with the IMF's data dissemination standards and that its balance 
sheet is always available to the public. 
iv Accountability and assurances of integrity: Central bank officials should meet with the 
public on a regular basis to account for the effects of their policy 
 
According to the IMF’s (2003a) report on the outcome of the implementation of the code, 
several benefits accrued. The December 2003 report showed that in countries that had adopted 
the code the transparency policy enhanced the usefulness of monetary policy by ensuring that it 
was less vague; it was advantageous to financial market operations, which depended on 
information; and it improved the harmonisation of monetary and fiscal policy. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 
show a follow-up of a review of the code completed in the December 2000 Board Paper using 
the experience of 23 countries. 
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Table 3.8: Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency Code assessments of monetary policy1 
Compliance 
All monetary 
policy 
transparency 
practices of the 
code 
Clarity of roles 
responsibilities 
and objectives of 
agencies for 
monetary policy 
Open process 
for formulating 
and reporting 
monetary/ 
financial policy 
decisions 
Public 
availability 
of 
information 
on monetary 
policy 
Accountability 
and assurances 
of integrity by 
the central 
banks 
December 2000 Board Paper2 
Observed 73 78 71 70 69 
Broadly 
observed3 19 17 19 27 16 
Not 
observed 
8 5 10 3 15 
Current review4 
Fully 
observed 69 69 68 75 63 
Broadly 
observed 12 12 14 12 9 
Partly 
observed 13 16 13 11 13 
Not observed 6 3 4 3 14 
Source:  IMF (2003a) Country assessment of the Monetary and Financial Policies (MFP) Transparency Code 
Notes:  1  Numbers in the table represent the average percentage share (across the detailed practice-by-practice 
assessments) of the applicable and assessed practices from the respective sections of the MFP Transparency 
Code categorised as being observed, broadly observed and not observed. 
2 A total of 21 countries were assessed in Board Paper 1. 
3 Some assessment at the time of the first Board Paper did not have a “partly observed” rating, therefore, the 
rating “broadly observed” combines ratings of both “broadly” and “partly observed”. 
4 A total of 35 countries’ transparency practices in monetary policy were assessed in the current review. 
 
 
Table 3.9:  Monetary and Financial Policy Transparency Code assessments of financial 
policies (in per cent) 
Financial supervisory agencies assessed 
Compliance 
Payment 
systems 
Banking 
supervision 
Insurance 
regulation 
Securities 
regulation 
Deposit 
insurance 
December 2000 Board Paper2 
Observed 
Broadly observed3 
Not observed 
75 
19 
 6 
77 
16 
 7 
75 
19 
 6 
78 
15 
 7 
84 
 5 
11 
Current review4 
Fully observed 
Broadly observed 
Partly observed 
Not observed 
69 
10 
15 
 6 
71 
10 
13 
 6 
61 
10 
16 
10 
69 
11 
13 
 7 
73 
7 
14 
 6 
Source:  IMF (2003a) Country Assessment of the MFP Transparency Code 
Notes: 1  Numbers in the table represent the average percentage share (across the detailed practice-by-practice 
assessments) of the applicable and assessed practices from the respective sections of the MFP Transparency 
Code categorised as being observed, broadly observed and not observed. 
2 A total of 21 countries were assessed in Board Paper 1. 
3 Some assessment at the time of the first board paper did not have a "partly observed" rating, therefore, the 
rating "broadly observed" combines ratings of both "broadly" and "partly observed". 
4 The transparency practices in financial policies of a total of 37 countries were assessed in the current review. 
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According to the tables, central banks and financial agencies have broadly observed the 
transparency practices. Furthermore, most of the financial agencies implemented a high 
standard of transparency in their policies. The implementation of the code has made financial 
agencies more conscious of the importance of transparency in both monetary and financial 
policy. Many countries have therefore adopted these codes, as of March 2011, 346 countries 
have undergone a transparency assessment in both monetary and financial policy (IMF, 
2011a:2). Geraats (2005:116) says that the main effects of monetary policy transparency are 
“that it improves the predictability of monetary policy actions and outcomes; it induces reputation 
building and it enhances credibility and makes long-run private sector inflation expectations 
more stable”.  
 
In analysing policy transparency, Walsh (2001:1,2) asserts that “a policy is transparent about 
objectives if the public can accurately gauge the central bank’s intentions”. But even with the 
central banks’ intention to be transparent, monetary policy will still be unclear to the public due 
to the public’s vague comprehension of the economic model used by the central bank to assess 
different policies. However, if the public is familiar with the central banks’ economic model, it 
may not be in possession of some of the economic information the central bank obtains, thus, 
according to Walsh (2001:1;2), “monetary policy is opaque as there are no quantitative 
estimates of either gains or costs of transparency”.  
 
The combination of inflation targeting and monetary policy transparency has become a norm in 
many countries. The inflation target is made public, which ensures that the intentions of the 
central bank are transparent enough. Inflation targeting has become more widespread since the 
1990s as emerging market countries abandoned their fixed exchange rate regimes. Some of the 
countries that implemented an inflation-targeting regime include South Africa, Brazil, Mexico, 
Poland, Colombia, Thailand, South Korea and Switzerland. However, although some central 
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banks make use of exchange rate targeting, they are not as transparent as inflation targeters, 
because inflation targeters are more visible in terms of publishing data and other information to 
the public. Geraats (2005:113) maintains that “although the adoption of inflation targeting has 
contributed to the rise in monetary policy transparency; inflation targeting is not a sufficient 
condition for transparency”. 
 
3.3 Conclusion 
When countries liberalise their financial systems, it is commendable. Thus it is important to keep 
up with international norms. But experience shows that (i) it is disastrous to liberalise an 
economy in one concerted effort; (ii) premature liberalisation of the capital account with a weak 
domestic financial sector does not result in efficient allocation of financial resources; (iii) having 
a pegged exchange rate does not guarantee price stability and growth; (iv) a very tight monetary 
stance can push inflation to negative levels; and (v) harmonising international best practices 
without proper domestic supervision and regulation can disrupt the financial system. 
 
With this in mind, the following are some of the measures that should be adopted to ensure 
effective financial liberalisation: 
 
• Sequencing, which will strengthen the market structure and ensure a less complicated 
liberalisation process. 
• Appropriate macroeconomic reforms and exchange rate policies should be in place 
before liberalising capital accounts, and capital flows should be long-term and not 
easily changed to avoid crises. 
• A flexible exchange rate can be more effective and better able to absorb shocks if it is 
accompanied by good fiscal policies and inflation targeting. 
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• Monetary policies should be aimed at stabilising inflation and preventing volatile 
markets; and central banks should be transparent and accountable so that the public is 
aware of the goals of monetary policy.  
• It is important for policies to be flexible so that new developments, technology and 
structural changes are not stifled and competition is promoted.  
 
Although the above steps are important for more effective financial liberalisation, it is clear that 
financial liberalisation, combined with a lack of financial infrastructure, has resulted in a more 
careful consideration of regulation and standards. Financial crises have transformed from 
“country crises” to “systemic crises”, as can be seen from the Asian crises and the more recent 
subprime crisis. Regulatory practices and efforts to liberalise have ensured that developed and 
emerging market economies have integrated more closely. The question arises whether these 
practices will provide more protection from crises than in the past. New policies and updates to 
the financial safety net call for supervisors and managers to be more prudent in order to prevent 
problems such as that of the East Asian and the US subprime crisis. As regards the East Asian 
crisis, liberalisation was one of the factors that contributed to the impact and spread of the crisis. 
In the US subprime crisis bad monitoring, and a lack of risk management and regulation 
exacerbated the crisis. Had prudential supervision been implemented more efficiently and 
effectively, it would have helped to minimise or prevent the crises. 
 
It is of no use if countries cannot update their regulatory regimes after liberalisation. In the case 
of the US and EU, although they are considered to have liberalised economies they were in the 
epitome of a crisis because they delayed in implementing current international practices such as 
Basel II, and the resultant ramifications were severe. Therefore, liberalisation and a continuous 
updating of regulation due to changing times are important to maintain systemic stability within 
any economy. 
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Chapter 4 
South Africa and financial liberalisation 
 
4.1 Historical overview of South Africa’s economic instability 
 
4.1.1 Liberalisation in South Africa after the De Kock Inquiry 
 
South Africa, like other emerging countries was also burdened with repressive policies in the 
period 1960–1980. The link to these repressive policies falls within the ambit of the post-war 
period where the central bank played a role as the bank of rediscount which accommodated the 
banking system with liquidity requirements. At the peak of the post-war period the South African 
economy experienced huge upswings which resulted in the expansion of the liquidity base of 
the banking system, an increase in inflationary pressures, continued excessive credit creation 
and overspending. At that time the authorities decided that conventional monetary policy was 
inadequate to curb the economic pressures mentioned before and more direct controls were 
necessary to curb, among other things, the problem of inflation and credit. As a result, 
government implemented direct monetary controls which included ceilings on bank credit to the 
private sector, deposit rate control, exchange control and direct consumer credit controls. The 
monetary controls were put into effect through the market mechanism, the coordinated 
application of fiscal policy, public debt management and interest rate policy to obtain the 
ultimate goal of stability in the value of money and economic growth. 
 
Although there were many negative consequences to these policies, the following are just a few 
outcomes of the policy stance of the country at that time:  
 
In implementing these repressive policies, direct deposits and lending rate controls were used 
as measures to keep interest rates low to avoid large increases in politically sensitive interest 
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rates and to minimise the cost of certain forms of socially desirable credit, such as building 
society mortgage loans and Land Bank cash credit advances.  
 
During this period, the central bank used credit ceilings and extensive rises in minimum liquid 
asset requirements to restrain bank credit to the private sector. This resulted in banks investing 
more funds in government stock. At the time the ‘grey market’, together with its steep interest 
rates plus credit controls, brought about a fall in the industrial sector’s business confidence. This 
caused a reduction in private fixed investment expenditure. As a result, funds were channelled 
to the services sector as an alternative investment means with higher returns on capital. This 
shift in investment led to supply constraints which provoked greater inflationary pressures. 
 
Deposit rate controls were set to ensure that home mortgage rates were not increased as 
interest rates increased. Furthermore, control over the deposit rates was essential in keeping 
competition between banks and building societies in abeyance, and from possibly pushing 
mortgage and deposit rates upwards, especially when bank liquidity was abundant and interest 
rates failing. It was believed that competition between banks could lead to unstable practices 
that would be at the inconvenience of borrowers.  
 
After the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1973, the exchange rate was delinked 
from the sterling and re-valued in terms of the dollar. The central bank aspired to increase the 
foreign-exchange reserves of the country. This ultimately led to an increase in money supply 
(which were induced by advances in the gold and foreign-exchange reserves). Thus, as cash 
reserves increased (due to an increase in money supply), the banking sector also became more 
liquid. As a result, interest rates were depressed which ultimately influenced capital outflows. 
The latter, together with an increase in business cycle upswing, led to an increase in inflation. 
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All these considerations brought about a new awareness for the need for a monetary reform. A 
Commission of Inquiry into the Monetary System and Monetary Policy in South Africa was 
employed in 1977. This commission was chaired by Dr Gerhard de Kock. The De Kock 
Commission’s final report, which was released in 1985, stated that the only effective way to 
restore and maintain reasonable stability of the price level in South Africa was to exert better 
control over money creation and total spending with full acceptance of the implications this 
would have for interest rates and exchange rates (Kantor, 1986:94). This conclusion was solely 
based on the growing sophistication of the financial markets, which are important contributors to 
economic growth; and a need for a market approach to monetary policy which should ultimately 
contribute to (i) the moderation and stabilisation of the growth of the monetary aggregates; (ii) 
more effective control over disintermediation and other velocity-related developments; (iii) the 
maintenance of realistic and market-related interest rates; and (iv) the attainment of realistic and 
market-related spot and forward exchange rates (Kantor, 1985:98). The outcome of the report 
prompted a shift in policies that directed South Africa away from the financial repressive policies 
of direct control, towards a stance of financial liberalisation. Thus the report emphasised that 
amendments should be placed on the following three areas: 
 
a) Exchange rates 
b) The foreign-exchange market 
c) The money market and interest rates 
 
a) Exchange rates 
Since exchange rates were given precedence in the inquiry, a provisional report was issued in 
1979. The outcome of the De Kock Commission report suggested that the country’s exchange 
rate policy should be revolutionised in a slow, but continuous manner. As a result, this 
recommendation led to a reform of the exchange rate policies. This included that the rand no 
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longer be pegged to the dollar, the exchange rate system should be managed and that free 
floating be abolished, the exchange rate system be determined by the country’s balance of 
payments and domestic economy, and that the rand become an independent currency.  
 
b) The foreign-exchange market 
As regards the foreign-exchange market, previously the central bank use to quote 
predetermined buying and selling rates for US dollars at which it was prepared to transact with. 
After the De Kock Commission report (1985), the bank introduced reforms to develop a more 
sophisticated foreign-exchange market. The reforms were as follows: 
 
• The compulsory fixed buying and selling rates of US dollar was brought to a stop so that 
South Africa’s foreign-exchange market could be more dynamic and competitive.  
• Dealers of foreign exchange were requested to retain open positions in the foreign-
exchange market and to transact in foreign exchange within limits as prescribed by the 
central bank. These dealers were monitored on a continuous basis. 
• When it was established that the exchange rate of the rand would be determined by 
market forces, the central bank began participating as a buyer and seller of dollars in the 
market with the aim of still influencing the progress of the rand/dollar rate. 
• To contribute to a more dynamic foreign-exchange market, proceeds from Kruger rand 
and diamond sales were no longer in the care of the central bank but rather in the hands 
of authorised foreign-exchange dealers, thus making the market more conducive to a 
floating rand.  
 
Furthermore, most of the foreign transactions were denominated in foreign currencies and the 
need for forward cover facilities was based on the fact that: 
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• traders needed to be safeguarded against the risks stemming from exchange rate 
fluctuations; 
• exporters were at a competitive disadvantage to exporters in other countries who had 
forward cover to deal with exchange rate risks; 
• local commercial banks would be able to cover their own forward positions in the 
external foreign-exchange markets; and 
• the central bank would be better able to evaluate its future foreign currency requirements 
and improve the management of its gold and foreign-exchange reserves, its currency 
working balances and investment portfolio, and future gold sales on the private market. 
 
Provision was therefore made for forward cover which took the form of cover in dollars against 
the rand at a fixed cost of 1 per cent per annum for either purchase or sales contracts. Forward 
cover was provided to local traders, authorised dealers and public corporations. Eventually, 
excessive foreign borrowing by the central bank and government caused an imbalance in the 
forward book where forward sales of dollars exceeded forward purchases. In 1975, the rand 
devalued and the central bank incurred substantial losses. The De Kock Commission pointed 
out the deficiencies in the forward exchange policies and recommended a more active and 
competitive forward exchange market. 
 
Steps were taken to develop a more sophisticated forward exchange market. These included 
the following: 
 
• The central bank no longer quoted a fixed charge or commission to be paid by both 
importers and exporters for forward cover but rather one middle price for forward dollar 
of any maturity and later on 
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• A dollar discount (or rand premium) of 2 per cent a year was set by the central bank for 
forward margins on US dollars. 
• Dealers were encouraged by authorities to merge forward sales and purchases of 
dollars, and to cover their net forward liabilities by holding spot foreign assets. 
• Forward cover facilities were extended to the private sector (who had exchange control 
approval) on a year-on-year basis for foreign loans negotiated in respect of rand/dollar 
exchange risk. 
• The central bank decided to continue with forward cover on public loans. 
 
With all the above taken into account, the central bank fell in line with the De Kock proposals 
from the beginning of the 1980s and henceforth only furnished forward cover in US dollar for 
loans raised by the public corporations. 
 
c) Money market and interest rates 
Monetary policy in South Africa took a turn after the recommendations of the De Kock 
Commission. Changes in the growth rate of the domestic broad money supply (M3) became an 
important element in the monetary policy decisions and in the central bank’s objective of 
protecting the value of the currency. “The monetary policy model was based on monetary 
targeting which anchors monetary policy decisions to changes in the money supply” (Stals, 
1997:3). In 1985 the central bank began announcing broad money targets and in the 
subsequent years a target for M3 growth was announced. Stals (1997) acknowledged that the 
monetary model worked extremely well, especially during South Africa’s segregation from the 
global world. In 1992 M3 growth met the target range. However, afterwards the association 
between M3 and the demand for goods and services did not fully represent the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy. This was due to the fact that financial markets began extending 
their services and becoming integrated with global counterparts. As a result of this, the degree 
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of global capital flows increased substantially and domestic interest rates changed frequently. 
This in effect affected the exchange rate of the rand, and also affected time lags in policy 
change and its influence on the economy and inflation. Thus the link between interest rate, 
money supply and inflation became vague. Money supply was no longer a credible indicator for 
inflation and became unworthy as a guideline for monetary policy. The central bank then shifted 
from money supply targets towards the eclectic monetary policy approach.  
 
4.1.2 Socio-political effects on the South African economy  
As shown in the preceding chapters, liberalisation ensures better integration of the domestic 
economy into the world economy. The pace of liberalisation differs between countries: in some 
countries liberalisation efforts were gradual, while in others it was speedy. South Africa adopted 
a more cautious liberalisation strategy, which had positive effects in terms of reducing 
vulnerabilities to various international financial crises. Owing to socio-political circumstances, 
South Africa’s response to liberalisation was a delayed one, compared with other emerging 
economies of the world, which removed restrictions on bank entry and exchange controls 
swiftly, and introduced international rules for financial regulation and supervision promptly. 
However, the need for major financial reforms was long overdue in South Africa; economic 
restructuring in South Africa improved only after the constitutional change in 1994 (Calitz, 2002).  
 
South Africa’s financial isolation from the world was evidenced by many restrictions that were 
related to its political regimes. Sanctions on international trade and finance that one country 
imposes on another for political reasons (Investorwords, 1999b) intensified from the 1980s until 
1993 and this affected the country’s average growth rates, capital inflows, foreign investment, 
trade and so forth. Owing to sanctions, there were also large withdrawals of foreign capital. As a 
result, South Africa’s economic performance was deteriorating rapidly, leaving large government 
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deficits to be financed through borrowing and putting pressure on private capital markets. For 
example, in the late 1980s the public sector borrowing requirements amounted to R8,5 billion; 
its fixed investment relative to GDP declined from 27,8 per cent in 1981 to 15,5 per cent in 
1993; government taxes (which was a dominant factor in generating revenues), increased 
considerably from 19,5 per cent of GDP during 1975 to 26 per cent during 1987/8; and the ratio 
of domestic savings to GDP contracted from 24,5 per cent in 1985 to 17 per cent in 1994 
(SARB, 1991, 1996). While other developing countries such as Chile, Mexico and Brazil were in 
the process of liberalising their markets, South Africa was still fighting the impact of sanctions. 
 
Cross (2003:104) argues that the most visible impact of sanctions in South Africa was the 
imposition of a debt standstill in September 1985. While prime overdraft rates were at a 
historical high of 25 per cent, international banks such as Chase Manhattan and Barclays fled, 
as they were under extreme pressure to restrict their dealings with the local economy. They 
detached themselves from the South African economy by withdrawing their direct operations 
and placing a moratorium on lending. This placed South Africa in a more vulnerable position 
because of its dependence on loan capital and foreign investments. Cross (2003:104) explains 
that despite this debt standstill, “foreign capital still flowed out of the country; averaging 2,5 per 
cent of GDP in 1985 and 13 per cent of gross domestic fixed investment in 1994”.  
 
Rustomjee (2006) believes that the debt crisis was due to a variance in the maturity structure of 
the country’s private sector debt (i.e., the income on the repayment of the debt was not 
matched, because the debt matured earlier than the income generated; as a result, there was 
less income available to service the debt). He further explains that after the announcement of 
the debt standstill, the SARB and government intervened in response to the crisis through 
exchange controls and by swapping rand for dollars, which was to be repaid at the forward rate 
at maturity. Hence, a dollar overdraft materialised, which contributed to the net open forward 
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position, which is a measure of the country’s short-term foreign currency exposure or, 
uncovered foreign-exchange liabilities, amounting to US$25,8 billion in 1995 (SARB, 2004c). As 
a result, government and corporations were equally exposed to the foreign-exchange problem, 
which resulted in the value of the rand depreciating. “The commercial and financial rand9 
plummeted, with the rand losing over 30 per cent of its real trade weighted value in a matter of 
months” (Commission of Inquiry, 2001). 
 
Table 4.1:  National accounts: Percentage changes in selected 
data at constant 1990 prices 
Period GDP
Exports 
of goods 
and non-
factor 
services
Imports 
of goods 
and non-
factor 
services
1983 -1,8 -2,6 -16,1
1984 5,1 4,1 19,8
1985 -1,2 8,9 -14
1986 0.0 -3,8 -2,5
1987 2,1 -1,8 3,5
1988 4,2 9,8 21,9
1989 2,4 5,4 0,3
1990 -0,3 1,7 -5,8
1991 -1.0 -0,1 2,1
1992 -2,2 2,5 5,3
1993 1,3 4,8 7.0
1994 2,7 1.0 16,1
1995 3,4 10,5 17,1
1996 3,2 11 9,2
1997 1,7 5,3 4,6
 
Source: SARB (1998)  
 
                                                 
9 South Africa had a dual-exchange rate system composed of the commercial and financial rand (the commercial 
rand was used for ordinary current transactions, while the financial rand was used to control the outflow of foreign 
investments from the country which related to non-residents investing in South Africa). Its aim was to provide some 
protection to the domestic economy from the adverse effects of large capital outflows. It originated in the exchange 
control measures that were introduced in 1985. 
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Analysis of economic aggregates of the apartheid era provides evidence of the macroeconomic 
instability that occurred during this period. For example, during the period 1984–1993, net 
capital outflows amounted to more than R50 billion, which affected the balance of payments. 
This, on average, amounted to R5 billion per annum. To fund this outflow, a surplus on the 
current account was needed, therefore imports were decreased and exports were encouraged. 
However, the official foreign reserves were also added to the current-account balance in order 
to meet the outflow challenge. Despite this, the accumulated net capital outflow still exceeded 
the sum of the current-account surplus plus the official foreign reserves. This left the country 
with a zero balance of net official foreign reserves in 1994. This is evidenced by the percentage 
change in export growth from 8,9 per cent in 1985 to 9,8 per cent in 1988, and further positive 
and negative balances throughout the years until 1993 (Table 4.1). In comparison, percentage 
change in imports decreased by 14,0 per cent in 1985 and by 2,5 per cent in 1986, and 
increased by 3,5 per cent in 1987, mainly due to the low demand for imports. This may have 
added to the shortfall in the accumulated net capital flows. In 1988 the 21,9 per cent increase in 
imports was due to the ramification of the Asian financial crisis, which caused the value of the 
rand to decrease, and domestic expenditure and merchandise imports to increase. Furthermore, 
Table 4.1 shows that the percentage change in GDP in 1985 was -1,2 per cent at the beginning 
of sanctions but improved slightly in 1993 to 1,3 per cent. South Africa’s average CPI also fell 
from 16,2 per cent in 1985 to 8,8 per cent in 1994.  
 
4.2 South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy 
 
4.2.1 The South African experience  
 
Loots (2003:219) argues that “South Africa re-entered the international economy at a time when 
the process of globalisation was beginning to gain momentum”. Since 1994, South Africa’s 
integration into the global economy has led to important modifications in the domestic financial 
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sector. The abolition of apartheid sparked new challenges that led South Africa to embark on a 
path of reform. This included further liberalising the domestic economic sectors. Liberalisation in 
South Africa was aimed at attracting foreign investments, contributing to economic growth, 
supporting a more sound market, and enhancing South Africa’s involvement and acceptance in 
the world economy. To accomplish this, it had to reform its policies in order to develop and 
maintain a robust and stable financial sector. The restructuring of the policies included 
amending the legal and regulatory framework; improving its economic policies and rehabilitating 
the financial infrastructure. An example of how the policy framework as a whole was adjusted 
and improved can be viewed in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2: Development of the South African financial sector 
Date Description 
 
Prior to the 
1980s 
 
 
1980 
 
 
1985 
 
1986 
 
1990 
 
1995 
 
 
 
1997 
 
 
 
1998 
 
2000 
 
2003 
 
 
2005 
 
 
• Import control (permit control) in respect of numerous product categories; generally high import 
duties, including a surcharge on imported goods; some export subsidies. 
• Credit ceilings, deposit interest rates controlled. 
 
• Deposit interest rate controls and credit ceilings abolished. 
• 7,5 per cent surcharge on imports abolished. 
 
• Surcharge on imports reintroduced at a rate of 10 per cent. 
 
• Introduction of money supply targeting, flexibly applied. 
 
• Money supply targets renamed ‘money supply guidelines’, to emphasise flexibility. 
 
• Comprehensive reduction in import duties introduced in September; the first step in the 
implementation of the announced tariff reduction programme. 
• Remaining surcharge on imports abolished in October. 
 
• South African gold producers are no longer required to market their gold through the South African 
Reserve Bank. 
• Foreign banks are allowed to open branches in South Africa. 
 
• Informal, central bank announced inflation target introduced, alongside money supply guidelines. 
 
• Formal inflation targeting introduced. 
 
• South Africa became a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to combat money 
laundering. 
 
• Implementation of the National Credit Act (NCA) to regulate institutions that provide credit and to 
curb reckless behaviour by credit providers. 
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Date Description 
2008 
 
2011 
• Upgrade from Basel I to Basel II. 
 
• South Africa to begin implementing Basel III. 
 
• Draft Credit Ratings Services Bill to provide for the conditions for the issuance of credit ratings. 
Source: Cross (2003)  
 
These adjustments were necessary and were made in a sequential manner to ensure a healthy 
and upgraded financial sector. The SARB had made further efforts to reform the economic 
sector by adopting the 12 key standards of the FSF (which were discussed in Chapter 3) to 
enhance transparency, and to ensure that policies were conducted in an understandable and 
timely manner. Furthermore, in 2000 the SARB moved from an eclectic monetary policy stance 
to an inflation-targeting framework (which is forward-looking and more transparent), with a view 
to maintaining inflation between a 3 and 6 per cent band. With South Africa’s reintegration into 
the global economy, countries began reinvesting in South Africa. This led to positive 
contributions to the domestic sector, such as improved macroeconomic performances, FDI 
inflows and relaxation of exchange controls. 
 
4.2.1.1 Economic improvements 
South Africa’s macroeconomic performance in comparison with other emerging and developing 
market economies can be viewed in Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3.  
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Figure 4.1: GDP growth rate 
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Source: IMF (2010a; 2011b) 
 
During the period 1980–1992, South Africa experienced its worst decline in GDP growth. For 
example, in 1980 South Africa’s GDP growth was 6,62 per cent, in 1983 it plunged to negative 
1,85 per cent, in 1985 GDP growth reduced again to negative 1,21 per cent and in 1992 the 
country experienced a further decline in GDP growth to negative 2,14 per cent, mainly due to 
political and economic instability. In comparison, although emerging and developing markets’ 
GDP growth in 1980 was 3,90 per cent – much lower than that of South Africa – emerging and 
developing economies also experienced a short drop in GDP growth but it has gained 
momentum. In 1983, for example, its GDP growth rate was 2,12 per cent, in 1985 4,07 per cent 
and in 1992 2,25 per cent, all of which were higher than that of South Africa. Since 1993, South 
Africa’s GDP growth trend has gained momentum and has been in line with that of other 
emerging markets. GDP growth for both emerging and developing markets, and for South Africa 
in particular, has shown signs of recovery in general economic activity. This is confirmed by the 
upward trend of GDP growth during the period 1993–7, after which both markets experienced 
112 
 
fluctuating movements in GDP growth. The latest GDP growth figures show that South Africa 
experienced a growth rate of 3,40 per cent in 2011, while other emerging and developing 
market economies’ growth rate in 2011 was at 6,40 per cent.  
Figure 4.2: Annual inflation rate 
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Source: IMF (2010a; 2011b) 
 
Inflation in South Africa reduced considerably to single digits after liberalisation in 1994, for 
example, in 1984 the annual inflation rate was 11,2 per cent, while the inflation rate of other 
emerging and developing markets was 40,70 per cent. In 1994 South Africa’s inflation reduced 
to 8,8 per cent lower than the emerging and developing market economies’ rate of 88,52 per 
cent. In 2009 South Africa’s inflation was recorded at 7,2 per cent and in the same year, other 
emerging and developing markets’ inflation stood at 5,2 per cent. As confirmed by Figure 4.3, 
South Africa’s inflation rate still remains low. At the time of writing (September 2011), inflation 
was sitting at 5,7 per cent, well within the target range of 3 to 6 per cent. 
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Figure 4.3: Current-account balance as a percentage of GDP 
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South Africa’s current-account balance as a percentage of GDP was positive during the period 
1985–1994, contrary to the total for emerging and developing markets, which was negative 
during this period. This was mainly due to the large outflows that required a sustained surplus 
during sanctions. However, after 1994 the current-account balance as a percentage of GDP 
reflected variations in the deficit, for example, in 1998 both South Africa and emerging and 
developing market economies’ balance was at negative 1,8 per cent. However, in 2011 
emerging and developing markets’ balance was positive 2,4 per cent, while South Africa’s 
current-account balance as a percentage of GDP remained negative at 2,8 per cent. 
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4.2.1.2 Foreign direct investment inflows 
 
The restoration of international contact led to large inflows of capital from other countries, which 
consisted largely of portfolio and shorter-term investments. According to SARB data (SARB, 
2001b; 2010c), calculations of FDI inflows at current prices were at 0,279 per cent of GDP per 
annum in the period 1994, while net portfolio inflows totalled about 2,135 per cent of GDP. 
However, ten years after the termination of sanctions, FDI inflows in 2004 were at 0,369 per 
cent of GDP at current price and net portfolio inflows were at 3,31 per cent of GDP. 
Furthermore, capital inflows into South Africa were exceptional for most of the period after 
sanctions had been abolished; recording direct investment inflows of R5,1 billion in 2004, 
R42,2 billion in 2005, -R3,5 billion in 2006, R40,1 billion in 2007, R74,4 billion in 2008, and 
R48,2 billion in 2009 (SARB, 2010c). This progress in the economy shows significant 
improvements as, just after the transition period, South Africa’s economy was faced with deep-
rooted burdens of the past, including high inflation and poor economic growth. 
 
4.2.1.3 Exchange controls 
 
One of the reasons for maintaining foreign-exchange controls was to maintain the exchange 
rate of the currency at a stable level. The introduction of foreign-exchange controls in 1961 in 
terms of the Currency and Exchange Act 9 of 1933 was to prevent the flight of capital from the 
country and to protect foreign reserves. The controls had the following broad impact on 
individuals and companies (Van der Merwe, 1996:8–11): 
 
• South Africans as well as non-residents were not allowed to move capital abroad.  
• Institutional investors such as insurers, pension funds and unit trusts were also unable to 
transact abroad. However, in 1995 asset swaps were introduced, which allowed these 
institutions to invest a portion of their assets globally. Companies including banks that 
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wanted to engage in offshore direct investments outside the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA) (i.e., South Africa; Lesotho; Namibia and Swaziland) were required to seek 
approval from the [SARB] and demonstrate benefits to South Africa such as job creation, 
huge foreign exchange earnings, etc. 
 
These rules were implemented to prevent large capital outflows. However, Mohamed and 
Finnof (2004:2) argue that  
 
from 1980 to 2000 on average, capital flight as a percentage of GDP was 6,6 per cent a year. 
During the last 13 years of apartheid, from 1980 to 1993, average capital flight as a percentage 
of GDP was 5,4 per cent a year. Post-apartheid, from 1994 to 2000 capital flight rose to an 
average of 9,2 per cent of GDP per year 
 
which is higher than in the apartheid era. They explain that this was due to the “structural 
weaknesses of the South African economy that limited diversification and stifled 
investment” (p. 18). 
 
South Africa, with its growing economy and international diversification, and in an attempt to 
reform the economy, began to relax exchange control. The aim was to get rid of certain 
bottlenecks, encourage growth of businesses and reduce the cost of doing business. This 
approach was part of the liberalisation process. South Africa had taken a gradual approach to 
exchange control liberalisation since 1994. In 1995 the dual exchange rate system was also 
eliminated. The reformation of exchange controls impacted on corporates, financial institutions 
and private individuals, which meant that they were now allowed to invest abroad. The progress 
that has been made towards exchange control relaxation is shown in Table 4.3. 
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Table 4.3: Relaxation of exchange control 
The gradual relaxation of exchange controls since 1995 
A. Foreigners  
• 1995: The financial rand abolished (exchange 
controls on foreigners also abolished). 
D. Companies (including banks) 
• 1997: Offshore direct investments allowed up to R30 million, 
and R40 million for the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
• 1998: Offshore direct investments increased to R50 million 
abroad and R250 million in SADC. 
• 2001: Offshore direct investments increased to R500 million 
abroad and R750 000 in SADC. 
• 2002: Offshore direct investments increased to R2 billion for 
Africa; allowance to be used to fund approved expansion of 
existing offshore direct investments. 
• 2003 Budget: Offshore investment increased to R1 billion 
abroad (excluding Africa); allowance to be used to fund 
approved expansion of existing offshore direct investment. 
Foreign dividends could be repatriated to South Africa and 
be re-exported subject to approval. 
• 2004 Budget: Offshore direct investment limits retained, but 
percentage of excess costs to be funded from South Africa 
raised from 10 to 20 per cent. Foreign entities could list on 
the South African stock and bond exchanges. 
• 2004 Medium-Term Budget Policy Statement (MTBPS): 
Limits on offshore direct investments removed (but 
application still required). South African corporates allowed 
to retain foreign dividends offshore. 
• 2005 MTBPS: South African banks allowed to hold foreign 
assets up to 40 per cent of domestic regulatory capital; non-
African assets could only make up to 20 per cent of the 
40 per cent of domestic regulatory capital, while African 
assets could make up the total 40 per cent. 
• 2006 Budget: Outward direct investment ownership lowered 
from controlling interest (50 per cent +1) to 25 per cent for 
investments in Africa. Developments finance institutions 
could issue loans to non-residents without the requirement 
of a 50 per cent South African content. 
• 2007 Budget: Enabled the JSE Limited to develop a Rand 
Currency Futures Market, enabling South Africans to 
speculate on the currency for the first time. Outward direct 
investment ownership lowered from controlling interest 
(50 per cent +1) to 25 per cent for investments outside 
Africa. CFC accounts streamlined. 
• 2009 Budget: Outward investment raised to R500 million 
from R50 million. 
B. Individuals 
• 1997: Offshore allowance of R200 000 introduced. 
• 1998: Offshore allowance increased to R400 000. 
• 1999: Offshore allowance increased to R500 000. 
• 2000: Offshore allowance increased to R750 0000. 
• 2003: South African emigrants allowed to transfer 
offshore amounts in excess of R750 000 subject to 
a 10 per cent exit levy. Amounts up to R750 000 
were exempt from any change. 
• 2006 Budget: Offshore allowance increased to 
R2 million.  
• 2009: offshore allowance increased by a further 
R2 million. 
C. Institutional investors 
• 1995: Asset swaps introduced to enable foreign 
exposure up to 5 per cent of total assets. 
• 1996: Foreign exposure limit increased from 5 to 
10 per cent of total assets, and institutions could 
acquire offshore portfolio investments up to 3 per 
cent of the net inflow of funds in the previous year. 
• 1997: 10 per cent foreign exposure limit 
maintained, and the above 3 per cent dispensation 
was extended to investment managers. 
• 1998: Foreign exposure limit of 10 per cent 
increased to 15 per cent, and 3 per cent pertaining 
to foreign-currency transfers was increased to 5 
per cent (based on previous year’s net inflow of 
funds). 
• 2000: Foreign exposure limit of 20 per cent and 
15 per cent on total assets for collective 
investment schemes and for the rest of institutions 
respectively.  
• 2001: Asset swaps system abolished. 
• 2003: Restriction based on prior year’s inflow of 
funds removed. 
• 2005 MTBPS: Foreign exposure limit for collective 
investment schemes and investment managers 
increased from 20 per cent to 25 per cent and from 
15 per cent to 25 per cent, of total retail assets 
respectively.  
• 2009: abolishment of 180 day rule which entailed 
businesses changing their foreign currency into 
rand. 
• 2011: Inward listed shares on the JSE are 
classified as domestic. 
Source: National Treasury (2006); Financial Mail (2006). 
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Further liberalisation of exchange controls was implemented in 2009. This included the following 
(National Treasury, 2009;26): 
 
• Foreign offshore allowance for individuals was raised by R2 million, and the single 
discretionary allowance raised by R250 000. 
• South African businesses are permitted to invest in Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) member countries through offshore intermediaries.  
• Outward investment by companies has been raised to R500 million from R50 million. 
• Doing away with the 180-day rule which entailed that businesses had to change their 
foreign currencies into rand. However, proceeds received from exports should be sent 
back to South Africa.  
• Abolishing the advance payment rules for import trades.  
• South African businesses can engage in foreign banking without prior consent.  
 
The intention of the gradual abolition of exchange control was to make South Africa more visible 
to foreign investors, thus making the country more attractive for foreign investment. It was also 
aimed at ensuring that the exchange control framework was in line with current times. A recent 
change to exchange controls can be seen in the inward listing policy. Previously, the inward 
listing policy prohibited South African trusts and companies from investing in inward listing 
entities. This was because South African corporates were not allowed to undertake foreign 
portfolio investments. However, in 2011, the Minister of Finance (Pravin Gordhan) announced 
that all inward listed shares on the stock exchange, the JSE Limited (JSE) would be classified 
as domestic. This proposal would boost investments into Africa through new listings on the JSE 
and companies concerned were likely to experience increased trading in their shares which 
would, in turn, improve liquidity. 
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Although South Africa has made major improvements in removing controls, the foreign-currency 
hedging requirement policy still remains. This policy requires that South African businesses 
trade their foreign currency hedging requirements exclusively through accredited local banks 
and not through overseas financial institutions. This puts South African businesses at a 
disadvantage because (i) the local banks are not price-competitive and (ii) they operate within 
South African business hours. For this reason, South African businesses cannot trade with their 
overseas counterparts outside South African business hours.  
 
4.2.2 The South African financial banking landscape 
 
As mentioned earlier, banks were also affected by the sanctions that were imposed on the 
country. However, once all restrictions were lifted in 1994, foreign banks were once again 
permitted to operate in the country. During that time, South African banks consisted of 35 finally 
registered banks, 2 mutual banks and 4 provisionally registered banks, with minimum capital 
requirements at 8 per cent and prime overdraft rates resulting in a reduced 16,25 per cent. Total 
bank assets in 1994, some of which included money, loans and advances, non-financial assets, 
investment portfolio, non-bank advances and so forth amounted to R344,1 billion (Figure 4.4). 
By the end of 1994 international participation in the local banking sector (i.e., foreign holdings of 
local banks) was at 1,16 per cent of banking sector assets. South African banking competition 
was on the verge of unfolding as local and foreign banks began growing their business on either 
side of the border. 
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Figure 4.4: Growth of total assets and foreign assets in South African banks 
 
Source: SARB (2010a, b) 
 
Ten years after liberalisation, confidence in the financial sector had grown. This is evidenced by 
the foreign composition of total bank assets rising to 9,79 per cent in 2004.  
 
In 1999 a banking crisis erupted in small banks where a number of them exited the banking 
sector or were placed under curatorship. This was due to pressures from the East Asian 
financial crises in 1997, the Russian financial crisis in 1998, liquidity pressures and a lack of 
depositor confidence. The crisis, however, did not negatively impact the local banks’ foreign 
assets since total foreign assets grew by 81 per cent from R3,9 billion in 1994 to R34,4 billion in 
1999. The crisis faded away quite quickly due to the quick action taken by regulators and the 
prudent behaviour of bankers. More importantly, this did not have any negative systemic 
implications for the economy. By 2004, total assets of banks amounted to R1 498,6 billion, a 
huge increase of R1 154,5 billion since 1994 and prime overdraft rates were further reduced to 
11 per cent. The banking sector eased from a state of fragility during the 1990s to a more 
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resilient one in 2004 with a capital adequacy of 13,5 per cent (which is above the minimum 
requirement of 10 per cent) and a total of 36 banking institutions. In 2009 South Africa had a 
total of 31 banking institutions with total assets of the banks amounting to R2 962,6 billion and 
foreign assets of local banks amounting to R378,2 billion.  
 
Furthermore, to have a clearer perspective of the concentration of the banking industry, the 
SARB has implemented the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (H-Index), which takes into 
consideration the number of banks in a system and its size to measure concentration in the 
banking system. A small H-Index indicates greater competition and lower concentration in the 
banking sector, while a high H-Index means weaker competition and higher concentration of a 
banking system. Oligopoly concerns are raised when the index reaches a level of 0,18 (SARB, 
2001a). According to Figure 4.5, in 1994 the H-Index was at 0,165 with the number of bank 
institutions averaging 41. In comparison, by the year 1999, the H-Index was at 0,138, reflecting 
a moderate concentration in the banking system, even though some small banks had exited the 
financial system during the period of the financial crisis. The number of finally registered banks 
was 41 and local branches of foreign banks amounted to 12 in that year. However, ten years 
after liberalisation, that is, in 2004, the index was at 0,182, reflecting a large deterioration from 
the year 1994 to 2004. 
 
This is due to the number of registered banks decreasing to 18 institutions, with 4 of the largest 
banks dominating the banking sector and representing 83,7 per cent of the total banking sector. 
It is obvious that the index of 0,182 exhibits weaker competition. Business is increasing in the 
4 major banks and decreasing in the smaller banks, which therefore leads to the higher 
concentration in the banking system. In 2009 the H-Index was at 0,189, which reflects an almost 
oligopoly supremacy by the 4 major banks in the country. These banks hold a total of 84,6 per 
cent of total banking sector assets. Unfortunately, nothing is being done about the dominance of 
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these large banks. Because the four banks hold such a large part of the total bank assets, even 
if all the small banks were to amalgamate, their total asset value would not match up to the 
large banks.  
 
Figure 4.5: H-Index for South African banking system (1994–2009) 
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Source: SARB (2004b, 2009a, 2010d, 2011). 
 
 
4.2.2.1 Further financial reforms 
 
In view of the adjustments that South Africa experienced, liberalising the domestic financial 
sector meant improving regulations and complying with best practices. Since 1994, the 
regulatory framework has changed as banking activities advanced. The following is an 
explanation of the underlying reasons as to why the regulatory framework has changed:  
  
a) International pressures 
As mentioned earlier, owing to political isolation, international banks were forced to terminate 
their operations in South Africa. After sanctions had been dropped, the Banks Amendment 
Act 26 of 1994 was amended to allow international banks, and representative offices, 
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subsidiaries and branches of these banks to be established in South Africa. As before, these 
banks would have had to start a subsidiary or maintain a representative office. 
 
b) Four-pillar policy 
The four-pillar policy used in South Africa seeks to ensure that the four big banks (which are 
called ‘pillars’) do not merge. This is to prevent anti-competitive behaviour and to minimise risk. 
Similar policies are implemented in countries such as Australia and New Zealand. The four-pillar 
policy in South Africa originated when Nedcor made a bid for Stanbic. In order to ensure a 
minimum number of significant banks in the country, in 2004 the Minister of Finance announced 
that South Africa would maintain a four-pillar policy.  
 
c) Access to finance  
Banks deny many poor South Africans access to finance because of the high levels of risk the 
banks face, such as inadequate securities of individuals, high costs of granting microloans and 
bad debts. Previously, these unbanked South Africans saved money through mostly stokvels, 
burial societies, village banks and credit unions. In order to ensure that the low-income group of 
the market was incorporated into the mainstream economy, the regulatory framework was 
amended to broaden access to finance, and to meet the needs of the unbanked and lower end 
of the market. In 2004 the National Treasury responded by publishing draft legislation in the 
form of (i) a Dedicated Banks Bill and (ii) a Cooperative Banks Bill. These Bills deal with the 
needs of the unbanked. 
 
d) Dedicated Banks Bill 
The aim of the Dedicated Banks Bill (RSA 2004) is to provide affordable banking to the poor, 
and to enhance savings and competition. It addresses the issue of a second-tier banking 
institution and comprises a savings bank, and a savings and loans bank. According to the Bill, 
the difference between a savings bank, and a savings and loans bank is that the savings banks 
123 
 
may accept deposits from the public and open a savings account on behalf of the depositor in 
which he or she can deposit money, withdraw, transfer or make payments, while the savings 
and loans bank will provide all of the functions of the latter, but may include opening a money 
market account, and granting secured and unsecured loans within limits. Furthermore, the entry 
requirements and prudential regulation for these banks are not harsh because they are intended 
to create an enabling environment and to encourage entry into the banking system. 
 
e) Cooperative Banks Bill (now Cooperative Banks Act 40 of 2007) 
The aim of the Cooperative Banks Act 40 of 2007 is to regulate community banks such as the 
stokvels and village banks, so that they can be aligned with the formal banking system. There 
are three tiers to cooperative banks, as stated in the Act: 
 
a. Primary cooperative banks: These will comprise the savings co-operative bank, as well as 
savings and loans cooperative bank. The savings cooperative bank may accept deposits; 
open a savings account and borrow money from its members; make, draw, accept, 
indorse, or negotiate negotiable instruments; provide trust or custody services to 
members; and invest money deposited. The savings and loans cooperative bank may 
provide all of the functions of the latter, including granting secured and unsecured loans 
to its members, and may perform extra banking services and invest depositors as 
approved by the Minister. 
b. Secondary cooperative banks: May provide all of the functions of the savings and loans 
cooperative bank and, furthermore, may trade financial instruments and open a foreign 
currency account.  
c. Tertiary cooperative banks: May provide services as the primary savings and loans 
cooperative bank and the secondary cooperative bank. However, included in these 
services, the Minister or supervisor may give advice to the approach in which they want 
the bank services referred to above to be performed. 
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f) Anti-money laundering 
‘Money laundering’ can be defined as money that has been obtained illegally, usually through 
an act of crime (i.e., terrorism) and where the source of the funds is unknown, appears to be 
legal in the financial system. It is, in other words, illegal money moving through the financial 
system unnoticed. Money laundering is regarded as a threat internationally and as a hindrance 
to the banking system. This is because banking institutions get involved in criminal activities 
unknowingly and this can weaken public confidence, thus threatening the stability of the global 
and domestic banking sector. In keeping abreast of international concerns, South Africa 
implemented the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) 38 of 2001 to address these offences 
and in 2003 became a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which is a body that 
develops policies to combat money laundering. 
 
The Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) (2008/9:11) assists 
 
in the identification of the proceeds from unlawful activities and the combating of money 
laundering activities and, more recently, the financing of terrorism and related activities. FICA 
also introduces a regulatory framework of measures concerning client identification, record-
keeping, reporting of information and internal compliance structures, which apply to a broad 
range of financial and non-financial institutions such as banks, as well as define the anti-money 
laundering responsibilities of supervisory bodies. 
  
In order to maintain the integrity of the financial system and to ensure compliance with FICA, 
banking institutions have made a commitment to implementing the anti-money-laundering 
measures. The SARB issued its first anti-money-laundering circular in December 2002, which 
provides banks with guidelines on how to prevent the movement of illegal proceeds. In 2004 
further consultations between the banks and the Registrar of Banks took place to investigate 
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section 21(2) of FICA which states that accountable institutions are not allowed to transact with 
clients after 30 June 2004, if the client’s identity has not been verified. However, for low money-
laundering risk clients an exemption was made until 30 September 2006 for identification 
verification. Banks have to submit detailed reports of suspicious transactions to the FIC, while 
the SARB monitors the progress of anti-money-laundering measures. The FIC then makes 
referrals to the law enforcement authorities on suspicious transactions so that further 
investigations are conducted. In 2008–9, for example, the total number of suspicious 
transactions amounted to 112 829, with a 22 per cent increase in recommendations to law 
enforcement authorities. These referrals had a value of about R6 billion (FIC, 2009). In 2010–11 
suspicious transactions increased to 179 230 with the majority of the transactions emanating 
from financial bodies. The FIC froze over R6,7 million in bank accounts (FIC, 2010–11). 
 
Furthermore, in 2006 the BCBS revised Principle 18 of its Core Principles on Banking 
Supervision (Core Principles) to include aspects of anti-money laundering and the fight against 
the funding of terrorism. Compliance with Principle 18 requires guidelines for the supervisors in 
monitoring or managing the banks’ internal controls (SARB, 2008).  
 
g) National Payment System 
In the past South Africa operated its settlement system manually. South Africa’s reintegration 
into the global markets exposed the country to risks associated with the payment system, such 
as credit and liquidity risks. South Africa was therefore obligated to ensure that its payment and 
settlement system conformed to international best practice. Hence, a settlement system with 
real-time gross settlement (RTGS) was developed, which provides a facility for banks and 
customers to settle their obligations immediately. The South African Multiple Option Settlement 
(SAMOS) System was developed in 1998, which put the country in line with the most modern 
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and sophisticated payment systems globally, and ensured that it could transact with ease, even 
at an international level. 
 
Stemming from this, the South African Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1989 had to be amended to 
include section 10(1)(C) so that it could officially oversee the national payment system (NPS). In 
addition, an NPS legal framework was developed resulting in, among other things, the NPS Act 
78 of 1998 which assisted with the regulation, supervision and management of the payment and 
settlement system. At an international level, the payment and settlement system transacts 
through the Continuous Link Settlement System (CLS). The aim of the CLS is to settle foreign-
exchange operations across various time zones in CLS currencies. According to the SARB 
(2005:18), “CLS currencies include Australian dollar, Canadian dollar, Danish krone, Euro, Hong 
Kong dollar, Japanese yen, Korean won, New Zealand dollar, Norwegian krone, GB pound, 
Singapore dollar, Swedish krona, Swiss franc and US dollar”. The NPS Act was amended in 
2004 to include the rand as part of the CLS currencies. The value of transactions associated 
with the rand has improved since 2004, showing a 17 per cent growth rate. However, by the end 
of 2008 the number of transactions decreased to 7 per cent due to the recent financial crisis. In 
2008, owing to volatility, the transactions that were settled averaged R296 billion (SARB, 
2009b:36).  
 
h) Basel II 
The regulatory framework also changed due to the upgrade from Basel I to Basel II. South 
Africa decided to implement Basel II in 2008, not only because it was necessary to adhere to 
international rules, but also because of the changing environment such as globalisation, the 
development of new financial products and technological advances. In addition, the 
implementation of Basel II will ensure better supervision, risk management, transparency, and 
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the safety and soundness of the banking system. Furthermore, South Africa will gain 
economically through its international position and credibility.  
 
Before the implementation of Basel II, in order to ensure effective execution of Basel II, the 
SARB created an Accord Implementation Forum (AIF) consisting of a Steering Committee and 
subcommittees. These subcommittees addressed the impact of Basel Pillars 1, 2 and 3 in the 
economy, and were responsible for developing a new regulatory framework to integrate Basel II. 
The AIF put forward revisions to the Banks Act 89 of 1990 (the Banks Act, 1990) and 
amendments to the Regulations under the Banks Act, 1990 to the Minister of Finance for his 
approval. Some of the amendments to the Banks Act, 1990 are as follows:  
 
• Supervisory responsibilities and publication of information of the Registrar of Banks: 
where, for example, the Registrar is responsible for the publication of specific resolution 
that applies to bank submissions in terms of the Banks Act 1990 and maintaining a record 
of all banks details which previously was not a requirement.  
• Minimum share capital and reserve fund: Where bank laws ensure that capital 
requirements as per Basel II is adhered to. 
• Shares, debentures and negotiable certificates of deposit (NCDs): Because NCDs and 
promissory notes have like qualities and attributes; included in the Banks Act 1990 
section 79 and Section 79(1)(C ) are the words “negotiable certificates of deposit, 
promissory notes or instruments of similar characteristics” to make better distinctions 
when issuing securities. 
• Approval of eligible institutions: Where credit rating agencies should get consent from the 
Registrar of Banks before their evaluations are used by the banks to estimate regulatory 
capital. 
• Verification of information: Where the Registrar of Banks may require information 
submitted by banks to be validated. (SARB, 2007:52–3.) 
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Overall, in order to comply with international standards, South Africa has implemented Basel II 
through the Banks Amendment Act 20 of 2007 so that capital in relation to risks can be 
managed effectively; in other words, the Banks Amendment Act 20 of 2007 necessitates the 
execution of Basel II by ensuring the following: 
 
• Clarity on the roles and responsibilities of the members of the banking institutions, such 
as the board of directors 
• Effective reporting and disclosure standards 
• Banks should have a choice when estimating minimum capital requirements for market 
risk, operational risk and credit risk exposures 
• Management has reserved adequate capital for all the business risks of the bank 
beyond minimum requirements. 
 
i) How did Basel II affect the banks? 
 
• No existing skills base and upgrade of data 
 
Implementing Basel II meant that there should be consistency in the approach to 
risk management among all banks, both internationally and domestically. As a 
result, banks’ data needed to be improved in the sense that the quality and level 
of detail of their data had to be enhanced. Previously, the data that banks used 
for their operations was adequate, but with the execution of the new accord, the 
data had to be upgraded so that they could be used for the purpose of analysis. 
Implementing Basel II was not only a costly affair for the banks, but also an 
agonising experience. There was no existing skills base that the banks could 
exploit due to, in some cases, the new leading-edge technology that needed to 
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be used. As a result, local skills had to be enhanced and developed on the job 
with the aid of international experience during the implementation of Basel II. 
 
• The three pillars 
 
As mentioned earlier, in South Africa Basel II was implemented in January 2008 
so that banks could use the capital-adequacy framework to benchmark their 
capital and risk management practices. What follows is an indication of how the 
banks responded to Basel II according to the three pillars: 
 
Pillar 1: Minimum capital requirement: As a minimum, capital requirement 
focuses on risk to economic loss, the four big banks obtained accreditation from 
the SARB and adopted the following risk approaches in 2008: 
 
Table 4.4: Risk approach by the four big banks  
Risk Nedbank Group Absa Group 
Standard Bank 
Group 
FirstRand 
Banking Group 
Credit risk AIRB IRB AIRB AIRB 
Market risk VaR Internal model Internal model Internal model 
Operational risk Standardised approach AMA 
Standardised 
approach 
Standardised 
approach 
Sources:  Absa Group (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010); FirstRand Banking Group (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010), 
 Nedbank Group (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010), Standard Bank Group (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010) 
 
To recap on the various risk measurements from Chapter 3: 
 
− IRB approach: In this method banks use an individual risk model to 
determine the probability of default. 
− AIRB approach: In this approach banks use their own internal measures of 
credit risk as primary inputs to capital calculation.  
− VaR: Is used to determine risk of loss of a particular asset. 
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− Standardised approach: Is used for minimum operational risk exposure. 
− AMA: Is more risk-sensitive and caters for internationally active banks and 
banks that are largely exposed to operational risks.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4.4, for credit risk, most of the banks adopted the AIRB 
approach. The AIRB is most complex and ensures that banks use their own 
methods for calculating credit risk. For market risk only, the Nedbank Group uses 
the VaR method and only the Absa Group uses the AMA method for operational 
risk. All in all, the four big banks have successfully adopted Pillar 1 of Basel II. 
 
Pillar 2: Supervisory approach (capital-adequacy ratio): Since all registered banks 
are compelled to comply with the SARB regulations, one of the requirements is 
for banks to adhere to a minimum capital-adequacy ratio, which is a ratio of the 
bank’s capital to its risk-weighted assets. This ratio is measured via Core Tier 1 
Capital; Tier 1 Capital and Total Capital. The Nedbank Group (2009a) defines 
these capitals as follows:  
 
− Tier 1 Capital is defined as primary capital consisting of issued ordinary share 
capital and perpetual preference share capital, qualifying perpetual callable 
hybrid capital, retained earnings and reserves, less regulatory deductions. 
− Core Tier 1 Capital is defined as primary capital less any amount on non-core 
Tier 1 capital, being perpetual preference share capital and qualifying perpetual 
callable hybrid capital. 
− Total Capital is defined as the capital adequacy ratio, which includes 
unappropriated profit at year-end. 
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The minimum requirements for the capital-adequacy ratio lie in the Tier 1 capital 
ratio of 7,0 per cent and total capital ratio of 9,5 per cent. In South Africa all four 
of the big banks have successfully adopted Basel II and are well capitalised. This 
is evidenced by Table 4.5, which reflects how the four big banks were capitalised 
before and after Basel II: 
 
Table 4.5: Capitalisation of the four big banks in South Africa 
Total capital-adequacy ratio
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011* 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011*
Nedbank Group 7.90% 9.80% 11.70% 11.70% 12.40% 6.80% 8.00% 9.60% 10.10% 10.70%
Absa Group 9.20% 11.60% 12.70% 12.80% 13.90% 13.10% 14.10% 15.60% 15.50% 16.70%
Standard Bank Group 8.50% 9.30% 10.60% 11.50% 12.40% 11.70% 12.20% 14.10% 14.90% 14.80%
FirstRand Banking Group 10.70% 11.10% 12.33% 13.50% 15.00% 13.60% 13.70% 14.57% 15.60% 16.50%
Actual Tier 1 ratio
 
         
Sources:  Absa Group (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011); FirstRand Banking Group (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011),  
Nedbank Group (2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011), Standard Bank Group (2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 
2011) 
* June interim annual results 
 
Table 4.5 shows that even during the adoption of Basel I, three of the four big 
banks’ capital-adequacy ratio was above the minimum requirement of 8 per cent. 
For example, in 2007 FirstRand Banking Group’s Tier 1 capital ratio was 10,7 per 
cent and its total capital-adequacy ratio was 13,60 per cent. Nedbank Group’s 
total capital-adequacy ratio at that time was 6,80 per cent, which was below the 
minimum requirement. However, the majority of the major banks took the stance 
to provide an extra capital buffer which instilled confidence in their clients. During 
2008, when Basel II was first implemented, banks were capitalised above the 
regulatory capital. For example, Absa Group’s Tier 1 capital ratio was 11,60 per 
cent and Standard Bank Group’s total capital adequacy was 12,20 per cent. In 
2009 all four banks’ Tier 1 ratio and total capital-adequacy ratio was more than 
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the required minimum. Overall, the four big banks are well capitalised and in a 
good position to guard against risks. As regards Basel III requirements, in 2010 
Tier 1 capital for all four major banks was above the new Basel capital 
requirements on a pro forma basis: for example, Nedbank Group’s and FirstRand 
Banking Group’s Tier 1 capital ratio was 11,7 per cent and 13,5 per cent 
respectively, and Absa Group’s and Standard Bank Group’s total capital-
adequacy ratios were 15,5 per cent and 14,9 per cent respectively. The 2011 
interim results for all four banks also shows that the banks are preparing for the 
implementation of Basel III within the timelines required. This will ensure that the 
financial markets are sound and that financial stability is enhanced. The Standard 
Bank Group, for example, has participated in the SARB’s Basel III quantitative 
impact study which shows a reduction in the group’s capital-adequacy ratios. 
However, the group is currently working towards being well capitalised for the full 
Basel III implementation. 
 
Pillar 3: Market discipline: The aim of Pillar 3 of the Capital Accord is to support 
Pillars 1 and 2 so that key information is assessed and is in line with the other 
two pillars. According to the banking regulations (RSA, 2008), banks have to 
disclose certain information publically. Regulation 43(1)(e)(ii) of the Regulations 
relating to Banks states that information to be disclosed to the public should 
include 
− primary capital, including the primary capital adequacy ratio; 
− total capital, including the total capital adequacy ratio; 
− the components of capital; 
− the total required amount of capital and reserve funds; and 
− any risk exposure or other item that is subject to rapid or material change. 
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All four of the big banks comply with Pillar 3 of Basel II and ensure that their 
information is disclosed to the public semi-annually. Some banks, for example 
Absa, sometimes disclose information beyond the requirements of the 
Regulations relating to Banks. 
 
The implementation of Basel II is a success in the South African financial system. 
Although there was a slowdown in economic activity due to the subprime mortgage 
crisis, on the whole, the banking business remained robust, generating strong 
financial performance. With the implementation of Basel II, banks agreed that it 
brought about a more cyclical nature in capital requirements compared to Basel I. 
“The cyclicality is driven by external factors that affect the banks’ risk measures 
across various portfolios which eventually drive its capital requirements” 
(FirstRand, 2009:23). As a result, banks ensure that they are well capitalised by 
even going beyond their required minimum: for example, the implementation of 
Basel II had a small impact on FirstRand Group’s capital ratio; hence it increased its 
target capital ratios from 9,25 to 10 per cent. Furthermore, Basel III now addresses 
procyclicality through a capital conservation buffer of 2,5 per cent and a 
countercyclical buffer of 0 to 2,5 per cent. However, the Basel III liquidity rules 
(discussed in Chapter 3) is a concern to banks as it can derail a bank’s business 
model due to the large sum of liquid assets it will have to hold, as too-large an 
amount can lead to the collapse of the bank’s business. 
  
j) Basel III 
Although the IMF (2010c:4) has commended the SARB for its “early adoption and full 
implementation of the Basel II framework in an emerging market environment on 
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1 January 2008, and its continuous efforts to remain in line with subsequent international 
developments”, the implementation of Basel III is putting pressure on banks in South Africa. 
Previously, with Basel II, banks were assessed using only one capital ratio, but the 
implementation of Basel III now requires banks to be assessed using up to seven capital ratios. 
Banks are further pressurised by the threats of rising costs which is driven mostly by the 
looming economic environment, complex information technology systems and the need for more 
staff and profitability squeeze. Basel III also calls for risk management and sound compliance 
programmes on an enterprise level. Thus banks need to ensure that they have the correct 
systems to support compliance. But compliance within the banks is also proving to be 
challenging due to different management of the same data across different division in the same 
bank. The need to manage data adequately is now more important because of the number of 
capital ratios that needs to be implemented across multiple jurisdictions and across individual 
banks. Compliance with Basel III requires large amounts of data thus banks need to break down 
the silos and homogenise data. This will in the long term, improve the efficiency of the banks 
business and prevent risks and will offset the strain on profits as a result of Basel III and make 
the implementation of Basel III easier. 
 
k) Twin peak regulation 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, twin peak regulation is when prudential regulation and market 
conduct regulation are separated, in that the central bank overseas potentially systemic 
institutions, and the oversight of the payment and settlement systems, while the business 
regulator is responsible for the conduct of business across the financial system. In his 2011 
budget speech the Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, announced that South Africa’s financial 
regulation should be reformed to include a twin peak system of regulation. Thus “South Africa 
will adopt a system-wide approach to financial stability and regulation, bolster the supervision of 
individual institutions, and ensure better coordination and information sharing. The scope of 
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regulation will also be extended to cover presently unregulated financial activities that have the 
potential to create systemic risks to financial stability” (National Treasury, 2011:23). 
 
l) National Credit Act 34 of 2005 
 
Before the implementation of the NCA South African consumers were exploited by 
microlenders, debt collectors, credit providers and so forth. Consumers were burdened with 
over-indebtedness, soaring cost of credit and outdated legislation. To address these issues, the 
NCA was promulgated in 2005 which replaced the old outdated South African consumer credit 
legislation. This legislation replaced the Usury Act; the Credit Agreements Act 74 of 1980: and 
the Exemption Notices, 1992 and 1999, which regulated microlending transactions. 
 
The aim of the NCA is to regulate institutions that provide credit and to control credit 
transactions in order to curb reckless behaviour by credit providers. Most importantly, the NCA 
ensures that consumers are protected and well informed when entering into a credit transaction. 
Accordingly, the purpose of the Act is to encourage a transparent, observable, competitive and 
responsible credit market by 
 
• promoting the development of a credit market that is accessible to all South Africans, and, 
in particular, to those who have historically been unable to access credit under 
sustainable market conditions; 
• ensuring consistent treatment of different credit products and different credit providers; 
• promoting responsibility in the credit market; 
• promoting equity in the credit market by balancing the respective rights and 
responsibilities of credit providers and consumers; 
• addressing and correcting imbalances in negotiating power between consumers and 
credit providers;  
• improving consumer credit information and reporting and regulation of credit bureaux; 
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• addressing and preventing over-indebtedness of consumers, and providing mechanisms 
for resolving over-indebtedness based on the principle of satisfaction by the consumer of 
all responsible financial obligations; 
• providing for a consistent and accessible system of consensual resolution of disputes 
arising from credit agreements; and 
• providing for a consistent and harmonised system of debt restructuring, enforcement and 
judgment, which places priority on the eventual satisfaction of all responsible consumer 
obligations under credit agreements. (RSA, 2007.)  
 
All institutions that provide credit will have to comply with the NCA, which came into effect in 
2007; this also includes banks. Many banks invested in resources to ensure compliance with the 
Act: for example, banks invested in training for the purpose of educating consumers and limiting 
over-indebtedness. In addition, banks ensure that customers who are over-indebted are 
rehabilitated, first via counselling, advice and debt consolidation, instead of taking corrective 
actions against them. According to the NCR (2009), 130 000 consumers had applied for debt 
counselling and the total value of new credit granted declined by 1,83 per cent from 
R51,87 billion in March 2009 to R50,93 billion in the second quarter ended June 2009. Table 4.6 
shows the credit standing of consumers since the inception of the NCA.  
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Table 4.6: Consumers’ credit standing  
 
Credit Standing of Consumers  Credit Bureau Monitor- National Credit Regulator
Jun-09 Sep-09 Dec-09 Mar-10 Jun-10 Sep-10 Dec-10 Mar-11 Jun-11 Sep-11
Good 
standing 9,94m 9,92m 9,89m 9,84m 9,73m 9,86m 9,90m 9,97m 10,04m 10,27m
Good 
standing 55.9% 55.1% 54.7% 54.0% 53.1% 53.7% 53.5% 53.6% 53.3% 53.8%
Impaired 
records 7,85m 8,09m 8,18m 8,37m 8,59m 8,49m 8,61m 8,63m 8,80m 8,83m
Impaired 
records 44.1% 44.9% 45.3% 46.0% 46.9% 46.3% 46.5% 46.4% 46.7% 46.2%
 
Source: NCR (2011) 
 
Credit-active consumers are consumers who have a credit obligation in the form of payments in 
arrears for three months or more (i.e., impaired records) and those whose credit account is on 
par with payments or those who have not missed more than one or two payments (i.e., good 
standing). In June 2009 the total number of credit-active consumers amounted to 17,79 million. 
However, this number grew to 19,10 million in September 2011. Of the credit-active consumers, 
impaired records increased from 44,1 per cent in June 2009 to 46,2 per cent in 
September 2011. In addition, consumers with good standing decreased from 55,9 per cent in 
June 2009 to 53,8 per cent in September 2011. This effect is due to many causes, such as the 
increase in food prices, high electricity prices and increases in fuel prices, which made it difficult 
for households to pay their debts. Furthermore, banks increased their credit requirements due to 
increased risks of bad debts as a result of the recession.  
 
The NCA generally contributes to a more efficient credit market, which ensures that consumer 
credit information is maintained. This contributes to more responsible credit granting. The NCA 
also ensures that consumers are conscious of their rights and are not deceived by credit 
providers.  
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4.3 Conclusion 
The implementation of sanctions in South Africa had affected the country’s economic 
performance. It led to large withdrawals of foreign capital and disinvestments by foreign 
companies. Since South Africa’s reintegration into the global economy, the country has 
improved its economic policies, amended its legal and regulatory framework, and developed its 
financial infrastructure in order to strengthen the domestic and financial sector, and to be in line 
with international best practice.  
 
However, South Africa adopted its policies in a structured fashion where it reformed existing 
policies first before opening up the economy to foreign competition. The idea behind this was to 
allow existing financial institutions to be familiar with the changes in the economy, to safeguard 
systemic stability and to boost growth opportunities within the economy.  
 
The new reformed policies that South Africa implemented, such as the NPS, anti-money 
laundering and the Basel accords, were implemented with prudence: for example, banks 
adopted a cautious stance by running Basel II parallel with Basel I before the final 
implementation of Basel II in 2008. Although the implementation of Basel III will be a challenging 
one, financial institutions are already testing their capabilities through early participation of the 
quantitative impact studies set by the SARB and BIS. Furthermore, the transformation of the 
financial sector to adoption of the new twin peaks regulation will contain systemic risks through 
enhanced regulation.  
 
The liberalisation of exchange control, as illustrated in Table 4.3, was executed in a sequential 
manner. The new policies were seen as a method to boost domestic and global competition, 
and to widen the scope for FDIs, the result of which led to better FDI inflows, GDP performance 
and trade.  
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South Africa’s experience of implementing reformed policies has proved that this method of 
implementing policies has contributed to enhancing macroeconomic stabilisation and reducing 
the effects of shocks in the economy. Through policy adjustments South Africa has therefore 
managed to bring about a better-regulated financial system, eliminate macroeconomic 
imbalances and ensure efficient financial institutions.  
 
Although South Africa has made major improvements in its liberalisation strategy, the country is 
still not completely liberalised due to a few bottlenecks that prevail, such as the foreign currency 
hedging requirements as governed by exchange control regulations. However, it is hoped that in 
due course the gradual abolition of exchange controls will ensure complete liberalisation of the 
country. 
 
Nevertheless, the effects of liberalisation in South Africa were positive. South Africa’s financial 
markets have moved from being government-led to being market-led, reaping the benefits of 
liberalisation. This is as a result of the timely and gradual implementation of policies as well as 
the opportunity of global firms to access the domestic financial markets and vice versa. 
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Chapter 5 
Findings, recommendations and conclusions  
The findings of this research show that the need for regulation is important in any economy but 
the manner in which it is conducted determines how the financial system is managed: for 
example, repressive financial policies lead to limited economic growth, increased market 
inefficiencies and heightened economic costs. More market-friendly policies can lead to greater 
competition and more efficient markets.  
 
Patnaik’s (2011) detailed definition of financial liberalisation states that 
 
the term financial liberalisation is used to cover a whole set of measures, such as the autonomy 
of the central bank from the government; the complete freedom of finance to move into and out 
of the economy, which implies the full convertibility of the currency; the abandonment of all 
“priority sector” lending targets; an end to government-imposed differential interest rate 
schemes; a freeing of interest rates; the complete freedom of banks to pursue profits 
unhindered by government directives; the removal of restrictions on the ownership of banks, 
which means de-nationalisation and full freedom for foreign ownership. 
 
Ghosh (2005) associates financial liberalisation with “measures that are designed to make the 
central bank more independent, relieve ‘financial repression’ by freeing interest rates and 
allowing financial innovation, and reduce directed and subsidized credit, as well as allow greater 
freedom in terms of external flows of capital in various forms”.  
 
Taking into consideration the definition of liberalisation, why is policy updates so important in 
liberalisation?  
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Liberalisation is important in an economy even though there are signs that the after-effects can 
destabilise an economy. Financial liberalisation in some emerging market economies has 
proven to be disastrous if proper measures such as prudential regulation and supervision, and 
new policies for regulation are not considered before liberalisation, as in the case of the East 
Asian crisis. Thus financial liberalisation, combined with a lack of policy and procedures, has 
brought about a more careful consideration of regulation and standards. 
 
Financial liberalisation introduces increased competition in an economy. Safeguarding systemic 
stability is therefore important. Thus better corporate governance, transparency, risk 
management techniques and sounder institutions are key to a more efficient and robust market. 
In addition, macroeconomic reforms should be combined with prudential and supervisory rules 
to ensure a resilient domestic financial system. 
 
Even though liberalisation has positive benefits, which include wider competition in the markets, 
an increase in economic growth, FDIs, implementation of best practices, better institutional 
frameworks and higher living standards, negative effects also exist. If liberalisation is not 
properly implemented, then the outcome results in undernourished domestic industries (which 
are a consequence of the presence of powerful foreign institutions), instability within the 
financial sector, excessive risk-taking, unfamiliar practices, risk of contagion and volatility in the 
domestic markets. 
 
However, the long-term gains of liberalisation certainly supersede its short-term instability. 
Accordingly, liberalisation should be focused on a long-term view. Therefore, when making the 
regulatory changes and preparations for opening up the market, it should be done in an orderly, 
timely and well-sequenced manner with adequate structural reforms, such as the 
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implementation of robust regulatory and supervisory frameworks, which work hand in hand with 
the country’s specific environment and which will also limit the impact of a crisis.  
 
Thus for more effective financial liberalisation the following measures should be adopted:  
 
• Sequencing, which will strengthen the market structure and ensure a less-complicated 
liberalisation process. 
• Appropriate macroeconomic reforms and exchange rate policies should be in place 
before liberalising capital accounts, and capital flows should be long term and not 
easily reversible to avoid crises. 
• A flexible exchange rate can be more effective and better able to absorb shocks if it is 
accompanied by good fiscal policies and inflation targeting. 
• Monetary policies should be aimed at stabilising inflation and preventing volatile 
markets, and central banks should be transparent and accountable so that the public is 
aware of the goals of monetary policy.  
• Policies should be flexible so that new developments, technology and structural 
changes are not stifled and competition is promoted.  
 
But these steps to liberalisation do not guarantee that countries will not experience a financial 
crisis unless regulation is constantly updated on the domestic front and policies are harmonised 
on the international front. South Africa is a good example of this where on the domestic front it 
reformed existing policies first before opening up the economy to foreign competition to allow 
existing financial institutions to be familiar with the changes in the economy, to safeguard 
systemic stability and to boost growth opportunities in the economy. On the international front, 
South African banks, for example, adopted a cautious stance by running Basel II parallel with 
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Basel I before the final implementation of Basel II in 2008 which was beneficial during the global 
economic crisis. 
 
What is interesting to note is that regulatory practices, combined with the efforts made to 
liberalise, have ensured that developed and emerging market economies have integrated more 
closely. However, the question now arises whether these practices will provide more protection 
from crises than in the past. New policies and updates to the financial safety net calls for 
supervisors and managers to be more prudent in order to prevent problems such as that of the 
East Asian and the US subprime mortgage crisis. Financial crises have transformed from 
“country crises” to “systemic crises”, as can be seen from the occurrence of the Asian crises 
and the more recent subprime crisis. As regards the East Asian crisis, liberalisation was one of 
the factors that contributed to the impact and spread of the crisis. In the US subprime mortgage 
crisis bad monitoring, and a lack of risk management and regulation exacerbated the crisis. In 
the recent global economic crisis, although some countries (e.g., the US and EU) had been 
liberalised decades ago, their inconsistencies with international policy updates led to the 
financial crisis.  
 
Thus it is clear that financial liberalisation, combined with a lack of updated financial policies, 
has brought about a more careful consideration of regulation and standards. Liberalisation and 
a continuous update on regulation due to changing times are important means to maintain 
systemic stability within any economy. 
 
For further research, since banks have the ability to cause instability in the economy as in the 
case of the East Asian crisis and current global economic crisis, the implementation of Basel III 
is not going to be plain sailing in most emerging market economies. Moreover, compliance with 
Basel III requires large amounts of data because of the number of capital ratios that need to be 
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implemented. In South African banks, since many of the big banks’ data are in silos, the same 
data seems to be managed differently across different divisions in the same bank. To safeguard 
systemic stability and avoid any disappointment, banks need to break down the silos and 
homogenise data thus ensuring better management of banking data, banking businesses and 
processes.  
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